chore(deploy): pass target password through env
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@@ -215,9 +215,8 @@ func TestManagedEntrypointSupervision(t *testing.T) {
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return path
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}
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log := filepath.Join(root, "log")
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write("secret", strings.Repeat("a", 32))
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write("awk", "#!/bin/sh\ncase \"$*\" in */proc/net/tcp*) until grep -q ready-ss-server \"$LOG\" && grep -q ready-ss-local \"$LOG\"; do sleep 0.02; done;; esac\nexit 0\n")
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child := "#!/bin/sh\ntrap 'echo stopped-$0 >> \"$LOG\"; exit 0' TERM INT\necho ready-$(basename \"$0\") >> \"$LOG\"\nwhile :; do sleep 0.1 & wait $!; done\n"
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child := "#!/bin/sh\n[ -z \"${SS_PASSWORD+x}\" ] || exit 88\ntrap 'echo stopped-$0 >> \"$LOG\"; exit 0' TERM INT\necho ready-$(basename \"$0\") >> \"$LOG\"\nwhile :; do sleep 0.1 & wait $!; done\n"
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write("ss-server", child)
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write("ss-local", child)
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zapret := write("zapret", "#!/bin/sh\necho zapret-$1 >> \"$LOG\"\n")
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@@ -226,12 +225,12 @@ func TestManagedEntrypointSupervision(t *testing.T) {
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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text := strings.NewReplacer("/run/secrets/ss_password", filepath.Join(root, "secret"), "/run/zapret-autotune-ss", config, "/usr/local/bin/zapret-autotune", monitor, managedZapretScript, zapret).Replace(string(data))
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text := strings.NewReplacer("/run/zapret-autotune-ss", config, "/usr/local/bin/zapret-autotune", monitor, managedZapretScript, zapret).Replace(string(data))
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entry := write("entrypoint", text)
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
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defer cancel()
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cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "/bin/sh", entry)
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cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "PATH="+root+":"+os.Getenv("PATH"), "LOG="+log, "MODE="+mode, "ZAPRET_CONFIG="+filepath.Join(root, "config"))
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cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "PATH="+root+":"+os.Getenv("PATH"), "LOG="+log, "MODE="+mode, "ZAPRET_CONFIG="+filepath.Join(root, "config"), "SS_PASSWORD="+strings.Repeat("a", 32))
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cmd.SysProcAttr = &syscall.SysProcAttr{Setpgid: true}
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var output bytes.Buffer
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cmd.Stdout, cmd.Stderr = &output, &output
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@@ -1,86 +1,70 @@
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# Isolated managed-test definition — deployment deferred
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# Isolated managed-test target
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This definition is **not autonomous acceptance-ready**: `managed monitor` and
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entrypoint recovery integration exist in code but are not live verified. Do not build/pull/start it as part of this
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change. Existing containers, production and Xray configuration are out of scope.
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This Compose project provisions a new, isolated target. It does not attach to,
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reconfigure, or stop the existing `zapret2-ss-autotune` container. The target
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starts from a disabled managed baseline; `managed monitor` bootstraps the
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frontend/API strategy, then discovers and applies an exact-host GGC strategy.
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For a later approved deployment, from this directory:
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## Provisioning
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1. Copy `.env.example` to `.env` and restrict it to `0600`; it sets only the
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host loopback SOCKS port. Generate a **new independent** secret locally:
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`(umask 077; set -C; openssl rand -hex 32 > ss_password)`.
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This refuses to overwrite an existing file. Never copy existing secrets or
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put the password in `.env`, environment variables or command arguments.
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`ss_password`, `.env` and state are gitignored and excluded from the build
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context. Do not commit the secret file. Compose mounts it read-only at
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`/run/secrets/ss_password`; keep the host file owned by the invoking user
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with mode `0600` (no deploy-time chown or world-readable permissions).
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Use only this newly generated regular file at `./ss_password`, not a symlink
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or a reused secret. Do not mount its parent directory or other host secrets.
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2. Provision a **new empty** `./target-state`, owned by host UID 0 (runtime
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user), mode `0700`. Rootless/user-remapped Docker needs the mapped owner.
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Never reuse mounts/state. Compose refuses a missing bind source. Retain
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state for recreation; deletion loses identity, journal, backups and DB.
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3. Orchestrator may validate without deploying:
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From this directory, create a private `.env` with a fresh independent password
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and the configured host SOCKS port:
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```sh
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(umask 077; set -C; printf 'SS_PASSWORD=%s\nZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_HOST_SOCKS_PORT=11080\n' "$(openssl rand -hex 32)" > .env)
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```
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This refuses to overwrite an existing `.env`; do not print it or commit it.
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Compose passes `SS_PASSWORD` as a container environment variable. It is removed
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from the entrypoint environment before Shadowsocks children start and is never
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placed in argv or logs. Docker administrators/root can still read container
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environment and runtime config, so use this only for the isolated test target.
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Create a **new empty** `./target-state`, owned by host UID 0 (runtime user),
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mode `0700`; rootless/user-remapped Docker needs the mapped owner. Never reuse
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state. Compose refuses a missing bind source. Retain state for recreation;
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deletion loses transaction identity, journal, backups and candidate DB.
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Validate without printing interpolated values:
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`docker compose --env-file .env -f compose.yaml config --quiet`.
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Rendered Compose config contains only the secret file path, not its value. Build/run require
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separate approval and runtime validation gates.
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Then build and start only this Compose project. The rendered configuration
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contains the environment password, so never use plain `docker compose config`
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in logs or shared terminals.
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Offline static guard (from repository root):
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`python3 deploy/managed-target/check_static.py`. It pins the capability allowlist
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and single-secret/single-state mount shape; it does not prove runtime readability.
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`python3 deploy/managed-target/check_static.py`.
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## Isolation and runtime contract
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Only SOCKS TCP/UDP is published on host
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`127.0.0.1:${ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_HOST_SOCKS_PORT:-11080}` for same-host Xray;
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no Xray edits are supplied. SS port `8388` is internal, never published.
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The server binds `0.0.0.0:8388` only inside the dedicated bridge namespace;
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ss-local binds `0.0.0.0:1080`. Startup requires a hex-only secret of at least
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32 characters and writes JSON configs to the dedicated target-owned tmpfs
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`/run/zapret-autotune-ss` (directory `0700`, files `0600`). Both Shadowsocks
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processes receive only `-c <config_path>`, never a password in argv or env.
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Docker administrators/root can still read mounted secrets and runtime configs;
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file-backed Compose secrets are not encrypted storage.
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`127.0.0.1:${ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_HOST_SOCKS_PORT:-11080}` for optional same-host
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Xray use; no Xray edits are supplied. SS port `8388` is internal and never
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published. The server binds `0.0.0.0:8388` only inside the dedicated bridge
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namespace; ss-local binds `0.0.0.0:1080`. Startup validates a hex-only password
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of at least 32 characters, writes JSON configs to target-owned tmpfs
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`/run/zapret-autotune-ss` (directory `0700`, files `0600`), then unsets the
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password before starting child processes.
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The dedicated bridge is not shared with existing services. No host networking,
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Docker socket, existing mounts, host Lua/fakes or privileged mode; all
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capabilities are dropped except `NET_ADMIN`, `NET_RAW`, `SETUID`, `SETGID`
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and `DAC_OVERRIDE`.
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capabilities are dropped except `NET_ADMIN`, `NET_RAW`, `SETUID`, `SETGID`.
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`NET_ADMIN` covers nft/NFQUEUE; `NET_RAW` covers nfqws2 raw sends. Zapret2's
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`nfqws2 --user=tpws` needs `SETUID`/`SETGID` for UID/GID switching, then retains
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only `CAP_NET_RAW` and `CAP_NET_ADMIN`. `DAC_OVERRIDE` lets the root entrypoint
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read the invoking user's mode-`0600` file-backed secret despite its different
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host UID; it does not make the host file world-readable or writable through
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the read-only secret mount. This capability is container-wide, not restricted
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to one pathname: its safe scope depends on exposing only
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`./ss_password` → `/run/secrets/ss_password` (read-only) and the fresh
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`./target-state` → `/var/lib/zapret-autotune/target` bind, plus dedicated runtime
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tmpfs. Never add host directories, other secrets or existing state to this
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container. No default-all capability set is used. Rootless/user-remapped Docker
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must validate secret readability separately; this does not bypass user-namespace
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or host filesystem restrictions.
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`nfqws2 --user=tpws` needs `SETUID`/`SETGID` for UID/GID switching.
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Go builder matches `Dockerfile`; runtime digest is pinned and image-owned
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Lua/fakes retained. Startup: ss-server/ss-local → internal listener 1080
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(30-second bound) → guarded managed init on fresh state (status on recreation)
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→ zapret2 start using target config → one installed managed monitor child. Drift/pending state refuses startup;
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no automatic adoption of unknown state. SIGTERM/SIGINT cancels and waits the monitor
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before stopping target-local zapret and the entrypoint's Shadowsocks children.
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Monitor fatal exits stop the entrypoint; no restart policy hides fail-closed exits.
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Monitor probes Player API via owned loopback SOCKS; unresolved GGC is not playback health.
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Startup order: ss-server/ss-local → listener 1080 → guarded managed init on
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fresh state (status on recreation) → target-local `zapret2 start` → supervised
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managed monitor. Drift/pending state refuses startup; unknown state is never
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adopted. SIGTERM/SIGINT cancels and waits for the monitor before stopping
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target-local zapret and Shadowsocks children. Monitor fatal exits stop the
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entrypoint. Monitor health is YouTube Player API status through the owned SOCKS,
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not video playback/SABR; GGC candidates are scoped to the exact discovered
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hostname.
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Inside target, `zapret-autotune health youtube` uses
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`socks5://127.0.0.1:1080`, never the host port. It is one-shot Player API health,
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not playback or scheduling.
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The supplied remote read-only inspection verified shadowsocks-libev 3.3.5
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and `ss-server -h` supports `-c <config_file>`; runtime JSON loading remains
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unverified. Before deployment acceptance, validate Lua/fakes,
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`ZAPRET_CONFIG` binding and full zapret start/stop/restart with only
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the explicit `NET_ADMIN`, `NET_RAW`, `SETUID`, `SETGID`, `DAC_OVERRIDE` capability set (including
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the `tpws` user drop). Prove target-local routing,
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NFQUEUE activation/rollback, signal cleanup and persistent recreation on the
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new target only. Compose syntax, build and runtime integration are unverified
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by this producer. Do not widen capabilities or reuse existing config/network
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as a workaround. Autonomous acceptance also needs tests/build and live verification
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of monitor/recovery and crash reconciliation, including shutdown grace sufficient
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for bounded restoration (which may exceed the defined 45s). Docker configuration
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has not been changed by this code integration increment.
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The deployment has not yet passed live runtime acceptance. Validate the pinned
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image's JSON config loading, Lua/fakes, `ZAPRET_CONFIG` binding, target-local
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routing, NFQUEUE activation/rollback, signal cleanup and persistent recreation
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on this new target only. Do not widen capabilities or reuse existing config or
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network as a workaround. Verify the complete unattended path: empty profile →
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frontend/API candidate scan and apply → exact-host GGC candidate scan and apply
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→ ongoing probes → saved-first recovery, falling back to scan only when saved
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scenarios validly fail.
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@@ -9,20 +9,20 @@ entrypoint = (directory.parents[1] / "managed-target-entrypoint.sh").read_text()
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readme = (directory / "README.md").read_text()
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# ponytail: checks the committed Compose shape, not arbitrary YAML; use a YAML
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# parser if this definition grows beyond its single service and single secret.
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# parser if this definition grows beyond its single target service.
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assert " privileged: false\n" in compose
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assert " cap_drop: [ALL]\n" in compose
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assert " cap_add: [NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SETUID, SETGID, DAC_OVERRIDE]\n" in compose
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assert " cap_add: [NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SETUID, SETGID]\n" in compose
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assert compose.count(" - type: bind\n") == 1
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assert " source: ./target-state\n" in compose
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assert " target: /var/lib/zapret-autotune/target\n" in compose
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assert " create_host_path: false\n" in compose
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assert " secrets: [ss_password]\n" in compose
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assert compose.endswith("secrets:\n ss_password:\n file: ./ss_password\n")
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assert "SS_PASSWORD" not in compose
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assert "ss_password=$(cat /run/secrets/ss_password) || exit 1" in entrypoint
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assert "SS_PASSWORD: ${SS_PASSWORD:?Set SS_PASSWORD in the deployment environment}" in compose
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assert "secrets:" not in compose
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assert "ss_password=${SS_PASSWORD-}" in entrypoint
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assert "unset SS_PASSWORD" in entrypoint
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assert "export ss_password" not in entrypoint
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assert "export SS_PASSWORD" not in entrypoint
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assert "container-wide, not restricted" in readme
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assert "mode `0600`" in readme
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assert "not a symlink" in readme
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assert "Docker administrators/root can still read container" in readme
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assert "removed\nfrom the entrypoint environment" in readme
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assert "No host networking" in readme
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@@ -8,10 +8,9 @@ services:
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privileged: false
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cap_drop: [ALL]
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# nft/NFQUEUE, nfqws2 raw sends, and --user=tpws UID/GID switching.
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# DAC_OVERRIDE lets root read the invoking user's 0600 read-only secret bind.
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# It is container-wide; expose only this secret and the fresh target-state bind.
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cap_add: [NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SETUID, SETGID, DAC_OVERRIDE]
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cap_add: [NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SETUID, SETGID]
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environment:
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SS_PASSWORD: ${SS_PASSWORD:?Set SS_PASSWORD in the deployment environment}
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SOCKS_PORT: "1080"
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ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_TARGET_ROLE: managed-test
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ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_TARGET_ID: zapret-autotune-managed-v1
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@@ -28,7 +27,6 @@ services:
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target: /var/lib/zapret-autotune/target
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bind:
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create_host_path: false
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secrets: [ss_password]
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tmpfs:
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- /run/zapret-autotune-ss:rw,noexec,nosuid,nodev,size=1m,mode=0700,uid=0,gid=0
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networks: [target]
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@@ -36,6 +34,3 @@ services:
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networks:
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target:
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driver: bridge
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secrets:
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ss_password:
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file: ./ss_password
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@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
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#!/bin/sh
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set -eu
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umask 077
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unset SS_PASSWORD ss_password
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[ "$#" -eq 0 ] || { echo 'error: target entrypoint accepts no arguments' >&2; exit 1; }
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# Credentials never enter exported variables or Shadowsocks command arguments.
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ss_password=$(cat /run/secrets/ss_password) || exit 1
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# Credentials never enter argv or logs. Docker supplies SS_PASSWORD via env;
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# clear the exported value before starting any child processes.
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ss_password=${SS_PASSWORD-}
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unset SS_PASSWORD
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case "$ss_password" in
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''|*[!0123456789abcdefABCDEF]*)
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echo 'error: target secret must contain only hexadecimal characters' >&2; exit 1 ;;
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