chore(deploy): pass target password through env

This commit is contained in:
Zeusina committed 2026-10-10 10:10:36 +03:00
1 parent 5f3a6953ee
commit 2fbb247a1e
5 files changed
+75 -96

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@@ -215,9 +215,8 @@ func TestManagedEntrypointSupervision(t *testing.T) {
return path return path
} }
log := filepath.Join(root, "log") log := filepath.Join(root, "log")
write("secret", strings.Repeat("a", 32))
write("awk", "#!/bin/sh\ncase \"$*\" in */proc/net/tcp*) until grep -q ready-ss-server \"$LOG\" && grep -q ready-ss-local \"$LOG\"; do sleep 0.02; done;; esac\nexit 0\n") write("awk", "#!/bin/sh\ncase \"$*\" in */proc/net/tcp*) until grep -q ready-ss-server \"$LOG\" && grep -q ready-ss-local \"$LOG\"; do sleep 0.02; done;; esac\nexit 0\n")
child := "#!/bin/sh\ntrap 'echo stopped-$0 >> \"$LOG\"; exit 0' TERM INT\necho ready-$(basename \"$0\") >> \"$LOG\"\nwhile :; do sleep 0.1 & wait $!; done\n" child := "#!/bin/sh\n[ -z \"${SS_PASSWORD+x}\" ] || exit 88\ntrap 'echo stopped-$0 >> \"$LOG\"; exit 0' TERM INT\necho ready-$(basename \"$0\") >> \"$LOG\"\nwhile :; do sleep 0.1 & wait $!; done\n"
write("ss-server", child) write("ss-server", child)
write("ss-local", child) write("ss-local", child)
zapret := write("zapret", "#!/bin/sh\necho zapret-$1 >> \"$LOG\"\n") zapret := write("zapret", "#!/bin/sh\necho zapret-$1 >> \"$LOG\"\n")
@@ -226,12 +225,12 @@ func TestManagedEntrypointSupervision(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil { if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err) t.Fatal(err)
} }
text := strings.NewReplacer("/run/secrets/ss_password", filepath.Join(root, "secret"), "/run/zapret-autotune-ss", config, "/usr/local/bin/zapret-autotune", monitor, managedZapretScript, zapret).Replace(string(data)) text := strings.NewReplacer("/run/zapret-autotune-ss", config, "/usr/local/bin/zapret-autotune", monitor, managedZapretScript, zapret).Replace(string(data))
entry := write("entrypoint", text) entry := write("entrypoint", text)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second) ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel() defer cancel()
cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "/bin/sh", entry) cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "/bin/sh", entry)
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "PATH="+root+":"+os.Getenv("PATH"), "LOG="+log, "MODE="+mode, "ZAPRET_CONFIG="+filepath.Join(root, "config")) cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "PATH="+root+":"+os.Getenv("PATH"), "LOG="+log, "MODE="+mode, "ZAPRET_CONFIG="+filepath.Join(root, "config"), "SS_PASSWORD="+strings.Repeat("a", 32))
cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{Setpgid: true} cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{Setpgid: true}
var output bytes.Buffer var output bytes.Buffer
cmd.Stdout, cmd.Stderr = &output, &output cmd.Stdout, cmd.Stderr = &output, &output
+57 -73
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@@ -1,86 +1,70 @@
# Isolated managed-test definition — deployment deferred # Isolated managed-test target
This definition is **not autonomous acceptance-ready**: `managed monitor` and This Compose project provisions a new, isolated target. It does not attach to,
entrypoint recovery integration exist in code but are not live verified. Do not build/pull/start it as part of this reconfigure, or stop the existing `zapret2-ss-autotune` container. The target
change. Existing containers, production and Xray configuration are out of scope. starts from a disabled managed baseline; `managed monitor` bootstraps the
frontend/API strategy, then discovers and applies an exact-host GGC strategy.
For a later approved deployment, from this directory: ## Provisioning
1. Copy `.env.example` to `.env` and restrict it to `0600`; it sets only the From this directory, create a private `.env` with a fresh independent password
host loopback SOCKS port. Generate a **new independent** secret locally: and the configured host SOCKS port:
`(umask 077; set -C; openssl rand -hex 32 > ss_password)`.
This refuses to overwrite an existing file. Never copy existing secrets or ```sh
put the password in `.env`, environment variables or command arguments. (umask 077; set -C; printf 'SS_PASSWORD=%s\nZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_HOST_SOCKS_PORT=11080\n' "$(openssl rand -hex 32)" > .env)
`ss_password`, `.env` and state are gitignored and excluded from the build ```
context. Do not commit the secret file. Compose mounts it read-only at
`/run/secrets/ss_password`; keep the host file owned by the invoking user This refuses to overwrite an existing `.env`; do not print it or commit it.
with mode `0600` (no deploy-time chown or world-readable permissions). Compose passes `SS_PASSWORD` as a container environment variable. It is removed
Use only this newly generated regular file at `./ss_password`, not a symlink from the entrypoint environment before Shadowsocks children start and is never
or a reused secret. Do not mount its parent directory or other host secrets. placed in argv or logs. Docker administrators/root can still read container
2. Provision a **new empty** `./target-state`, owned by host UID 0 (runtime environment and runtime config, so use this only for the isolated test target.
user), mode `0700`. Rootless/user-remapped Docker needs the mapped owner.
Never reuse mounts/state. Compose refuses a missing bind source. Retain Create a **new empty** `./target-state`, owned by host UID 0 (runtime user),
state for recreation; deletion loses identity, journal, backups and DB. mode `0700`; rootless/user-remapped Docker needs the mapped owner. Never reuse
3. Orchestrator may validate without deploying: state. Compose refuses a missing bind source. Retain state for recreation;
deletion loses transaction identity, journal, backups and candidate DB.
Validate without printing interpolated values:
`docker compose --env-file .env -f compose.yaml config --quiet`. `docker compose --env-file .env -f compose.yaml config --quiet`.
Rendered Compose config contains only the secret file path, not its value. Build/run require Then build and start only this Compose project. The rendered configuration
separate approval and runtime validation gates. contains the environment password, so never use plain `docker compose config`
in logs or shared terminals.
Offline static guard (from repository root): Offline static guard (from repository root):
`python3 deploy/managed-target/check_static.py`. It pins the capability allowlist `python3 deploy/managed-target/check_static.py`.
and single-secret/single-state mount shape; it does not prove runtime readability.
## Isolation and runtime contract
Only SOCKS TCP/UDP is published on host Only SOCKS TCP/UDP is published on host
`127.0.0.1:${ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_HOST_SOCKS_PORT:-11080}` for same-host Xray; `127.0.0.1:${ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_HOST_SOCKS_PORT:-11080}` for optional same-host
no Xray edits are supplied. SS port `8388` is internal, never published. Xray use; no Xray edits are supplied. SS port `8388` is internal and never
The server binds `0.0.0.0:8388` only inside the dedicated bridge namespace; published. The server binds `0.0.0.0:8388` only inside the dedicated bridge
ss-local binds `0.0.0.0:1080`. Startup requires a hex-only secret of at least namespace; ss-local binds `0.0.0.0:1080`. Startup validates a hex-only password
32 characters and writes JSON configs to the dedicated target-owned tmpfs of at least 32 characters, writes JSON configs to target-owned tmpfs
`/run/zapret-autotune-ss` (directory `0700`, files `0600`). Both Shadowsocks `/run/zapret-autotune-ss` (directory `0700`, files `0600`), then unsets the
processes receive only `-c <config_path>`, never a password in argv or env. password before starting child processes.
Docker administrators/root can still read mounted secrets and runtime configs;
file-backed Compose secrets are not encrypted storage.
The dedicated bridge is not shared with existing services. No host networking, The dedicated bridge is not shared with existing services. No host networking,
Docker socket, existing mounts, host Lua/fakes or privileged mode; all Docker socket, existing mounts, host Lua/fakes or privileged mode; all
capabilities are dropped except `NET_ADMIN`, `NET_RAW`, `SETUID`, `SETGID` capabilities are dropped except `NET_ADMIN`, `NET_RAW`, `SETUID`, `SETGID`.
and `DAC_OVERRIDE`.
`NET_ADMIN` covers nft/NFQUEUE; `NET_RAW` covers nfqws2 raw sends. Zapret2's `NET_ADMIN` covers nft/NFQUEUE; `NET_RAW` covers nfqws2 raw sends. Zapret2's
`nfqws2 --user=tpws` needs `SETUID`/`SETGID` for UID/GID switching, then retains `nfqws2 --user=tpws` needs `SETUID`/`SETGID` for UID/GID switching.
only `CAP_NET_RAW` and `CAP_NET_ADMIN`. `DAC_OVERRIDE` lets the root entrypoint
read the invoking user's mode-`0600` file-backed secret despite its different
host UID; it does not make the host file world-readable or writable through
the read-only secret mount. This capability is container-wide, not restricted
to one pathname: its safe scope depends on exposing only
`./ss_password` → `/run/secrets/ss_password` (read-only) and the fresh
`./target-state` → `/var/lib/zapret-autotune/target` bind, plus dedicated runtime
tmpfs. Never add host directories, other secrets or existing state to this
container. No default-all capability set is used. Rootless/user-remapped Docker
must validate secret readability separately; this does not bypass user-namespace
or host filesystem restrictions.
Go builder matches `Dockerfile`; runtime digest is pinned and image-owned Startup order: ss-server/ss-local → listener 1080 → guarded managed init on
Lua/fakes retained. Startup: ss-server/ss-local → internal listener 1080 fresh state (status on recreation) → target-local `zapret2 start` → supervised
(30-second bound) → guarded managed init on fresh state (status on recreation) managed monitor. Drift/pending state refuses startup; unknown state is never
→ zapret2 start using target config → one installed managed monitor child. Drift/pending state refuses startup; adopted. SIGTERM/SIGINT cancels and waits for the monitor before stopping
no automatic adoption of unknown state. SIGTERM/SIGINT cancels and waits the monitor target-local zapret and Shadowsocks children. Monitor fatal exits stop the
before stopping target-local zapret and the entrypoint's Shadowsocks children. entrypoint. Monitor health is YouTube Player API status through the owned SOCKS,
Monitor fatal exits stop the entrypoint; no restart policy hides fail-closed exits. not video playback/SABR; GGC candidates are scoped to the exact discovered
Monitor probes Player API via owned loopback SOCKS; unresolved GGC is not playback health. hostname.
Inside target, `zapret-autotune health youtube` uses The deployment has not yet passed live runtime acceptance. Validate the pinned
`socks5://127.0.0.1:1080`, never the host port. It is one-shot Player API health, image's JSON config loading, Lua/fakes, `ZAPRET_CONFIG` binding, target-local
not playback or scheduling. routing, NFQUEUE activation/rollback, signal cleanup and persistent recreation
on this new target only. Do not widen capabilities or reuse existing config or
The supplied remote read-only inspection verified shadowsocks-libev 3.3.5 network as a workaround. Verify the complete unattended path: empty profile →
and `ss-server -h` supports `-c <config_file>`; runtime JSON loading remains frontend/API candidate scan and apply → exact-host GGC candidate scan and apply
unverified. Before deployment acceptance, validate Lua/fakes, → ongoing probes → saved-first recovery, falling back to scan only when saved
`ZAPRET_CONFIG` binding and full zapret start/stop/restart with only scenarios validly fail.
the explicit `NET_ADMIN`, `NET_RAW`, `SETUID`, `SETGID`, `DAC_OVERRIDE` capability set (including
the `tpws` user drop). Prove target-local routing,
NFQUEUE activation/rollback, signal cleanup and persistent recreation on the
new target only. Compose syntax, build and runtime integration are unverified
by this producer. Do not widen capabilities or reuse existing config/network
as a workaround. Autonomous acceptance also needs tests/build and live verification
of monitor/recovery and crash reconciliation, including shutdown grace sufficient
for bounded restoration (which may exceed the defined 45s). Docker configuration
has not been changed by this code integration increment.
+9 -9
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@@ -9,20 +9,20 @@ entrypoint = (directory.parents[1] / "managed-target-entrypoint.sh").read_text()
readme = (directory / "README.md").read_text() readme = (directory / "README.md").read_text()
# ponytail: checks the committed Compose shape, not arbitrary YAML; use a YAML # ponytail: checks the committed Compose shape, not arbitrary YAML; use a YAML
# parser if this definition grows beyond its single service and single secret. # parser if this definition grows beyond its single target service.
assert " privileged: false\n" in compose assert " privileged: false\n" in compose
assert " cap_drop: [ALL]\n" in compose assert " cap_drop: [ALL]\n" in compose
assert " cap_add: [NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SETUID, SETGID, DAC_OVERRIDE]\n" in compose assert " cap_add: [NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SETUID, SETGID]\n" in compose
assert compose.count(" - type: bind\n") == 1 assert compose.count(" - type: bind\n") == 1
assert " source: ./target-state\n" in compose assert " source: ./target-state\n" in compose
assert " target: /var/lib/zapret-autotune/target\n" in compose assert " target: /var/lib/zapret-autotune/target\n" in compose
assert " create_host_path: false\n" in compose assert " create_host_path: false\n" in compose
assert " secrets: [ss_password]\n" in compose assert "SS_PASSWORD: ${SS_PASSWORD:?Set SS_PASSWORD in the deployment environment}" in compose
assert compose.endswith("secrets:\n ss_password:\n file: ./ss_password\n") assert "secrets:" not in compose
assert "SS_PASSWORD" not in compose assert "ss_password=${SS_PASSWORD-}" in entrypoint
assert "ss_password=$(cat /run/secrets/ss_password) || exit 1" in entrypoint assert "unset SS_PASSWORD" in entrypoint
assert "export ss_password" not in entrypoint assert "export ss_password" not in entrypoint
assert "export SS_PASSWORD" not in entrypoint assert "export SS_PASSWORD" not in entrypoint
assert "container-wide, not restricted" in readme assert "Docker administrators/root can still read container" in readme
assert "mode `0600`" in readme assert "removed\nfrom the entrypoint environment" in readme
assert "not a symlink" in readme assert "No host networking" in readme
+2 -7
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@@ -8,10 +8,9 @@ services:
privileged: false privileged: false
cap_drop: [ALL] cap_drop: [ALL]
# nft/NFQUEUE, nfqws2 raw sends, and --user=tpws UID/GID switching. # nft/NFQUEUE, nfqws2 raw sends, and --user=tpws UID/GID switching.
# DAC_OVERRIDE lets root read the invoking user's 0600 read-only secret bind. cap_add: [NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SETUID, SETGID]
# It is container-wide; expose only this secret and the fresh target-state bind.
cap_add: [NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SETUID, SETGID, DAC_OVERRIDE]
environment: environment:
SS_PASSWORD: ${SS_PASSWORD:?Set SS_PASSWORD in the deployment environment}
SOCKS_PORT: "1080" SOCKS_PORT: "1080"
ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_TARGET_ROLE: managed-test ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_TARGET_ROLE: managed-test
ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_TARGET_ID: zapret-autotune-managed-v1 ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_TARGET_ID: zapret-autotune-managed-v1
@@ -28,7 +27,6 @@ services:
target: /var/lib/zapret-autotune/target target: /var/lib/zapret-autotune/target
bind: bind:
create_host_path: false create_host_path: false
secrets: [ss_password]
tmpfs: tmpfs:
- /run/zapret-autotune-ss:rw,noexec,nosuid,nodev,size=1m,mode=0700,uid=0,gid=0 - /run/zapret-autotune-ss:rw,noexec,nosuid,nodev,size=1m,mode=0700,uid=0,gid=0
networks: [target] networks: [target]
@@ -36,6 +34,3 @@ services:
networks: networks:
target: target:
driver: bridge driver: bridge
secrets:
ss_password:
file: ./ss_password
+4 -3
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@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
#!/bin/sh #!/bin/sh
set -eu set -eu
umask 077 umask 077
unset SS_PASSWORD ss_password
[ "$#" -eq 0 ] || { echo 'error: target entrypoint accepts no arguments' >&2; exit 1; } [ "$#" -eq 0 ] || { echo 'error: target entrypoint accepts no arguments' >&2; exit 1; }
# Credentials never enter exported variables or Shadowsocks command arguments. # Credentials never enter argv or logs. Docker supplies SS_PASSWORD via env;
ss_password=$(cat /run/secrets/ss_password) || exit 1 # clear the exported value before starting any child processes.
ss_password=${SS_PASSWORD-}
unset SS_PASSWORD
case "$ss_password" in case "$ss_password" in
''|*[!0123456789abcdefABCDEF]*) ''|*[!0123456789abcdefABCDEF]*)
echo 'error: target secret must contain only hexadecimal characters' >&2; exit 1 ;; echo 'error: target secret must contain only hexadecimal characters' >&2; exit 1 ;;