docs: record DoH outage and live validation
Co-authored-by: GPT-6 <gpt-6@openai.com>
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@@ -1,5 +1,42 @@
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# Fresh managed-test target contract (isolated acceptance, not production approval)
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## Managed DoH live acceptance (2026-10-13): DNS verified, NOT READY
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Supplied verified reports bind source `544dda7c85965fc3200de3af17fca9ef9999b2ce`
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(DoH `367d956`, TCP deadline `721cad4`, public-health `socks5h` fix `544dda7`)
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to image `sha256:b3085b7ceca4a629c28bd58f23bf97f02a34c2a38df08b57756e40594ba2d427`,
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container `4ad54175a54c`, owned SOCKS `127.0.0.1:11082`.
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The 303-second LIVE snapshot retained root/DNS22/SS59,60/monitor253 PIDs,
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children PPID1, owned readiness ACK and parent FD8/9 anchors. UDP/TCP DNS
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IDs/questions matched, rcode0, answers2/8; SOCKS `0500`, WWW HTTP200/SSL0
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and configured `health youtube` exit0 passed. Wire evidence: 41 marked direct
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DoH connections, zero external port53. Scope `suffix`, generation9, IDs `[1,9]`
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and hash preservation versus staging are measured snapshots, not universal
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state; autonomous updates have occurred since the earlier generation8 snapshot.
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In isolated staging, blocking both bootstrap IPs for 61 seconds returned
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UDP/TCP SERVFAIL/rcode2 at about 5000ms without changing root, DNS, SS or monitor
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PIDs or sending external port53 traffic. DNS recovered immediately after removal;
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WWW HTTP200 passed after 46 seconds without restart. Graceful stop: 1 second,
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exit0, no survivors. Staging nft fault rules were removed; this is a tested DNS
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dependency failure, not all-outage or nonconfiguration-guard acceptance.
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No new runtime firewall policy beyond normal generated native rules is supplied.
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Existing shared GGC qualification is separate evidence, not an 18-transfer rerun
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under DoH. Fresh TLS1.3 media: HTTP206/65536 bytes/MP4 `ftyp`/SSL0; TLS1.2
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TIMEOUT is not qualified. Avatar/thumbnail qualification remains independently
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outstanding; no whole-service READY claim. Historical media results below do
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not close these gates on this image. Generic service integration and maximum
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strategy collection remain future work, without a new policy framework.
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Private supplied reports (not reread here):
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`/home/agent/zapret2-autotune-rc-doh-721cad4/live-upgrade-private/`, then latest
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`/home/agent/zapret2-autotune-rc-doh-544dda7/live-upgrade-private/`.
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No deployment/probes accompany this docs update; later docs are not tested source.
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State/credentials/private env were preserved, staging containers removed, old
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user SS1080 and user-stopped proxy unchanged. See the deployment guide for the
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four DNS settings, LIVE env location, privacy boundary and recreation lifecycle.
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## Autonomous three-CDN acceptance (2026-10-13): media qualified, NOT READY
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Supplied field results bind source `3fc8563995e890310580ba8f78850b92fea42136`
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@@ -73,7 +110,7 @@ must supply all of the following before any managed command can run:
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| `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_TARGET_DIR` | `/var/lib/zapret-autotune/target` |
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| `ZAPRET_CONFIG` | `/var/lib/zapret-autotune/target/config` |
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| `SOCKS_PORT` | Base image's actual ss-local service port (canonical decimal, 1–65535) |
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| `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_SOCKS_PROXY` | `socks5://127.0.0.1:$SOCKS_PORT` (expanded value) |
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| `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_SOCKS_PROXY` | `socks5h://127.0.0.1:$SOCKS_PORT` (expanded value; legacy `socks5` validated and canonicalized internally) |
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The fixed directory must already be a private runtime-user-owned **dedicated
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persistent volume mountpoint**, not just a directory under another mount.
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@@ -222,9 +259,9 @@ DB/safety/journal/runner failures stop nonzero; joined cancellation plus a clean
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failure is also fatal. A qualified frontend at startup is probed immediately,
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not rescanned merely because the process restarted.
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Entrypoint ordering is SS children → listener → fresh managed init if needed → managed reconcile → zapret start
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Entrypoint ordering is owned DNS readiness (default DoH) → SS children → listener → fresh managed init if needed → managed reconcile → zapret start
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→ one installed `/usr/local/bin/zapret-autotune managed monitor` child. It supervises
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all three children; unexpected monitor exit is not a successful shutdown.
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the DNS, SS and monitor children; unexpected monitor exit is not a successful shutdown.
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SIGTERM/SIGINT cancels and waits the monitor before target-local zapret stop and
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SS child termination/wait. Existing targets and Xray remain unchanged. Deployment
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allows 240s Compose shutdown grace for bounded
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@@ -362,10 +399,11 @@ signed ordinary media host samples are required; multiple VideoIDs may yield one
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CDN host and leave `DEGRADED` with no authorized suffix. Sampled thumbnail/avatar
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routes do not prove availability of the whole thumbnail pool. The reported
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`8.8.8.8` DNS diagnostic corrected a tampered avatar, not all thumbnail routes;
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native DNS correction is not full asset availability proof. Target DNS uses
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validated native `-d` argv (nonsecret), with installed-option support checked
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at image build; passwords remain private JSON only. No DoH bridge, permanent
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Google IP pins, global host DNS edits or external startup manager are introduced.
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native DNS correction is not full asset availability proof. Default DoH uses
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SS `-d 127.0.0.1:5353`; explicit native mode uses validated literal `-d` argv,
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with installed-option support checked at image build. Passwords remain private
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JSON only. No permanent service IP pins, global host DNS edits or external
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startup manager are introduced.
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### Supervision and failure handling
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@@ -379,13 +417,16 @@ errors never authorize retry. No new dependency, host service installation or
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external process manager is required. SIGTERM/SIGINT cancels backoff or the running
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monitor, waits for bounded restoration and joins children before exit.
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In default DoH mode PID 1 first starts the Go UDP/TCP loopback DNS forwarder,
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In default DoH mode PID 1 first starts the stdlib UDP/TCP loopback DNS forwarder
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inside the existing Go binary (no dependency or new container),
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waits at most five seconds for its owned private PID marker, and only then starts
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ss-server with `-d 127.0.0.1:5353`. No host DNS port or DNS/iptables changes are
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made. Hostname SOCKS traffic and managed `socks5h` checks use the same encrypted
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HTTPS resolver; clients must enable remote SOCKS DNS, not resolve locally or
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send IP literals. Bootstrap uses configured literal IPs with verified TLS and
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marked direct sockets excluding probe/live NFQUEUE. Endpoint failures produce
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mark `0x50000000` direct sockets excluding probe/live NFQUEUE, with no system DNS, proxy
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or plaintext fallback. The DoH resolver sees queries directly, not SS-tunneled;
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the plaintext helper exchange stays on loopback5353. Endpoint failures produce
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SERVFAIL without child exit or plaintext fallback. A forwarder crash, unlike an
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upstream outage, uses the same bounded technical retry budget. The DNS child
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stays alive through monitor restoration, zapret stop and SS joins; it is then
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@@ -393,7 +434,8 @@ terminated/joined within five seconds and only its validated readiness inode is
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removed using PID1-held directory/file anchors. Foreign/stale/replaced readiness
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is preserved and vetoes startup/retry; SIGKILL does not lose owned cleanup proof. Explicit
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native mode has no DNS child. See the deployment README for provider settings
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and scope limits. New DoH runtime acceptance remains pending.
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and scope limits. Supplied staged-outage and LIVE DNS acceptance are recorded
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above; they do not establish all-outage resilience or whole-service readiness.
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Compose restart remains disabled: a blanket container restart could loop over a
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safety refusal or reset the in-container retry budget. Compose stop grace is 240s:
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