test(deploy): guard managed target isolation defaults
Co-authored-by: GPT-6 <gpt-6@openai.com>
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# Isolated managed-test definition — deployment deferred
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This definition is **not autonomous acceptance-ready**: no `managed monitor`
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or integrated recovery loop exists. Do not build/pull/start it as part of this
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change. Existing containers, production and Xray configuration are out of scope.
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For a later approved deployment, from this directory:
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1. Copy `.env.example` to `.env` and restrict it to `0600`; it sets only the
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host loopback SOCKS port. Generate a **new independent** secret locally:
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`(umask 077; set -C; openssl rand -hex 32 > ss_password)`.
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This refuses to overwrite an existing file. Never copy existing secrets or
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put the password in `.env`, environment variables or command arguments.
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`ss_password`, `.env` and state are gitignored and excluded from the build
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context. Do not commit the secret file. Compose mounts it read-only at
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`/run/secrets/ss_password`; keep the host file owned by the invoking user
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with mode `0600` (no deploy-time chown or world-readable permissions).
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Use only this newly generated regular file at `./ss_password`, not a symlink
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or a reused secret. Do not mount its parent directory or other host secrets.
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2. Provision a **new empty** `./target-state`, owned by host UID 0 (runtime
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user), mode `0700`. Rootless/user-remapped Docker needs the mapped owner.
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Never reuse mounts/state. Compose refuses a missing bind source. Retain
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state for recreation; deletion loses identity, journal, backups and DB.
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3. Orchestrator may validate without deploying:
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`docker compose --env-file .env -f compose.yaml config --quiet`.
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Rendered Compose config contains only the secret file path, not its value. Build/run require
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separate approval and runtime validation gates.
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Offline static guard (from repository root):
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`python3 deploy/managed-target/check_static.py`. It pins the capability allowlist
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and single-secret/single-state mount shape; it does not prove runtime readability.
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Only SOCKS TCP/UDP is published on host
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`127.0.0.1:${ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_HOST_SOCKS_PORT:-11080}` for same-host Xray;
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no Xray edits are supplied. SS port `8388` is internal, never published.
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The server binds `0.0.0.0:8388` only inside the dedicated bridge namespace;
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ss-local binds `0.0.0.0:1080`. Startup requires a hex-only secret of at least
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32 characters and writes JSON configs to the dedicated target-owned tmpfs
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`/run/zapret-autotune-ss` (directory `0700`, files `0600`). Both Shadowsocks
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processes receive only `-c <config_path>`, never a password in argv or env.
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Docker administrators/root can still read mounted secrets and runtime configs;
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file-backed Compose secrets are not encrypted storage.
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The dedicated bridge is not shared with existing services. No host networking,
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Docker socket, existing mounts, host Lua/fakes or privileged mode; all
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capabilities are dropped except `NET_ADMIN`, `NET_RAW`, `SETUID`, `SETGID`
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and `DAC_OVERRIDE`.
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`NET_ADMIN` covers nft/NFQUEUE; `NET_RAW` covers nfqws2 raw sends. Zapret2's
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`nfqws2 --user=tpws` needs `SETUID`/`SETGID` for UID/GID switching, then retains
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only `CAP_NET_RAW` and `CAP_NET_ADMIN`. `DAC_OVERRIDE` lets the root entrypoint
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read the invoking user's mode-`0600` file-backed secret despite its different
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host UID; it does not make the host file world-readable or writable through
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the read-only secret mount. This capability is container-wide, not restricted
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to one pathname: its safe scope depends on exposing only
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`./ss_password` → `/run/secrets/ss_password` (read-only) and the fresh
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`./target-state` → `/var/lib/zapret-autotune/target` bind, plus dedicated runtime
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tmpfs. Never add host directories, other secrets or existing state to this
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container. No default-all capability set is used. Rootless/user-remapped Docker
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must validate secret readability separately; this does not bypass user-namespace
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or host filesystem restrictions.
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Go builder matches `Dockerfile`; runtime digest is pinned and image-owned
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Lua/fakes retained. Startup: ss-server/ss-local → internal listener 1080
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(30-second bound) → guarded managed init on fresh state (status on recreation)
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→ zapret2 start using target config. Drift/pending state refuses startup;
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no automatic adoption/reconciliation. SIGTERM/SIGINT stop only target-local
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zapret firewall and the entrypoint's own Shadowsocks children. Process
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supervision is **not** health/recovery; no restart policy hides fail-closed exits.
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Inside target, `zapret-autotune health youtube` uses
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`socks5://127.0.0.1:1080`, never the host port. It is one-shot Player API health,
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not playback or scheduling.
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The supplied remote read-only inspection verified shadowsocks-libev 3.3.5
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and `ss-server -h` supports `-c <config_file>`; runtime JSON loading remains
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unverified. Before deployment acceptance, validate Lua/fakes,
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`ZAPRET_CONFIG` binding and full zapret start/stop/restart with only
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the explicit `NET_ADMIN`, `NET_RAW`, `SETUID`, `SETGID`, `DAC_OVERRIDE` capability set (including
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the `tpws` user drop). Prove target-local routing,
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NFQUEUE activation/rollback, signal cleanup and persistent recreation on the
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new target only. Compose syntax, build and runtime integration are unverified
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by this producer. Do not widen capabilities or reuse existing config/network
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as a workaround. Autonomous acceptance also needs monitor/recovery integration
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and crash reconciliation.
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