fix: classify resource peer TLS rejections as recoverable damage
Keep verified curl peer TLS negatives unqualified without making them process-wide safety failures. Preserve local proxy/configuration, guard, cleanup and mixed cancellation vetoes; test owned verification, rollback and durable absence cooldown. Co-authored-by: GPT-6 <gpt-6@openai.com>
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## Текущий статус
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### Peer TLS rejection classification fix (2026-10-12)
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- Read-only field inspection: RC source `50a78608ce40dfc26289b5a63d01eeb3fc569ace`, image `sha256:1a97f34cfbe3bd606d5fb13599767f8a51273b374fa441f5e67802c74d814701`, container `d361b5d581bf710af28f14d3998d6a9a699661b827248c12c9352182df94f98d` is now exited78 (finished `2026-10-12T18:44:23.941802233Z`); host port11082 has no TCP listener. The earlier `proof-v2/final.safe.json` observation at 18:44:10 reported it running, so it is not current uptime evidence. Private artifacts: `/home/agent/zapret2-autotune-rc-50a7860/proof-v2/`.
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- That safe collector evidence contains a fresh allowed avatar URL, avatar TLS1.2 curl60 and TLS1.3 curl35, both zero samples/FAIL with generic fatal wrappers; thumbnail and sampled media passed. Terminal safe logs subsequently show avatar degradation, **thumbnail** degradation, recovery failure, and the generic safety/database/runtime terminal branch. They do not identify the exact terminal underlying error: do not claim avatar TLS alone is proven to have caused exit78 or that a real local guard failed.
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- Source fix distinguishes validated resource-curl peer TLS rejection (35/51/60) from process-wide operational safety. It remains rejected/unqualified, with certificate verification, origin checks and SSLVerifyResult=0 qualification unchanged. Probe/recovery can remain DEGRADED; genuine exhausted asset verification enters the existing minimum two-hour pause with workers joined and committed profiles preserved. Local proxy connection7, client-certificate configuration58, unknown/mixed cancellation and explicit guard/cleanup failures remain infrastructure/safety failures. No certificate bypass, host pinning, DNS change, family promotion or READY claim.
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- The corrected source has not been deployed or image-qualified. Existing remote containers, profiles and other working ports were not restarted or modified by this fix; a tested new image and renewed actual-resource checks are the next dispatch.
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- Local affected-area verification: managed/resource/experimental/asset/Googlevideo/monitor tests passed normally and under `-race`; local CLI build and `git diff --check` passed. Fixture checks cover production avatar35/60 degradation, owned verification exhaustion and post-apply rejection/rollback, joined workers, durable two-hour cooldown, experimental same-profile media35/60 recovery, and retained local/mixed safety failures. These are not live image acceptance.
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### Googlevideo suffix RC — browser-verified experiment (2026-10-12)
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- Initial source RC `eade051c2bc335b71b1616d697326ca4c8019d70`, immutable image `sha256:fdb60593e29d7c337a413a47aaddfbcaaeabdeb877042c58f506d4abdc98a13b`, isolated host SOCKS `127.0.0.1:11082`. Historical initial journal: generation3, active candidates [1,2,3], scope `experimental_googlevideo_suffix`; `www.youtube.com` and `i.ytimg.com` profiles preserved. Older targets were unchanged. These are recorded field observations, not current candidate IDs or a new probe/deployment by this source update; its SHA is not the tested image source.
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