fix: keep rejected image payloads recoverable across verification
Type decoder payload rejections once and share the image nonpass classifier across live health and owned verification. Retain strict qualification, malformed metadata, source-kind separation and mixed safety vetoes; exercise seed fallback, joined workers, fresh evidence and durable absence cooldown. Co-authored-by: GPT-6 <gpt-6@openai.com>
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@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
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### Peer TLS rejection classification fix (2026-10-12)
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### Peer TLS rejection classification fix (2026-10-12)
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- Follow-up independent production repro exposed a separate decoder rejection bug: a bounded/origin-verified truncated image degraded live health but failed owned verification as infrastructure before remaining seeds. Image decoding now emits typed payload rejections (invalid magic/dimensions, truncated PNG/JPEG/GIF, body budget and content-type mismatch); both live health and candidate verification share that class, without accepting any payload or fabricating evidence. Missing/corrupt normalized evidence, malformed transfer metrics/Player JSON, arbitrary same-text errors, explicit guards and mixed cancellation remain fatal; image rejection cannot become media absence. Permanent production monitor tests cover joined workers, seed exhaustion/two-hour pause and a later seed's fresh both-TLS 3/3 evidence with preserved frontend/GGC profiles. The independent overlay repro, affected Go tests and race tests, vet, CLI build and diff checks passed locally; no remote deployment was performed.
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- Read-only field inspection: RC source `50a78608ce40dfc26289b5a63d01eeb3fc569ace`, image `sha256:1a97f34cfbe3bd606d5fb13599767f8a51273b374fa441f5e67802c74d814701`, container `d361b5d581bf710af28f14d3998d6a9a699661b827248c12c9352182df94f98d` is now exited78 (finished `2026-10-12T18:44:23.941802233Z`); host port11082 has no TCP listener. The earlier `proof-v2/final.safe.json` observation at 18:44:10 reported it running, so it is not current uptime evidence. Private artifacts: `/home/agent/zapret2-autotune-rc-50a7860/proof-v2/`.
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- Read-only field inspection: RC source `50a78608ce40dfc26289b5a63d01eeb3fc569ace`, image `sha256:1a97f34cfbe3bd606d5fb13599767f8a51273b374fa441f5e67802c74d814701`, container `d361b5d581bf710af28f14d3998d6a9a699661b827248c12c9352182df94f98d` is now exited78 (finished `2026-10-12T18:44:23.941802233Z`); host port11082 has no TCP listener. The earlier `proof-v2/final.safe.json` observation at 18:44:10 reported it running, so it is not current uptime evidence. Private artifacts: `/home/agent/zapret2-autotune-rc-50a7860/proof-v2/`.
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- That safe collector evidence contains a fresh allowed avatar URL, avatar TLS1.2 curl60 and TLS1.3 curl35, both zero samples/FAIL with generic fatal wrappers; thumbnail and sampled media passed. Terminal safe logs subsequently show avatar degradation, **thumbnail** degradation, recovery failure, and the generic safety/database/runtime terminal branch. They do not identify the exact terminal underlying error: do not claim avatar TLS alone is proven to have caused exit78 or that a real local guard failed.
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- That safe collector evidence contains a fresh allowed avatar URL, avatar TLS1.2 curl60 and TLS1.3 curl35, both zero samples/FAIL with generic fatal wrappers; thumbnail and sampled media passed. Terminal safe logs subsequently show avatar degradation, **thumbnail** degradation, recovery failure, and the generic safety/database/runtime terminal branch. They do not identify the exact terminal underlying error: do not claim avatar TLS alone is proven to have caused exit78 or that a real local guard failed.
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- Source fix distinguishes validated resource-curl peer TLS rejection (35/51/60) from process-wide operational safety. It remains rejected/unqualified, with certificate verification, origin checks and SSLVerifyResult=0 qualification unchanged. Probe/recovery can remain DEGRADED; genuine exhausted asset verification enters the existing minimum two-hour pause with workers joined and committed profiles preserved. Local proxy connection7, client-certificate configuration58, unknown/mixed cancellation and explicit guard/cleanup failures remain infrastructure/safety failures. No certificate bypass, host pinning, DNS change, family promotion or READY claim.
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- Source fix distinguishes validated resource-curl peer TLS rejection (35/51/60) from process-wide operational safety. It remains rejected/unqualified, with certificate verification, origin checks and SSLVerifyResult=0 qualification unchanged. Probe/recovery can remain DEGRADED; genuine exhausted asset verification enters the existing minimum two-hour pause with workers joined and committed profiles preserved. Local proxy connection7, client-certificate configuration58, unknown/mixed cancellation and explicit guard/cleanup failures remain infrastructure/safety failures. No certificate bypass, host pinning, DNS change, family promotion or READY claim.
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@@ -177,27 +177,36 @@ func validateAssetTransfers(m assetMeasurement) (float64, float64, error) {
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return latency[1], speed[1], nil
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return latency[1], speed[1], nil
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}
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}
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// Only supplied body bytes can produce this typed rejection. Missing/corrupt
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// normalized evidence remains a local format error, never candidate absence.
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type imageBodyRejection string
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func (e imageBodyRejection) Error() string { return string(e) }
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// Bodies are transient. Stored evidence carries only verified normalized facts.
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// Bodies are transient. Stored evidence carries only verified normalized facts.
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func normalizeAssetBody(t *assetTransfer) error {
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func normalizeAssetBody(t *assetTransfer) error {
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if len(t.Body) != 0 {
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if len(t.Body) != 0 {
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if len(t.Body) > 5<<20 {
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if len(t.Body) > 5<<20 {
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return fmt.Errorf("image body exceeds limit")
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return imageBodyRejection("image body exceeds limit")
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}
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}
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cfg, format, err := image.DecodeConfig(bytes.NewReader(t.Body))
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cfg, format, err := image.DecodeConfig(bytes.NewReader(t.Body))
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if err != nil || cfg.Width <= 0 || cfg.Height <= 0 || cfg.Width > (16<<20)/cfg.Height {
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if err != nil || cfg.Width <= 0 || cfg.Height <= 0 || cfg.Width > (16<<20)/cfg.Height {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid image dimensions")
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return imageBodyRejection("invalid image dimensions")
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}
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}
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if format == "gif" {
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if format == "gif" {
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if _, err := gif.DecodeAll(bytes.NewReader(t.Body)); err != nil {
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if _, err := gif.DecodeAll(bytes.NewReader(t.Body)); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid GIF body")
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return imageBodyRejection("invalid GIF body")
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}
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}
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} else if _, _, err := image.Decode(bytes.NewReader(t.Body)); err != nil {
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} else if _, _, err := image.Decode(bytes.NewReader(t.Body)); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid image body")
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return imageBodyRejection("invalid image body")
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}
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}
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t.Format, t.Size, t.BodyHash = format, len(t.Body), fmt.Sprintf("%x", sha256.Sum256(t.Body))
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t.Format, t.Size, t.BodyHash = format, len(t.Body), fmt.Sprintf("%x", sha256.Sum256(t.Body))
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}
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}
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want := map[string]string{"png": "image/png", "jpeg": "image/jpeg", "gif": "image/gif"}[t.Format]
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want := map[string]string{"png": "image/png", "jpeg": "image/jpeg", "gif": "image/gif"}[t.Format]
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if want == "" || t.ContentType != want || t.Size <= 0 || t.Size > 5<<20 || len(t.BodyHash) != 64 || strings.Trim(t.BodyHash, "0123456789abcdef") != "" {
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if want == "" || t.ContentType != want || t.Size <= 0 || t.Size > 5<<20 || len(t.BodyHash) != 64 || strings.Trim(t.BodyHash, "0123456789abcdef") != "" {
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if len(t.Body) != 0 {
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return imageBodyRejection("invalid image content type")
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}
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid normalized image evidence")
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid normalized image evidence")
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}
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}
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return nil
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return nil
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@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
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package main
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"image"
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"image/jpeg"
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"io"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"time"
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)
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func rejectedImageRunner(mode string) subprocessRunner {
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return func(_ context.Context, args []string, in io.Reader, out, diag io.Writer) error {
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config, err := io.ReadAll(in)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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raw := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(string(config), "url = \""), "\"\n")
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body, contentType := resourceFixture(), "image/png"
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switch mode {
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case "jpeg":
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var b bytes.Buffer
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if err := jpeg.Encode(&b, image.NewRGBA(image.Rect(0, 0, 8, 8)), nil); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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body, contentType = b.Bytes(), "image/jpeg"
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if start := bytes.Index(body, []byte{0xff, 0xda}); start >= 0 {
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body = body[:start+12]
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}
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case "png":
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body = body[:len(body)/2]
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case "magic":
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body = []byte("not an image")
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case "gif":
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body, contentType = []byte("GIF89a\x01\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00"), "image/gif"
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case "dimensions":
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body, contentType = []byte("GIF89a\xff\xff\xff\xff\x00\x00\x00"), "image/gif"
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case "type":
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contentType = "image/jpeg"
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case "unknown":
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return errors.New("invalid image body")
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}
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fmt.Fprintf(out, "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Type: %s\r\nContent-Length: %d\r\n\r\n", contentType, len(body))
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if _, err := out.Write(body); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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metrics, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]interface{}{"url_effective": raw, "ssl_verify_result": 0, "num_redirects": 0, "http_code": 200, "time_total": 0.1, "speed_download": 10000, "size_download": len(body)})
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if mode == "footer" {
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metrics = []byte("{malformed")
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}
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fmt.Fprint(out, resourceTrailer, string(metrics))
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protocol := "TLSv1.2"
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if strings.Contains(strings.Join(args, " "), "--tlsv1.3") {
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protocol = "TLSv1.3"
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}
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fmt.Fprintln(diag, "SSL connection using "+protocol)
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return nil
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}
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}
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func TestImageBodyRejectionCollectorBoundaries(t *testing.T) {
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for _, mode := range []string{"jpeg", "png", "magic", "gif", "dimensions", "type", "unknown", "footer"} {
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t.Run(mode, func(t *testing.T) {
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m, err := collectAssetMeasurement(context.Background(), "socks5://127.0.0.1:1080", "https://i.ytimg.com/image", "i.ytimg.com", "tls12", "", rejectedImageRunner(mode))
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if err == nil || len(m.Transfers) != 0 {
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t.Fatal("invalid image qualified", m, err)
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}
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ordinary := mode != "unknown" && mode != "footer"
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var fatal *managedRecoveryFatal
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if errors.As(err, &fatal) == ordinary || managedAssetTransferNonpass(err) != ordinary || managedAssetHealthNonpass(err) != ordinary {
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t.Fatal("wrong rejection class", err)
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}
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if managedGooglevideoTransferNonpass(err) {
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t.Fatal("image rejection became media absence")
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}
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for _, veto := range []error{context.Canceled, errors.New("unknown infrastructure"), &managedRecoveryFatal{Err: imageBodyRejection("invalid image body")}} {
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mixed := resourceFailure(context.Background(), errors.Join(err, veto))
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if !errors.As(mixed, &fatal) || managedAssetTransferNonpass(mixed) || managedAssetHealthNonpass(mixed) {
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t.Fatal("mixed safety veto lost", mixed)
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}
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}
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})
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}
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_, _, metadataErr := playerMediaResource([]byte("{malformed"))
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if metadataErr == nil {
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t.Fatal("malformed Player JSON accepted")
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}
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for _, err := range []error{metadataErr, errors.New("invalid normalized image evidence")} {
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failure := resourceFailure(context.Background(), err)
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var fatal *managedRecoveryFatal
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if !errors.As(failure, &fatal) || managedAssetTransferNonpass(failure) || managedGooglevideoTransferNonpass(failure) {
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t.Fatal("local metadata damage became absence", failure)
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}
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}
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oversized := assetTransfer{Body: make([]byte, (5<<20)+1)}
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if err := normalizeAssetBody(&oversized); err == nil || !managedAssetTransferNonpass(resourceFailure(context.Background(), err)) {
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t.Fatal("image decoder budget rejection lost", err)
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}
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}
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func TestManagedTruncatedImageMonitorRecovery(t *testing.T) {
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for _, recoverable := range []bool{false, true} {
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t.Run(fmt.Sprint(recoverable), func(t *testing.T) {
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d, front, _ := recoveryFixture(t, true)
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target, _, _ := managedCLIFixture(t)
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initManagedCLI(t, target)
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d.transaction.Dir = target.directory
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r, events, _ := assetRuntimeFixture(t)
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good, start := r.curl, r.start
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attempts := 0
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r.start = func(args []string) (managedAssetWorker, error) { attempts++; return start(args) }
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r.curl = func(ctx context.Context, args []string, in io.Reader, out, diag io.Writer) error {
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if recoverable && attempts >= 2 {
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return good(ctx, args, in, out, diag)
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}
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return rejectedImageRunner("jpeg")(ctx, args, in, out, diag)
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}
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ggc := managedCandidateFixture(t, d.db, "googlevideo", "fresh.googlevideo.com", "--lua-desync=fake", true)
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ids := []int64{front, ggc}
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if err := d.transaction.Apply(d.db, ids); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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d.service = true
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d.frontHealth = func(context.Context) (string, error) { return "OK", nil }
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d.resources = func(context.Context) (managedServiceInventory, error) {
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return managedServiceInventory{images: map[string]string{"i.ytimg.com": "https://i.ytimg.com/image"}, proxy: r.proxy, runner: r.curl}, nil
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}
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d.verifyAssets = r.verify
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d.health = managedServiceHealth(r.proxy, d.frontHealth, d.resources, r.curl)
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monitor := monitorRuntimeFixture(t)
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monitor.db, monitor.target, monitor.threshold = d.db, target, 1
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if err := wireManagedRecovery(&monitor, d, func(error) {}); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
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defer cancel()
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monitor.reportRecoveryError = func(err error) {
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if recoverable || !errors.Is(err, errNoQualifiedStrategy) {
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t.Fatal("wrong recovery result", err)
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}
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}
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waits := 0
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monitor.wait = func(ctx context.Context, _ time.Duration) error {
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state, err := readMonitorState(d.db, monitor.serviceID)
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if err != nil || state.RecoveryRunning {
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t.Fatal("recovery ownership retained", state, err)
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}
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if !recoverable && state.CooldownUntil.Before(monitor.now().Add(2*time.Hour)) {
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t.Fatal("missing two-hour pause", state)
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}
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waits++
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if waits == 2 {
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cancel()
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return ctx.Err()
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}
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return nil
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}
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if err := runManagedMonitor(ctx, monitor); !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
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t.Fatal("invalid payload killed monitor", err, *events)
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}
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want := len(managedAssetSeeds)
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if recoverable {
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want = 2
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}
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joins := 0
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for _, event := range *events {
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if event == "join" {
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joins++
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}
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}
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if attempts != want || joins != want {
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t.Fatal("seed fallback/worker join failed", attempts, joins, *events)
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}
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active, err := d.transaction.ActiveCandidates(d.db)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if recoverable {
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if len(active) != 3 {
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t.Fatal("fresh image not applied", active)
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}
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fresh, err := readStrategyCandidate(d.db, active[2])
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if err != nil || !fresh.Qualified || fresh.Args != managedAssetSeeds[1] {
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t.Fatal("invalid fresh evidence", fresh, err)
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}
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ids = append(ids, fresh.ID)
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var rows int
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if err := d.db.QueryRow("SELECT count(*) FROM candidate_evidence WHERE candidate_id=? AND passes_ok=3 AND passes_total=3", fresh.ID).Scan(&rows); err != nil || rows != 2 {
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t.Fatal("missing both TLS 3/3 rows", rows, err)
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}
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}
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assertActiveCandidates(t, d.transaction, d.db, ids)
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})
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}
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}
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@@ -350,7 +350,9 @@ func managedAssetTransferNonpass(err error) bool {
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case *managedRecoveryFatal:
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case *managedRecoveryFatal:
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return false
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return false
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case *resourceError:
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case *resourceError:
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return managedResourceTransferNonpass(e, false)
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return managedResourceTransferNonpass(e, false, true)
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case imageBodyRejection:
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return true
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case *resourcePeerTLSRejection:
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case *resourcePeerTLSRejection:
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return true
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return true
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case *exec.ExitError:
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case *exec.ExitError:
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@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ func managedResourceHealthError(ctx context.Context, err error) error {
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}
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}
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var failure *managedResourceFailure
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var failure *managedResourceFailure
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var collector *resourceError
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var collector *resourceError
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if ctx.Err() == nil && errors.As(err, &failure) && (failure.ProbeKind == "media" || assetEndpoint(failure.Host) && failure.ProbeKind == managedImageProbeKind(failure.Host)) && errors.As(failure.Err, &collector) && managedResourceTransferNonpass(err, assetEndpoint(failure.Host)) {
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if ctx.Err() == nil && errors.As(err, &failure) && (failure.ProbeKind == "media" || assetEndpoint(failure.Host) && failure.ProbeKind == managedImageProbeKind(failure.Host)) && errors.As(failure.Err, &collector) && managedResourceTransferNonpass(err, assetEndpoint(failure.Host), assetEndpoint(failure.Host)) {
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return &managedResourceFailure{ProbeKind: failure.ProbeKind, Host: failure.Host}
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return &managedResourceFailure{ProbeKind: failure.ProbeKind, Host: failure.Host}
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}
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}
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return managedRecoveryContextError(ctx, err)
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return managedRecoveryContextError(ctx, err)
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@@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ func managedAssetHealthNonpass(err error) bool {
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if err == nil || err == context.Canceled {
|
if err == nil || err == context.Canceled {
|
||||||
return false
|
return false
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
return managedAssetTransferNonpass(err) || err.Error() == "image body exceeds limit" || err.Error() == "invalid image dimensions" || err.Error() == "invalid image body"
|
return managedAssetTransferNonpass(err)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -186,10 +186,10 @@ func (r managedAssetRuntime) verifyGooglevideo(ctx context.Context, c storedCand
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func managedGooglevideoTransferNonpass(err error) bool {
|
func managedGooglevideoTransferNonpass(err error) bool {
|
||||||
return managedResourceTransferNonpass(err, false)
|
return managedResourceTransferNonpass(err, false, false)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func managedResourceTransferNonpass(err error, metadata bool) bool {
|
func managedResourceTransferNonpass(err error, metadata, image bool) bool {
|
||||||
// Collector normalization wraps known transfer failures as fatal for generic
|
// Collector normalization wraps known transfer failures as fatal for generic
|
||||||
// consumers. Only that boundary may unwrap the wrapper; guard/cleanup failures
|
// consumers. Only that boundary may unwrap the wrapper; guard/cleanup failures
|
||||||
// and mixed error sets must never authorize absence or a daemon restart.
|
// and mixed error sets must never authorize absence or a daemon restart.
|
||||||
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ func managedResourceTransferNonpass(err error, metadata bool) bool {
|
|||||||
if fatal, ok := cause.(*managedRecoveryFatal); ok {
|
if fatal, ok := cause.(*managedRecoveryFatal); ok {
|
||||||
cause = fatal.Err
|
cause = fatal.Err
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
return managedResourceTransferNonpass(cause, metadata)
|
return managedResourceTransferNonpass(cause, metadata, image)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
if _, ok := err.(*managedRecoveryFatal); ok {
|
if _, ok := err.(*managedRecoveryFatal); ok {
|
||||||
return false
|
return false
|
||||||
@@ -209,14 +209,17 @@ func managedResourceTransferNonpass(err error, metadata bool) bool {
|
|||||||
return false
|
return false
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
for _, child := range children {
|
for _, child := range children {
|
||||||
if !managedResourceTransferNonpass(child, metadata) {
|
if !managedResourceTransferNonpass(child, metadata, image) {
|
||||||
return false
|
return false
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
return true
|
return true
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
if wrapped, ok := err.(interface{ Unwrap() error }); ok {
|
if wrapped, ok := err.(interface{ Unwrap() error }); ok {
|
||||||
return managedResourceTransferNonpass(wrapped.Unwrap(), metadata)
|
return managedResourceTransferNonpass(wrapped.Unwrap(), metadata, image)
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if _, ok := err.(imageBodyRejection); ok {
|
||||||
|
return image
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
// Metadata curl uses --fail. A non-2xx response is missing inventory,
|
// Metadata curl uses --fail. A non-2xx response is missing inventory,
|
||||||
// never media rejection or candidate-absence evidence.
|
// never media rejection or candidate-absence evidence.
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -305,12 +305,13 @@ func TestManagedServiceAssetLocalHealthFailureRollsBack(t *testing.T) {
|
|||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func TestManagedAssetHealthNonpassPreservesMixedSafetyFailures(t *testing.T) {
|
func TestManagedAssetHealthNonpassPreservesMixedSafetyFailures(t *testing.T) {
|
||||||
badBody := resourceFailure(context.Background(), errors.New("invalid image body"))
|
badBody := resourceFailure(context.Background(), imageBodyRejection("invalid image body"))
|
||||||
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
for _, tc := range []struct {
|
||||||
err error
|
err error
|
||||||
nonpass bool
|
nonpass bool
|
||||||
}{
|
}{
|
||||||
{badBody, true},
|
{badBody, true},
|
||||||
|
{resourceFailure(context.Background(), errors.New("invalid image body")), false},
|
||||||
{&managedRecoveryFatal{Err: errors.New("invalid image body")}, false},
|
{&managedRecoveryFatal{Err: errors.New("invalid image body")}, false},
|
||||||
{errors.Join(badBody, &managedRecoveryFatal{Err: errors.New("guard failed")}), false},
|
{errors.Join(badBody, &managedRecoveryFatal{Err: errors.New("guard failed")}), false},
|
||||||
{errors.Join(badBody, context.Canceled), false},
|
{errors.Join(badBody, context.Canceled), false},
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -40,12 +40,13 @@ type resourcePeerTLSRejection struct{ error }
|
|||||||
func (e *resourcePeerTLSRejection) Error() string { return "resource peer TLS rejected" }
|
func (e *resourcePeerTLSRejection) Error() string { return "resource peer TLS rejected" }
|
||||||
func (e *resourcePeerTLSRejection) Unwrap() error { return e.error }
|
func (e *resourcePeerTLSRejection) Unwrap() error { return e.error }
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
func resourcePeerTLSOnly(err error) bool {
|
func resourceRejectionOnly(err error) bool {
|
||||||
if _, ok := err.(*resourcePeerTLSRejection); ok {
|
switch err.(type) {
|
||||||
|
case *resourcePeerTLSRejection, imageBodyRejection:
|
||||||
return true
|
return true
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
if e, ok := err.(*resourceError); ok {
|
if e, ok := err.(*resourceError); ok {
|
||||||
return resourcePeerTLSOnly(e.cause)
|
return resourceRejectionOnly(e.cause)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
if e, ok := err.(interface{ Unwrap() []error }); ok {
|
if e, ok := err.(interface{ Unwrap() []error }); ok {
|
||||||
children := e.Unwrap()
|
children := e.Unwrap()
|
||||||
@@ -53,7 +54,7 @@ func resourcePeerTLSOnly(err error) bool {
|
|||||||
return false
|
return false
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
for _, child := range children {
|
for _, child := range children {
|
||||||
if !resourcePeerTLSOnly(child) {
|
if !resourceRejectionOnly(child) {
|
||||||
return false
|
return false
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -75,7 +76,7 @@ func resourceFailure(ctx context.Context, err error) error {
|
|||||||
if ctx.Err() != nil {
|
if ctx.Err() != nil {
|
||||||
err = errors.Join(err, ctx.Err())
|
err = errors.Join(err, ctx.Err())
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
if !managedRecoveryTimeoutSafe(err) && !resourcePeerTLSOnly(err) {
|
if !managedRecoveryTimeoutSafe(err) && !resourceRejectionOnly(err) {
|
||||||
err = &managedRecoveryFatal{Err: err}
|
err = &managedRecoveryFatal{Err: err}
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
return &resourceError{cause: err}
|
return &resourceError{cause: err}
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ func TestResourceRejectionsAndCancellation(t *testing.T) {
|
|||||||
t.Fatal("accepted failure or exposed secret", err)
|
t.Fatal("accepted failure or exposed secret", err)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
var fatal *managedRecoveryFatal
|
var fatal *managedRecoveryFatal
|
||||||
if errors.As(err, &fatal) != (mode != "cancel") {
|
if errors.As(err, &fatal) != (mode != "cancel" && mode != "truncated" && mode != "type") {
|
||||||
t.Fatal("unsafe cancellation classification", err)
|
t.Fatal("unsafe cancellation classification", err)
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
if (mode == "cancel" || mode == "mixed") && !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
|
if (mode == "cancel" || mode == "mixed") && !errors.Is(err, context.Canceled) {
|
||||||
|
|||||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user