fix: keep rejected image payloads recoverable across verification
Type decoder payload rejections once and share the image nonpass classifier across live health and owned verification. Retain strict qualification, malformed metadata, source-kind separation and mixed safety vetoes; exercise seed fallback, joined workers, fresh evidence and durable absence cooldown. Co-authored-by: GPT-6 <gpt-6@openai.com>
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### Peer TLS rejection classification fix (2026-10-12)
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- Follow-up independent production repro exposed a separate decoder rejection bug: a bounded/origin-verified truncated image degraded live health but failed owned verification as infrastructure before remaining seeds. Image decoding now emits typed payload rejections (invalid magic/dimensions, truncated PNG/JPEG/GIF, body budget and content-type mismatch); both live health and candidate verification share that class, without accepting any payload or fabricating evidence. Missing/corrupt normalized evidence, malformed transfer metrics/Player JSON, arbitrary same-text errors, explicit guards and mixed cancellation remain fatal; image rejection cannot become media absence. Permanent production monitor tests cover joined workers, seed exhaustion/two-hour pause and a later seed's fresh both-TLS 3/3 evidence with preserved frontend/GGC profiles. The independent overlay repro, affected Go tests and race tests, vet, CLI build and diff checks passed locally; no remote deployment was performed.
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- Read-only field inspection: RC source `50a78608ce40dfc26289b5a63d01eeb3fc569ace`, image `sha256:1a97f34cfbe3bd606d5fb13599767f8a51273b374fa441f5e67802c74d814701`, container `d361b5d581bf710af28f14d3998d6a9a699661b827248c12c9352182df94f98d` is now exited78 (finished `2026-10-12T18:44:23.941802233Z`); host port11082 has no TCP listener. The earlier `proof-v2/final.safe.json` observation at 18:44:10 reported it running, so it is not current uptime evidence. Private artifacts: `/home/agent/zapret2-autotune-rc-50a7860/proof-v2/`.
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- That safe collector evidence contains a fresh allowed avatar URL, avatar TLS1.2 curl60 and TLS1.3 curl35, both zero samples/FAIL with generic fatal wrappers; thumbnail and sampled media passed. Terminal safe logs subsequently show avatar degradation, **thumbnail** degradation, recovery failure, and the generic safety/database/runtime terminal branch. They do not identify the exact terminal underlying error: do not claim avatar TLS alone is proven to have caused exit78 or that a real local guard failed.
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- Source fix distinguishes validated resource-curl peer TLS rejection (35/51/60) from process-wide operational safety. It remains rejected/unqualified, with certificate verification, origin checks and SSLVerifyResult=0 qualification unchanged. Probe/recovery can remain DEGRADED; genuine exhausted asset verification enters the existing minimum two-hour pause with workers joined and committed profiles preserved. Local proxy connection7, client-certificate configuration58, unknown/mixed cancellation and explicit guard/cleanup failures remain infrastructure/safety failures. No certificate bypass, host pinning, DNS change, family promotion or READY claim.
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