docs: record DoH outage and live validation

Co-authored-by: GPT-6 <gpt-6@openai.com>
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ZeusinaandGPT-6 Bot committed 2026-10-13 16:10:37 +03:00
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@@ -5,6 +5,44 @@ reconfigure, or stop the existing `zapret2-ss-autotune` container. The target
starts from a disabled managed baseline; `managed monitor` bootstraps the
frontend/API strategy, then discovers and applies an exact-host GGC strategy.
## Recorded DoH acceptance (2026-10-13): live DNS and staged outage verified
Supplied verified reports, not remote evidence reread by this docs update:
source `544dda7c85965fc3200de3af17fca9ef9999b2ce`, managed image
`sha256:b3085b7ceca4a629c28bd58f23bf97f02a34c2a38df08b57756e40594ba2d427`,
container `4ad54175a54c`, owned loopback SOCKS11082. This source includes DoH
`367d956`, TCP timeout-reply fix `721cad4` and public-health `socks5h` fix
`544dda7`. Later docs commits are not the tested image source.
- LIVE 303-second snapshot: unchanged root and DNS22/SS59,60/monitor253 PIDs,
children PPID1; owned readiness ACK and parent FD8/9 anchors positive.
UDP/TCP IDs/questions correct, rcode0, answers2/8; SOCKS `0500`, WWW
HTTP200/SSLVerifyResult0, configured `health youtube` exit0. Wire evidence:
41 marked direct DoH connections, zero external port53. Scope `suffix`,
generation9, IDs `[1,9]`, hash preserved versus staging are measured snapshots,
not universal state; autonomous updates occurred since an earlier generation8.
- Staging blocked both literal bootstrap IPs for 61 seconds. UDP/TCP returned
SERVFAIL/rcode2 at about 5000ms; root, DNS, monitor and SS PIDs stayed the same,
external port53 stayed zero. Removing the block restored DNS immediately;
WWW HTTP200 passed after 46 seconds without restart. Graceful stop took
1 second, exit0, no survivors. This tests a DNS dependency outage, not all
conceivable failures or nonconfiguration guards. Temporary nft fault rules
were staging-only and removed; runtime firewall remains normal generated
native policy, not a new fault-injection policy.
- Existing shared GGC qualification is separate proof: no new 18-transfer
qualification under DoH. Fresh TLS1.3 media returned HTTP206/65536 bytes/MP4
`ftyp`/SSL0; TLS1.2 TIMEOUT is not qualified. Avatar and thumbnail qualification
remain independent outstanding gates. **No full-service READY claim.**
- Staging cleanup removed the test containers, leaving no new running tests;
old user SS1080 and user-stopped proxy were unchanged. State, credentials and
private env were preserved. No source/runtime changes or probes in this update.
Private reports: `/home/agent/zapret2-autotune-rc-doh-721cad4/live-upgrade-private/`,
then latest `/home/agent/zapret2-autotune-rc-doh-544dda7/live-upgrade-private/`.
Historical acceptance below remains scoped to its own source/image and DNS mode.
Generic service integration and maximum strategy collection remain future work,
not a new framework.
## Autonomous three-CDN field acceptance (2026-10-13): media qualified, NOT READY
Supplied field snapshot: source `3fc8563995e890310580ba8f78850b92fea42136`,
@@ -203,13 +241,16 @@ The current service/adaptive hardware acceptance gate is **pending**; the old
clean-run PASS below does not qualify these new modes.
**Managed DNS defaults to DoH**, independently of service/YouTube mode. PID 1
starts the stdlib Go forwarder on container loopback `127.0.0.1:5353` (UDP and
starts the stdlib forwarder inside the existing Go binary, with no dependency
or new container, on container loopback `127.0.0.1:5353` (UDP and
TCP), validates its private PID readiness acknowledgement, then starts ss-server
with `-d 127.0.0.1:5353`. No DNS port is published. Both client hostname traffic
and managed checks share this encrypted resolver path; it works for arbitrary
services, not only YouTube. HTTPS uses normal certificate verification, direct
literal-IP bootstrap and a socket mark excluding live/probe NFQUEUE rules;
there is no recursive SOCKS resolution or plaintext fallback. Endpoint errors
literal-IP bootstrap and socket mark `0x50000000` excluding live/probe NFQUEUE rules;
there is no system-DNS, proxy or plaintext fallback, or recursive SOCKS resolution.
The DoH resolver sees queries directly: they are not tunneled through SS.
Only the internal loopback5353 helper exchange is plaintext UDP/TCP. Endpoint errors
return SERVFAIL while the forwarder stays alive, rather than switching DNS modes.
The private `.env` controls `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_DNS_MODE=doh|native`,
@@ -224,6 +265,25 @@ or fragment. A path can contain a private provider token: do not print it.
Validation reports opaque errors before any services start. The subprocess
gets provider configuration through env, never endpoint argv/logging.
Default public settings in the private `.env`:
```dotenv
ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_DNS_MODE=doh
ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_DOH_URL=https://dns.google/dns-query
ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_DOH_BOOTSTRAP_IPS=
ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_DOH_TIMEOUT_SEC=5
```
LIVE configuration is
`/home/agent/zapret-autotune-cleanops-3fc8563-1791882112/.env` (mode0600).
These four key names/defaults are public; credentials, custom provider paths,
queries and signed resource URLs are not. URL/bootstrap are never child argv.
Changing DNS requires official Compose recreation using that private env under
the controlled PID1 lifecycle, not a detached helper or ad hoc child restart.
The forwarder bounds queries to 4096 bytes, replies to 65535 bytes, HTTP headers
to 8192 bytes and concurrent workers to 16; it adds no DNS cache. No claim is
made about caching inside the existing SS resolver.
Only explicit `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_DNS_MODE=native` restores the old resolver
behavior, with no forwarder child. In that mode optional `SS_DNS_SERVER` accepts
only an unbracketed literal IPv4/IPv6 address; empty retains the base resolver.
@@ -242,9 +302,10 @@ availability proof**. No permanent service IP pins or global host DNS changes
are supplied. Clients must request remote DNS (browser SOCKS5 remote DNS or
`curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:11082` when that is the chosen host port).
Client-local resolution and IP-literal requests bypass this hostname DNS path;
the bridge does not encrypt unrelated container processes' DNS. The new DoH
integration still needs remote runtime acceptance; earlier clean-run PASS does
not qualify it. PID 1 remains the sole startup/recovery owner.
the bridge does not encrypt unrelated container processes' DNS. IP-transmitting
SOCKS clients with local resolution are not covered: use remote DNS/`socks5h`.
Supplied LIVE and staged-outage DNS acceptance is recorded above; earlier
clean-run PASS is not DoH evidence. PID 1 remains the sole startup/recovery owner.
Compose has no automatic restart. PID 1 restarts the entire owned runtime only
for technical failures, with three starts per rolling six hours (including initial
@@ -295,7 +356,7 @@ use host or shared/container PID namespaces. It does not grant inspection of
broader host processes. The full service/adaptive hardware gate remains
**pending**, not PASS; this ownership fix alone does not qualify it.
Startup order: ss-server/ss-local → listener 1080 → guarded managed init on
Startup order: owned DNS readiness (default DoH) → ss-server/ss-local → listener 1080 → guarded managed init on
fresh state → `managed reconcile` on every startup → target-local `zapret2 start`
→ supervised managed monitor. Reconciliation uses the fixed private target DB
and restores an interrupted prepared transaction's qualified last-good bytes