fix(managed): guard dropped-UID queue ownership inspection

Require effective SYS_PTRACE only for native owned workers and distinguish denied FD inspection from foreign queue ownership. Keep inode proof authoritative and constrain deployment to its private PID namespace.

Co-authored-by: GPT-6 <gpt-6@openai.com>
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ZeusinaandGPT-6 Bot committed 2026-10-11 21:48:06 +03:00
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@@ -113,10 +113,20 @@ password before starting child processes.
The dedicated bridge is not shared with existing services. No host networking,
Docker socket, existing mounts, host Lua/fakes or privileged mode; all
capabilities are dropped except `NET_ADMIN`, `NET_RAW`, `SETUID`, `SETGID`, `KILL`.
capabilities are dropped except `NET_ADMIN`, `NET_RAW`, `SETUID`, `SETGID`, `KILL`,
`SYS_PTRACE`.
`NET_ADMIN` covers nft/NFQUEUE; `NET_RAW` covers nfqws2 raw sends. Zapret2's
`nfqws2 --user=tpws` needs `SETUID`/`SETGID` for UID/GID switching.
`KILL` allows bounded cleanup of workers that have dropped their UID.
`SYS_PTRACE` permits inspecting socket FD symlinks of privilege-dropped,
nondumpable nfqws workers to prove NFQUEUE ownership by inode. The native owned
worker path fails fast without effective `KILL`, `NET_ADMIN` and `SYS_PTRACE`;
legacy modes do not gain this requirement. Permission denial is an inspection
failure, not evidence that another process owns the queue.
This capability is confined to the target's **private PID namespace**: never
use host or shared/container PID namespaces. It does not grant inspection of
broader host processes. The full service/adaptive hardware gate remains
**pending**, not PASS; this ownership fix alone does not qualify it.
Startup order: ss-server/ss-local → listener 1080 → guarded managed init on
fresh state → `managed reconcile` on every startup → target-local `zapret2 start`