docs: record DoH outage and live validation

Co-authored-by: GPT-6 <gpt-6@openai.com>
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ZeusinaandGPT-6 Bot committed 2026-10-13 16:10:37 +03:00
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# Fresh managed-test target contract (isolated acceptance, not production approval) # Fresh managed-test target contract (isolated acceptance, not production approval)
## Managed DoH live acceptance (2026-10-13): DNS verified, NOT READY
Supplied verified reports bind source `544dda7c85965fc3200de3af17fca9ef9999b2ce`
(DoH `367d956`, TCP deadline `721cad4`, public-health `socks5h` fix `544dda7`)
to image `sha256:b3085b7ceca4a629c28bd58f23bf97f02a34c2a38df08b57756e40594ba2d427`,
container `4ad54175a54c`, owned SOCKS `127.0.0.1:11082`.
The 303-second LIVE snapshot retained root/DNS22/SS59,60/monitor253 PIDs,
children PPID1, owned readiness ACK and parent FD8/9 anchors. UDP/TCP DNS
IDs/questions matched, rcode0, answers2/8; SOCKS `0500`, WWW HTTP200/SSL0
and configured `health youtube` exit0 passed. Wire evidence: 41 marked direct
DoH connections, zero external port53. Scope `suffix`, generation9, IDs `[1,9]`
and hash preservation versus staging are measured snapshots, not universal
state; autonomous updates have occurred since the earlier generation8 snapshot.
In isolated staging, blocking both bootstrap IPs for 61 seconds returned
UDP/TCP SERVFAIL/rcode2 at about 5000ms without changing root, DNS, SS or monitor
PIDs or sending external port53 traffic. DNS recovered immediately after removal;
WWW HTTP200 passed after 46 seconds without restart. Graceful stop: 1 second,
exit0, no survivors. Staging nft fault rules were removed; this is a tested DNS
dependency failure, not all-outage or nonconfiguration-guard acceptance.
No new runtime firewall policy beyond normal generated native rules is supplied.
Existing shared GGC qualification is separate evidence, not an 18-transfer rerun
under DoH. Fresh TLS1.3 media: HTTP206/65536 bytes/MP4 `ftyp`/SSL0; TLS1.2
TIMEOUT is not qualified. Avatar/thumbnail qualification remains independently
outstanding; no whole-service READY claim. Historical media results below do
not close these gates on this image. Generic service integration and maximum
strategy collection remain future work, without a new policy framework.
Private supplied reports (not reread here):
`/home/agent/zapret2-autotune-rc-doh-721cad4/live-upgrade-private/`, then latest
`/home/agent/zapret2-autotune-rc-doh-544dda7/live-upgrade-private/`.
No deployment/probes accompany this docs update; later docs are not tested source.
State/credentials/private env were preserved, staging containers removed, old
user SS1080 and user-stopped proxy unchanged. See the deployment guide for the
four DNS settings, LIVE env location, privacy boundary and recreation lifecycle.
## Autonomous three-CDN acceptance (2026-10-13): media qualified, NOT READY ## Autonomous three-CDN acceptance (2026-10-13): media qualified, NOT READY
Supplied field results bind source `3fc8563995e890310580ba8f78850b92fea42136` Supplied field results bind source `3fc8563995e890310580ba8f78850b92fea42136`
@@ -73,7 +110,7 @@ must supply all of the following before any managed command can run:
| `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_TARGET_DIR` | `/var/lib/zapret-autotune/target` | | `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_TARGET_DIR` | `/var/lib/zapret-autotune/target` |
| `ZAPRET_CONFIG` | `/var/lib/zapret-autotune/target/config` | | `ZAPRET_CONFIG` | `/var/lib/zapret-autotune/target/config` |
| `SOCKS_PORT` | Base image's actual ss-local service port (canonical decimal, 1–65535) | | `SOCKS_PORT` | Base image's actual ss-local service port (canonical decimal, 1–65535) |
| `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_SOCKS_PROXY` | `socks5://127.0.0.1:$SOCKS_PORT` (expanded value) | | `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_SOCKS_PROXY` | `socks5h://127.0.0.1:$SOCKS_PORT` (expanded value; legacy `socks5` validated and canonicalized internally) |
The fixed directory must already be a private runtime-user-owned **dedicated The fixed directory must already be a private runtime-user-owned **dedicated
persistent volume mountpoint**, not just a directory under another mount. persistent volume mountpoint**, not just a directory under another mount.
@@ -222,9 +259,9 @@ DB/safety/journal/runner failures stop nonzero; joined cancellation plus a clean
failure is also fatal. A qualified frontend at startup is probed immediately, failure is also fatal. A qualified frontend at startup is probed immediately,
not rescanned merely because the process restarted. not rescanned merely because the process restarted.
Entrypoint ordering is SS children → listener → fresh managed init if needed → managed reconcile → zapret start Entrypoint ordering is owned DNS readiness (default DoH) → SS children → listener → fresh managed init if needed → managed reconcile → zapret start
→ one installed `/usr/local/bin/zapret-autotune managed monitor` child. It supervises → one installed `/usr/local/bin/zapret-autotune managed monitor` child. It supervises
all three children; unexpected monitor exit is not a successful shutdown. the DNS, SS and monitor children; unexpected monitor exit is not a successful shutdown.
SIGTERM/SIGINT cancels and waits the monitor before target-local zapret stop and SIGTERM/SIGINT cancels and waits the monitor before target-local zapret stop and
SS child termination/wait. Existing targets and Xray remain unchanged. Deployment SS child termination/wait. Existing targets and Xray remain unchanged. Deployment
allows 240s Compose shutdown grace for bounded allows 240s Compose shutdown grace for bounded
@@ -362,10 +399,11 @@ signed ordinary media host samples are required; multiple VideoIDs may yield one
CDN host and leave `DEGRADED` with no authorized suffix. Sampled thumbnail/avatar CDN host and leave `DEGRADED` with no authorized suffix. Sampled thumbnail/avatar
routes do not prove availability of the whole thumbnail pool. The reported routes do not prove availability of the whole thumbnail pool. The reported
`8.8.8.8` DNS diagnostic corrected a tampered avatar, not all thumbnail routes; `8.8.8.8` DNS diagnostic corrected a tampered avatar, not all thumbnail routes;
native DNS correction is not full asset availability proof. Target DNS uses native DNS correction is not full asset availability proof. Default DoH uses
validated native `-d` argv (nonsecret), with installed-option support checked SS `-d 127.0.0.1:5353`; explicit native mode uses validated literal `-d` argv,
at image build; passwords remain private JSON only. No DoH bridge, permanent with installed-option support checked at image build. Passwords remain private
Google IP pins, global host DNS edits or external startup manager are introduced. JSON only. No permanent service IP pins, global host DNS edits or external
startup manager are introduced.
### Supervision and failure handling ### Supervision and failure handling
@@ -379,13 +417,16 @@ errors never authorize retry. No new dependency, host service installation or
external process manager is required. SIGTERM/SIGINT cancels backoff or the running external process manager is required. SIGTERM/SIGINT cancels backoff or the running
monitor, waits for bounded restoration and joins children before exit. monitor, waits for bounded restoration and joins children before exit.
In default DoH mode PID 1 first starts the Go UDP/TCP loopback DNS forwarder, In default DoH mode PID 1 first starts the stdlib UDP/TCP loopback DNS forwarder
inside the existing Go binary (no dependency or new container),
waits at most five seconds for its owned private PID marker, and only then starts waits at most five seconds for its owned private PID marker, and only then starts
ss-server with `-d 127.0.0.1:5353`. No host DNS port or DNS/iptables changes are ss-server with `-d 127.0.0.1:5353`. No host DNS port or DNS/iptables changes are
made. Hostname SOCKS traffic and managed `socks5h` checks use the same encrypted made. Hostname SOCKS traffic and managed `socks5h` checks use the same encrypted
HTTPS resolver; clients must enable remote SOCKS DNS, not resolve locally or HTTPS resolver; clients must enable remote SOCKS DNS, not resolve locally or
send IP literals. Bootstrap uses configured literal IPs with verified TLS and send IP literals. Bootstrap uses configured literal IPs with verified TLS and
marked direct sockets excluding probe/live NFQUEUE. Endpoint failures produce mark `0x50000000` direct sockets excluding probe/live NFQUEUE, with no system DNS, proxy
or plaintext fallback. The DoH resolver sees queries directly, not SS-tunneled;
the plaintext helper exchange stays on loopback5353. Endpoint failures produce
SERVFAIL without child exit or plaintext fallback. A forwarder crash, unlike an SERVFAIL without child exit or plaintext fallback. A forwarder crash, unlike an
upstream outage, uses the same bounded technical retry budget. The DNS child upstream outage, uses the same bounded technical retry budget. The DNS child
stays alive through monitor restoration, zapret stop and SS joins; it is then stays alive through monitor restoration, zapret stop and SS joins; it is then
@@ -393,7 +434,8 @@ terminated/joined within five seconds and only its validated readiness inode is
removed using PID1-held directory/file anchors. Foreign/stale/replaced readiness removed using PID1-held directory/file anchors. Foreign/stale/replaced readiness
is preserved and vetoes startup/retry; SIGKILL does not lose owned cleanup proof. Explicit is preserved and vetoes startup/retry; SIGKILL does not lose owned cleanup proof. Explicit
native mode has no DNS child. See the deployment README for provider settings native mode has no DNS child. See the deployment README for provider settings
and scope limits. New DoH runtime acceptance remains pending. and scope limits. Supplied staged-outage and LIVE DNS acceptance are recorded
above; they do not establish all-outage resilience or whole-service readiness.
Compose restart remains disabled: a blanket container restart could loop over a Compose restart remains disabled: a blanket container restart could loop over a
safety refusal or reset the in-container retry budget. Compose stop grace is 240s: safety refusal or reset the in-container retry budget. Compose stop grace is 240s:
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## Текущий статус ## Текущий статус
### Managed DoH integration (2026-10-13): local implementation, remote gate pending ### Managed DoH acceptance (2026-10-13): live DNS path and staged outage verified, NOT READY
- Managed target defaults to the stdlib Go UDP/TCP loopback DoH forwarder; PID 1 validates owned readiness before ss-server `-d 127.0.0.1:5353`. SOCKS remote-hostname traffic and managed `socks5h` checks share this path. Provider URL/bootstrap IPs/timeout are private-env configurable; explicit native mode alone preserves legacy DNS, never automatic fallback. - Managed target defaults to the stdlib Go UDP/TCP loopback DoH forwarder; PID 1 validates owned readiness before ss-server `-d 127.0.0.1:5353`. SOCKS remote-hostname traffic and managed `socks5h` checks share this path. Provider URL/bootstrap IPs/timeout are private-env configurable; explicit native mode alone preserves legacy DNS, never automatic fallback.
- DNS stays available during monitor restoration, zapret stop and SS joins, then is terminated/joined with a five-second watchdog and readiness cleanup. DNS child death uses existing bounded retries; upstream failures return SERVFAIL without stopping the forwarder. No host DNS port, global DNS changes, new dependency or capability. - DNS stays available during monitor restoration, zapret stop and SS joins, then is terminated/joined with a five-second watchdog and readiness cleanup. DNS child death uses existing bounded retries; upstream failures return SERVFAIL without stopping the forwarder. No host DNS port, global DNS changes, new dependency or capability.
- Security follow-up: PID 1 retains directory/readiness inode descriptors for validated owned cleanup after graceful exit or SIGKILL; foreign/stale/replaced markers are preserved and fail closed. Compose passes empty bootstrap by default, allowing Google defaults only for the exact Google URL; custom URLs require explicit IPs. - Security follow-up: PID 1 retains directory/readiness inode descriptors for validated owned cleanup after graceful exit or SIGKILL; foreign/stale/replaced markers are preserved and fail closed. Compose passes empty bootstrap by default, allowing Google defaults only for the exact Google URL; custom URLs require explicit IPs.
- Offline shell lifecycle/static/config fixtures (real readiness CLI with inherited anchors), sh/bash syntax checks, `go test ./... -count=1 -timeout 180s` and targeted readiness/entrypoint `-race` tests passed locally. Coverage includes foreign regular/symlink preservation, SIGKILL owned cleanup/retry, custom-provider Compose validation, signal/cooldown cancellation and DNS-last cleanup. No deployment or external-network tests performed here. Remote encrypted-path, browser/check and upstream-outage acceptance remains pending; earlier PASS is not DoH qualification. - Earlier offline shell lifecycle/static/config fixtures (real readiness CLI with inherited anchors), sh/bash syntax checks, full Go and targeted readiness/entrypoint race checks passed as previously reported. Coverage includes foreign regular/symlink preservation, SIGKILL owned cleanup/retry, custom-provider Compose validation, signal/cooldown cancellation and DNS-last cleanup. This docs-only update adds no source/runtime changes or probes and does not rerun the Go suite.
- Supplied verified reports bind DoH implementation `367d956`, TCP reply deadline fix `721cad4`, and explicit public-health `socks5h` fix **`544dda7c85965fc3200de3af17fca9ef9999b2ce`** to LIVE image **`sha256:b3085b7ceca4a629c28bd58f23bf97f02a34c2a38df08b57756e40594ba2d427`**, container **`4ad54175a54c`**, owned SOCKS **`127.0.0.1:11082`**. Private reports: `/home/agent/zapret2-autotune-rc-doh-721cad4/live-upgrade-private/`, then latest `/home/agent/zapret2-autotune-rc-doh-544dda7/live-upgrade-private/`; not independently reread here. Later documentation commits are not the tested source.
- Real isolated staging blocked **both** bootstrap IPs for **61 seconds**: UDP and TCP replies returned SERVFAIL (rcode2) at about **5000ms**; DNS, monitor, SS and root PIDs stayed unchanged, with zero external port53 traffic. After removal, DNS recovered immediately and WWW HTTP200 was verified after **46 seconds**, without process restart. Graceful stop took **1 second**, exit0, no survivors. This proves the tested DNS dependency outage, not every conceivable outage or nonconfiguration guard behavior. Staging-only nft fault rules were removed; no new runtime firewall policy was added beyond normal generated native rules.
- LIVE **303-second** measured snapshot: same root and children DNS22, SS59/60, monitor253, all children PPID1; owned readiness ACK and PID1-held FD8/9 anchors were positive. UDP/TCP DNS IDs and questions matched, rcode0, answer counts2/8. SOCKS greeting `0500`, WWW HTTP200/SSLVerifyResult0, and configured `health youtube` exit0 passed. Wire evidence counted **41 marked DoH connections**, zero external port53; direct HTTPS sockets use mark **`0x50000000`** to bypass live/probe NFQUEUE. Scope `suffix`, generation9, IDs `[1,9]`, config hash preserved versus staging are measured snapshot values, not universal constants: autonomous state has advanced since an earlier generation8 observation.
- Existing normal shared GGC qualification remains separate proof; no new 18-transfer qualification under DoH is claimed. Fresh media TLS1.3 returned HTTP206/65536 bytes/MP4 `ftyp`/SSLVerifyResult0; TLS1.2 timed out and is **not qualified**. Avatar and thumbnail qualification remain independent outstanding gates; no full-service READY claim. Maximum strategy collection and generic service integration remain future work, not a new framework.
- DNS configuration is the private mode0600 LIVE `/home/agent/zapret-autotune-cleanops-3fc8563-1791882112/.env`; the four public DNS keys and defaults are documented in the deployment guide. URL/bootstrap come from env, never argv; changing DNS requires official Compose recreation under the controlled PID1 lifecycle. Credentials/private env and state were preserved. Staging cleanup left no new running test containers; the old user SS1080 and user-stopped proxy were unchanged.
- Default `https://dns.google/dns-query` selects literal `8.8.8.8,8.8.4.4` bootstrap only when missing/empty; custom endpoints require explicit IPs. TLS is verified, with no system-DNS, proxy or plaintext fallback; native mode is manual and explicit only. The direct DoH resolver sees queries: they are **not SS-tunneled**. Plaintext UDP/TCP exists only at internal loopback5353. IP-transmitting SOCKS clients using local DNS are outside this guarantee; use remote DNS/`socks5h`. The existing Go binary supplies the stdlib forwarder, no dependency or extra container, bounded to 4096-byte queries, 65535-byte replies, 8192-byte HTTP headers and 16 workers, with no forwarder cache.
### Autonomous three-CDN field acceptance (2026-10-13): media qualified, NOT READY ### Autonomous three-CDN field acceptance (2026-10-13): media qualified, NOT READY
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@@ -5,6 +5,44 @@ reconfigure, or stop the existing `zapret2-ss-autotune` container. The target
starts from a disabled managed baseline; `managed monitor` bootstraps the starts from a disabled managed baseline; `managed monitor` bootstraps the
frontend/API strategy, then discovers and applies an exact-host GGC strategy. frontend/API strategy, then discovers and applies an exact-host GGC strategy.
## Recorded DoH acceptance (2026-10-13): live DNS and staged outage verified
Supplied verified reports, not remote evidence reread by this docs update:
source `544dda7c85965fc3200de3af17fca9ef9999b2ce`, managed image
`sha256:b3085b7ceca4a629c28bd58f23bf97f02a34c2a38df08b57756e40594ba2d427`,
container `4ad54175a54c`, owned loopback SOCKS11082. This source includes DoH
`367d956`, TCP timeout-reply fix `721cad4` and public-health `socks5h` fix
`544dda7`. Later docs commits are not the tested image source.
- LIVE 303-second snapshot: unchanged root and DNS22/SS59,60/monitor253 PIDs,
children PPID1; owned readiness ACK and parent FD8/9 anchors positive.
UDP/TCP IDs/questions correct, rcode0, answers2/8; SOCKS `0500`, WWW
HTTP200/SSLVerifyResult0, configured `health youtube` exit0. Wire evidence:
41 marked direct DoH connections, zero external port53. Scope `suffix`,
generation9, IDs `[1,9]`, hash preserved versus staging are measured snapshots,
not universal state; autonomous updates occurred since an earlier generation8.
- Staging blocked both literal bootstrap IPs for 61 seconds. UDP/TCP returned
SERVFAIL/rcode2 at about 5000ms; root, DNS, monitor and SS PIDs stayed the same,
external port53 stayed zero. Removing the block restored DNS immediately;
WWW HTTP200 passed after 46 seconds without restart. Graceful stop took
1 second, exit0, no survivors. This tests a DNS dependency outage, not all
conceivable failures or nonconfiguration guards. Temporary nft fault rules
were staging-only and removed; runtime firewall remains normal generated
native policy, not a new fault-injection policy.
- Existing shared GGC qualification is separate proof: no new 18-transfer
qualification under DoH. Fresh TLS1.3 media returned HTTP206/65536 bytes/MP4
`ftyp`/SSL0; TLS1.2 TIMEOUT is not qualified. Avatar and thumbnail qualification
remain independent outstanding gates. **No full-service READY claim.**
- Staging cleanup removed the test containers, leaving no new running tests;
old user SS1080 and user-stopped proxy were unchanged. State, credentials and
private env were preserved. No source/runtime changes or probes in this update.
Private reports: `/home/agent/zapret2-autotune-rc-doh-721cad4/live-upgrade-private/`,
then latest `/home/agent/zapret2-autotune-rc-doh-544dda7/live-upgrade-private/`.
Historical acceptance below remains scoped to its own source/image and DNS mode.
Generic service integration and maximum strategy collection remain future work,
not a new framework.
## Autonomous three-CDN field acceptance (2026-10-13): media qualified, NOT READY ## Autonomous three-CDN field acceptance (2026-10-13): media qualified, NOT READY
Supplied field snapshot: source `3fc8563995e890310580ba8f78850b92fea42136`, Supplied field snapshot: source `3fc8563995e890310580ba8f78850b92fea42136`,
@@ -203,13 +241,16 @@ The current service/adaptive hardware acceptance gate is **pending**; the old
clean-run PASS below does not qualify these new modes. clean-run PASS below does not qualify these new modes.
**Managed DNS defaults to DoH**, independently of service/YouTube mode. PID 1 **Managed DNS defaults to DoH**, independently of service/YouTube mode. PID 1
starts the stdlib Go forwarder on container loopback `127.0.0.1:5353` (UDP and starts the stdlib forwarder inside the existing Go binary, with no dependency
or new container, on container loopback `127.0.0.1:5353` (UDP and
TCP), validates its private PID readiness acknowledgement, then starts ss-server TCP), validates its private PID readiness acknowledgement, then starts ss-server
with `-d 127.0.0.1:5353`. No DNS port is published. Both client hostname traffic with `-d 127.0.0.1:5353`. No DNS port is published. Both client hostname traffic
and managed checks share this encrypted resolver path; it works for arbitrary and managed checks share this encrypted resolver path; it works for arbitrary
services, not only YouTube. HTTPS uses normal certificate verification, direct services, not only YouTube. HTTPS uses normal certificate verification, direct
literal-IP bootstrap and a socket mark excluding live/probe NFQUEUE rules; literal-IP bootstrap and socket mark `0x50000000` excluding live/probe NFQUEUE rules;
there is no recursive SOCKS resolution or plaintext fallback. Endpoint errors there is no system-DNS, proxy or plaintext fallback, or recursive SOCKS resolution.
The DoH resolver sees queries directly: they are not tunneled through SS.
Only the internal loopback5353 helper exchange is plaintext UDP/TCP. Endpoint errors
return SERVFAIL while the forwarder stays alive, rather than switching DNS modes. return SERVFAIL while the forwarder stays alive, rather than switching DNS modes.
The private `.env` controls `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_DNS_MODE=doh|native`, The private `.env` controls `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_DNS_MODE=doh|native`,
@@ -224,6 +265,25 @@ or fragment. A path can contain a private provider token: do not print it.
Validation reports opaque errors before any services start. The subprocess Validation reports opaque errors before any services start. The subprocess
gets provider configuration through env, never endpoint argv/logging. gets provider configuration through env, never endpoint argv/logging.
Default public settings in the private `.env`:
```dotenv
ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_DNS_MODE=doh
ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_DOH_URL=https://dns.google/dns-query
ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_DOH_BOOTSTRAP_IPS=
ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_DOH_TIMEOUT_SEC=5
```
LIVE configuration is
`/home/agent/zapret-autotune-cleanops-3fc8563-1791882112/.env` (mode0600).
These four key names/defaults are public; credentials, custom provider paths,
queries and signed resource URLs are not. URL/bootstrap are never child argv.
Changing DNS requires official Compose recreation using that private env under
the controlled PID1 lifecycle, not a detached helper or ad hoc child restart.
The forwarder bounds queries to 4096 bytes, replies to 65535 bytes, HTTP headers
to 8192 bytes and concurrent workers to 16; it adds no DNS cache. No claim is
made about caching inside the existing SS resolver.
Only explicit `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_DNS_MODE=native` restores the old resolver Only explicit `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_DNS_MODE=native` restores the old resolver
behavior, with no forwarder child. In that mode optional `SS_DNS_SERVER` accepts behavior, with no forwarder child. In that mode optional `SS_DNS_SERVER` accepts
only an unbracketed literal IPv4/IPv6 address; empty retains the base resolver. only an unbracketed literal IPv4/IPv6 address; empty retains the base resolver.
@@ -242,9 +302,10 @@ availability proof**. No permanent service IP pins or global host DNS changes
are supplied. Clients must request remote DNS (browser SOCKS5 remote DNS or are supplied. Clients must request remote DNS (browser SOCKS5 remote DNS or
`curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:11082` when that is the chosen host port). `curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:11082` when that is the chosen host port).
Client-local resolution and IP-literal requests bypass this hostname DNS path; Client-local resolution and IP-literal requests bypass this hostname DNS path;
the bridge does not encrypt unrelated container processes' DNS. The new DoH the bridge does not encrypt unrelated container processes' DNS. IP-transmitting
integration still needs remote runtime acceptance; earlier clean-run PASS does SOCKS clients with local resolution are not covered: use remote DNS/`socks5h`.
not qualify it. PID 1 remains the sole startup/recovery owner. Supplied LIVE and staged-outage DNS acceptance is recorded above; earlier
clean-run PASS is not DoH evidence. PID 1 remains the sole startup/recovery owner.
Compose has no automatic restart. PID 1 restarts the entire owned runtime only Compose has no automatic restart. PID 1 restarts the entire owned runtime only
for technical failures, with three starts per rolling six hours (including initial for technical failures, with three starts per rolling six hours (including initial
@@ -295,7 +356,7 @@ use host or shared/container PID namespaces. It does not grant inspection of
broader host processes. The full service/adaptive hardware gate remains broader host processes. The full service/adaptive hardware gate remains
**pending**, not PASS; this ownership fix alone does not qualify it. **pending**, not PASS; this ownership fix alone does not qualify it.
Startup order: ss-server/ss-local → listener 1080 → guarded managed init on Startup order: owned DNS readiness (default DoH) → ss-server/ss-local → listener 1080 → guarded managed init on
fresh state → `managed reconcile` on every startup → target-local `zapret2 start` fresh state → `managed reconcile` on every startup → target-local `zapret2 start`
→ supervised managed monitor. Reconciliation uses the fixed private target DB → supervised managed monitor. Reconciliation uses the fixed private target DB
and restores an interrupted prepared transaction's qualified last-good bytes and restores an interrupted prepared transaction's qualified last-good bytes