# Isolated managed-test definition — deployment deferred This definition is **not autonomous acceptance-ready**: no `managed monitor` or integrated recovery loop exists. Do not build/pull/start it as part of this change. Existing containers, production and Xray configuration are out of scope. For a later approved deployment, from this directory: 1. Copy `.env.example` to `.env` and restrict it to `0600`; it sets only the host loopback SOCKS port. Generate a **new independent** secret locally: `(umask 077; set -C; openssl rand -hex 32 > ss_password)`. This refuses to overwrite an existing file. Never copy existing secrets or put the password in `.env`, environment variables or command arguments. `ss_password`, `.env` and state are gitignored and excluded from the build context. Do not commit the secret file. Compose mounts it read-only at `/run/secrets/ss_password`; keep the host file owned by the invoking user with mode `0600` (no deploy-time chown or world-readable permissions). Use only this newly generated regular file at `./ss_password`, not a symlink or a reused secret. Do not mount its parent directory or other host secrets. 2. Provision a **new empty** `./target-state`, owned by host UID 0 (runtime user), mode `0700`. Rootless/user-remapped Docker needs the mapped owner. Never reuse mounts/state. Compose refuses a missing bind source. Retain state for recreation; deletion loses identity, journal, backups and DB. 3. Orchestrator may validate without deploying: `docker compose --env-file .env -f compose.yaml config --quiet`. Rendered Compose config contains only the secret file path, not its value. Build/run require separate approval and runtime validation gates. Offline static guard (from repository root): `python3 deploy/managed-target/check_static.py`. It pins the capability allowlist and single-secret/single-state mount shape; it does not prove runtime readability. Only SOCKS TCP/UDP is published on host `127.0.0.1:${ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_HOST_SOCKS_PORT:-11080}` for same-host Xray; no Xray edits are supplied. SS port `8388` is internal, never published. The server binds `0.0.0.0:8388` only inside the dedicated bridge namespace; ss-local binds `0.0.0.0:1080`. Startup requires a hex-only secret of at least 32 characters and writes JSON configs to the dedicated target-owned tmpfs `/run/zapret-autotune-ss` (directory `0700`, files `0600`). Both Shadowsocks processes receive only `-c `, never a password in argv or env. Docker administrators/root can still read mounted secrets and runtime configs; file-backed Compose secrets are not encrypted storage. The dedicated bridge is not shared with existing services. No host networking, Docker socket, existing mounts, host Lua/fakes or privileged mode; all capabilities are dropped except `NET_ADMIN`, `NET_RAW`, `SETUID`, `SETGID` and `DAC_OVERRIDE`. `NET_ADMIN` covers nft/NFQUEUE; `NET_RAW` covers nfqws2 raw sends. Zapret2's `nfqws2 --user=tpws` needs `SETUID`/`SETGID` for UID/GID switching, then retains only `CAP_NET_RAW` and `CAP_NET_ADMIN`. `DAC_OVERRIDE` lets the root entrypoint read the invoking user's mode-`0600` file-backed secret despite its different host UID; it does not make the host file world-readable or writable through the read-only secret mount. This capability is container-wide, not restricted to one pathname: its safe scope depends on exposing only `./ss_password` → `/run/secrets/ss_password` (read-only) and the fresh `./target-state` → `/var/lib/zapret-autotune/target` bind, plus dedicated runtime tmpfs. Never add host directories, other secrets or existing state to this container. No default-all capability set is used. Rootless/user-remapped Docker must validate secret readability separately; this does not bypass user-namespace or host filesystem restrictions. Go builder matches `Dockerfile`; runtime digest is pinned and image-owned Lua/fakes retained. Startup: ss-server/ss-local → internal listener 1080 (30-second bound) → guarded managed init on fresh state (status on recreation) → zapret2 start using target config. Drift/pending state refuses startup; no automatic adoption/reconciliation. SIGTERM/SIGINT stop only target-local zapret firewall and the entrypoint's own Shadowsocks children. Process supervision is **not** health/recovery; no restart policy hides fail-closed exits. Inside target, `zapret-autotune health youtube` uses `socks5://127.0.0.1:1080`, never the host port. It is one-shot Player API health, not playback or scheduling. The supplied remote read-only inspection verified shadowsocks-libev 3.3.5 and `ss-server -h` supports `-c `; runtime JSON loading remains unverified. Before deployment acceptance, validate Lua/fakes, `ZAPRET_CONFIG` binding and full zapret start/stop/restart with only the explicit `NET_ADMIN`, `NET_RAW`, `SETUID`, `SETGID`, `DAC_OVERRIDE` capability set (including the `tpws` user drop). Prove target-local routing, NFQUEUE activation/rollback, signal cleanup and persistent recreation on the new target only. Compose syntax, build and runtime integration are unverified by this producer. Do not widen capabilities or reuse existing config/network as a workaround. Autonomous acceptance also needs monitor/recovery integration and crash reconciliation.