# Isolated managed-test target This Compose project provisions a new, isolated target. It does not attach to, reconfigure, or stop the existing `zapret2-ss-autotune` container. The target starts from a disabled managed baseline; `managed monitor` bootstraps the frontend/API strategy, then discovers and applies an exact-host GGC strategy. ## Provisioning From this directory, create a private `.env` with a fresh independent password and the configured host SOCKS port: ```sh (umask 077; set -C; printf 'SS_PASSWORD=%s\nZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_HOST_SOCKS_PORT=11080\n' "$(openssl rand -hex 32)" > .env) ``` This refuses to overwrite an existing `.env`; do not print it or commit it. Compose passes `SS_PASSWORD` as a container environment variable. It is removed from the entrypoint environment before Shadowsocks children start and is never placed in argv or logs. Docker administrators/root can still read container environment and runtime config, so use this only for the isolated test target. Create a **new empty** `./target-state`, owned by host UID 0 (runtime user), mode `0700`; rootless/user-remapped Docker needs the mapped owner. Never reuse state. Compose refuses a missing bind source. Retain state for recreation; deletion loses transaction identity, journal, backups and candidate DB. Validate without printing interpolated values: `docker compose --env-file .env -f compose.yaml config --quiet`. Then build and start only this Compose project. The rendered configuration contains the environment password, so never use plain `docker compose config` in logs or shared terminals. Offline static guard (from repository root): `python3 deploy/managed-target/check_static.py`. ## Isolation and runtime contract Only SOCKS TCP/UDP is published on host `127.0.0.1:${ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_HOST_SOCKS_PORT:-11080}` for optional same-host Xray use; no Xray edits are supplied. SS port `8388` is internal and never published. The server binds `0.0.0.0:8388` only inside the dedicated bridge namespace; ss-local binds `0.0.0.0:1080`. Startup validates a hex-only password of at least 32 characters, writes JSON configs to target-owned tmpfs `/run/zapret-autotune-ss` (directory `0700`, files `0600`), then unsets the password before starting child processes. The dedicated bridge is not shared with existing services. No host networking, Docker socket, existing mounts, host Lua/fakes or privileged mode; all capabilities are dropped except `NET_ADMIN`, `NET_RAW`, `SETUID`, `SETGID`. `NET_ADMIN` covers nft/NFQUEUE; `NET_RAW` covers nfqws2 raw sends. Zapret2's `nfqws2 --user=tpws` needs `SETUID`/`SETGID` for UID/GID switching. Startup order: ss-server/ss-local → listener 1080 → guarded managed init on fresh state (status on recreation) → target-local `zapret2 start` → supervised managed monitor. Drift/pending state refuses startup; unknown state is never adopted. SIGTERM/SIGINT cancels and waits for the monitor before stopping target-local zapret and Shadowsocks children. Monitor fatal exits stop the entrypoint. Monitor health is YouTube Player API status through the owned SOCKS, not video playback/SABR; GGC candidates are scoped to the exact discovered hostname. The deployment has not yet passed live runtime acceptance. Validate the pinned image's JSON config loading, Lua/fakes, `ZAPRET_CONFIG` binding, target-local routing, NFQUEUE activation/rollback, signal cleanup and persistent recreation on this new target only. Do not widen capabilities or reuse existing config or network as a workaround. Verify the complete unattended path: empty profile → frontend/API candidate scan and apply → exact-host GGC candidate scan and apply → ongoing probes → saved-first recovery, falling back to scan only when saved scenarios validly fail.