docs: record DoH outage and live validation

Co-authored-by: GPT-6 <gpt-6@openai.com>
This commit is contained in:
ZeusinaandGPT-6 Bot committed 2026-10-13 16:10:37 +03:00
1 parent 544dda7c85
commit 0623fa3323
3 files changed
+128 -19

No files matched your search

+52 -10
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,42 @@
# Fresh managed-test target contract (isolated acceptance, not production approval)
## Managed DoH live acceptance (2026-10-13): DNS verified, NOT READY
Supplied verified reports bind source `544dda7c85965fc3200de3af17fca9ef9999b2ce`
(DoH `367d956`, TCP deadline `721cad4`, public-health `socks5h` fix `544dda7`)
to image `sha256:b3085b7ceca4a629c28bd58f23bf97f02a34c2a38df08b57756e40594ba2d427`,
container `4ad54175a54c`, owned SOCKS `127.0.0.1:11082`.
The 303-second LIVE snapshot retained root/DNS22/SS59,60/monitor253 PIDs,
children PPID1, owned readiness ACK and parent FD8/9 anchors. UDP/TCP DNS
IDs/questions matched, rcode0, answers2/8; SOCKS `0500`, WWW HTTP200/SSL0
and configured `health youtube` exit0 passed. Wire evidence: 41 marked direct
DoH connections, zero external port53. Scope `suffix`, generation9, IDs `[1,9]`
and hash preservation versus staging are measured snapshots, not universal
state; autonomous updates have occurred since the earlier generation8 snapshot.
In isolated staging, blocking both bootstrap IPs for 61 seconds returned
UDP/TCP SERVFAIL/rcode2 at about 5000ms without changing root, DNS, SS or monitor
PIDs or sending external port53 traffic. DNS recovered immediately after removal;
WWW HTTP200 passed after 46 seconds without restart. Graceful stop: 1 second,
exit0, no survivors. Staging nft fault rules were removed; this is a tested DNS
dependency failure, not all-outage or nonconfiguration-guard acceptance.
No new runtime firewall policy beyond normal generated native rules is supplied.
Existing shared GGC qualification is separate evidence, not an 18-transfer rerun
under DoH. Fresh TLS1.3 media: HTTP206/65536 bytes/MP4 `ftyp`/SSL0; TLS1.2
TIMEOUT is not qualified. Avatar/thumbnail qualification remains independently
outstanding; no whole-service READY claim. Historical media results below do
not close these gates on this image. Generic service integration and maximum
strategy collection remain future work, without a new policy framework.
Private supplied reports (not reread here):
`/home/agent/zapret2-autotune-rc-doh-721cad4/live-upgrade-private/`, then latest
`/home/agent/zapret2-autotune-rc-doh-544dda7/live-upgrade-private/`.
No deployment/probes accompany this docs update; later docs are not tested source.
State/credentials/private env were preserved, staging containers removed, old
user SS1080 and user-stopped proxy unchanged. See the deployment guide for the
four DNS settings, LIVE env location, privacy boundary and recreation lifecycle.
## Autonomous three-CDN acceptance (2026-10-13): media qualified, NOT READY
Supplied field results bind source `3fc8563995e890310580ba8f78850b92fea42136`
@@ -73,7 +110,7 @@ must supply all of the following before any managed command can run:
| `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_TARGET_DIR` | `/var/lib/zapret-autotune/target` |
| `ZAPRET_CONFIG` | `/var/lib/zapret-autotune/target/config` |
| `SOCKS_PORT` | Base image's actual ss-local service port (canonical decimal, 1–65535) |
| `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_SOCKS_PROXY` | `socks5://127.0.0.1:$SOCKS_PORT` (expanded value) |
| `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_SOCKS_PROXY` | `socks5h://127.0.0.1:$SOCKS_PORT` (expanded value; legacy `socks5` validated and canonicalized internally) |
The fixed directory must already be a private runtime-user-owned **dedicated
persistent volume mountpoint**, not just a directory under another mount.
@@ -222,9 +259,9 @@ DB/safety/journal/runner failures stop nonzero; joined cancellation plus a clean
failure is also fatal. A qualified frontend at startup is probed immediately,
not rescanned merely because the process restarted.
Entrypoint ordering is SS children → listener → fresh managed init if needed → managed reconcile → zapret start
Entrypoint ordering is owned DNS readiness (default DoH) → SS children → listener → fresh managed init if needed → managed reconcile → zapret start
→ one installed `/usr/local/bin/zapret-autotune managed monitor` child. It supervises
all three children; unexpected monitor exit is not a successful shutdown.
the DNS, SS and monitor children; unexpected monitor exit is not a successful shutdown.
SIGTERM/SIGINT cancels and waits the monitor before target-local zapret stop and
SS child termination/wait. Existing targets and Xray remain unchanged. Deployment
allows 240s Compose shutdown grace for bounded
@@ -362,10 +399,11 @@ signed ordinary media host samples are required; multiple VideoIDs may yield one
CDN host and leave `DEGRADED` with no authorized suffix. Sampled thumbnail/avatar
routes do not prove availability of the whole thumbnail pool. The reported
`8.8.8.8` DNS diagnostic corrected a tampered avatar, not all thumbnail routes;
native DNS correction is not full asset availability proof. Target DNS uses
validated native `-d` argv (nonsecret), with installed-option support checked
at image build; passwords remain private JSON only. No DoH bridge, permanent
Google IP pins, global host DNS edits or external startup manager are introduced.
native DNS correction is not full asset availability proof. Default DoH uses
SS `-d 127.0.0.1:5353`; explicit native mode uses validated literal `-d` argv,
with installed-option support checked at image build. Passwords remain private
JSON only. No permanent service IP pins, global host DNS edits or external
startup manager are introduced.
### Supervision and failure handling
@@ -379,13 +417,16 @@ errors never authorize retry. No new dependency, host service installation or
external process manager is required. SIGTERM/SIGINT cancels backoff or the running
monitor, waits for bounded restoration and joins children before exit.
In default DoH mode PID 1 first starts the Go UDP/TCP loopback DNS forwarder,
In default DoH mode PID 1 first starts the stdlib UDP/TCP loopback DNS forwarder
inside the existing Go binary (no dependency or new container),
waits at most five seconds for its owned private PID marker, and only then starts
ss-server with `-d 127.0.0.1:5353`. No host DNS port or DNS/iptables changes are
made. Hostname SOCKS traffic and managed `socks5h` checks use the same encrypted
HTTPS resolver; clients must enable remote SOCKS DNS, not resolve locally or
send IP literals. Bootstrap uses configured literal IPs with verified TLS and
marked direct sockets excluding probe/live NFQUEUE. Endpoint failures produce
mark `0x50000000` direct sockets excluding probe/live NFQUEUE, with no system DNS, proxy
or plaintext fallback. The DoH resolver sees queries directly, not SS-tunneled;
the plaintext helper exchange stays on loopback5353. Endpoint failures produce
SERVFAIL without child exit or plaintext fallback. A forwarder crash, unlike an
upstream outage, uses the same bounded technical retry budget. The DNS child
stays alive through monitor restoration, zapret stop and SS joins; it is then
@@ -393,7 +434,8 @@ terminated/joined within five seconds and only its validated readiness inode is
removed using PID1-held directory/file anchors. Foreign/stale/replaced readiness
is preserved and vetoes startup/retry; SIGKILL does not lose owned cleanup proof. Explicit
native mode has no DNS child. See the deployment README for provider settings
and scope limits. New DoH runtime acceptance remains pending.
and scope limits. Supplied staged-outage and LIVE DNS acceptance are recorded
above; they do not establish all-outage resilience or whole-service readiness.
Compose restart remains disabled: a blanket container restart could loop over a
safety refusal or reset the in-container retry budget. Compose stop grace is 240s: