# Fresh managed-test target contract (isolated acceptance, not production approval) ## Autonomous three-CDN source candidate (2026-10-13): field acceptance pending The user's three-CDN requirement is retained; the proposed single-CDN relaxation was withdrawn. Service-mode discovery needs no manual domains: missing/empty `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_GOOGLEVIDEO_VIDEO_IDS` uses primary `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_VIDEO_ID` (default `dQw4w9WgXcQ`) plus `aqz-KE-bpKQ` and `jNQXAC9IVRw`, deduplicated. A nonempty JSON array of 1..5 unique VideoIDs overrides this inventory. VideoIDs are discovery inputs, not proof of distinct CDNs. Fresh round-robin Player requests are bounded to three rounds (at most 15 requests) and three minutes. Qualification selects three actual signed MP4 media hosts, with at least two roots and two prefixes, and twenty-minute remaining URL TTL. Only the existing version-1 owned native proof factory authorizes qualification: post-warmup actual media 3/3 on both TLS protocols for each measured endpoint. The common `googlevideo.com` suffix is an authorized extrapolative scope, not measured evidence for every Googlevideo host or cold/uniform behavior. Experimental promotion uses the same proof and fresh deployed three-host media checks before committing apply. Insufficient inventory preserves the current experiment and uses configured retry cooldown; genuine exhausted strategy search still waits at least two hours. Qualified frontend is required; avatar success does not block this media stage, but whole-service health remains DEGRADED until actual avatar checks pass. Legacy service-off/exact-host behavior is unchanged. This source candidate has only offline unit/fixture verification, not a newly deployed image or field-qualified autonomous promotion. The 2026-10-12 measured results below remain historical exact-endpoint evidence. Build from the committed source archive and field-test the owned factory, three actual CDNs, deployed relearning/apply, rollback and whole-service health before acceptance. Maximum strategy collection and PID1 global-failure stay-alive remain unfinished future increments. Arbitrary declarative service configuration is future work; no new generic policy framework is supplied. See [GOOGLEVIDEO_DISCOVERY.md](GOOGLEVIDEO_DISCOVERY.md). `managed init|reconcile|status|active-ids|apply` is exclusively for a **new dedicated container** which owns its entire config. The existing/dev/production container must refuse these commands. A role env or CLI-created identity is not enough. Provisioning must supply all of the following before any managed command can run: | Setting | Exact required value | | --- | --- | | `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_TARGET_ROLE` | `managed-test` | | `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_TARGET_ID` | `zapret-autotune-managed-v1` | | `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_TARGET_DIR` | `/var/lib/zapret-autotune/target` | | `ZAPRET_CONFIG` | `/var/lib/zapret-autotune/target/config` | | `SOCKS_PORT` | Base image's actual ss-local service port (canonical decimal, 1–65535) | | `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_SOCKS_PROXY` | `socks5://127.0.0.1:$SOCKS_PORT` (expanded value) | The fixed directory must already be a private runtime-user-owned **dedicated persistent volume mountpoint**, not just a directory under another mount. The production verifier checks the exact path in `/proc/self/mountinfo`. Provisioning must also supply `/etc/zapret-autotune/target-id` containing exactly `zapret-autotune-managed-v1` followed by a newline. Init never writes that marker. Base runtime executables must exist: `/opt/zapret2/init.d/sysv/zapret2`, `/opt/zapret2/nfq2/nfqws2`, and `/usr/bin/blockcheckw`. There are no arbitrary directory flags or env overrides of these fixed values. These are operator safety guards, not protection against a privileged user deliberately forging a provisioned runtime. The managed `config` is a standalone **full config only in this fresh volume**. Never replace, adopt, or symlink over `/opt/zapret2/config` or any existing service config. The deployment entrypoint must ensure the base daemon actually honors the exact `ZAPRET_CONFIG` path; isolated RC acceptance does not waive that check for a new image. Existing services would require a separately designed managed **include fragment**, not this full-config adapter. No such integration is implemented. ```sh # Only after fresh-target provisioning establishes the entire contract above: zapret-autotune managed init zapret-autotune managed status zapret-autotune managed apply --frontend-candidate 1 # bootstrap before discovery zapret-autotune managed active-ids # JSON for supervisor; no health probe zapret-autotune managed apply --frontend-candidate 1 --googlevideo-candidate 2 ``` Init refuses nonempty directories except an exact private disabled baseline; it never overwrites/adopts another config. It creates identity, journal and backup; repeated initialization, symlinks, hardlinks, public/unowned files and unsafe ancestors are refused. Status reports generation/hash/transaction state, validated active IDs/groups and unresolved groups, not config, secrets or live health. Pending or unverifiable state reports unknown groups and no active IDs; drift fails closed. `active-ids` fails closed on pending or unverifiable state. Init/status do not reload or probe, but both verify runtime and listener ownership. All managed commands verify that the expected IPv4 listener is owned by a running `ss-local` executable in the target PID/network namespace: `/proc/net/tcp` socket inodes must match that process's file descriptors. A process alone, a wrong port, or another loopback proxy is insufficient. Health repeats this validation before its Player API request. The host's published SOCKS port may map to this listener, but is never used inside the target. The standalone `health youtube` command retains its separate generic loopback contract; managed activation is stricter. Ambient proxies/direct fallback are disabled. Player API OK is **not playback**. Apply accepts one or both frontend/exact-GGC SQLite candidate IDs, requiring distinct positive IDs, at most one per group, complete endpoint × TLS evidence and inert shell-safe arguments. The arguments are the full desired active set, not patches: omitting a group removes it. Frontend-only bootstrap supports Player API discovery before GGC scanning; GGC-only is also permitted. No missing profile is invented, and missing groups remain unresolved. Player API OK never asserts GGC/video playback or full-profile health. A supervisor can read `managed active-ids` and explicitly retain the other group while replacing a failed one. It opens the candidate DB read-only via `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_DB`; candidates are not active state. Bindings/inputs are checked before pending transaction reconciliation. Production reload is exclusively the fixed argv `/opt/zapret2/init.d/sysv/zapret2 restart`, no shell, with a 30-second deadline. Apply and rollback both use this full firewall/daemon restart; daemon-only restart is not a supported fallback. This changes only the **new target container's dedicated network namespace**, never the host or old container's firewall. Provisioning must not use host networking or share an existing container's network namespace. The baseline explicitly sets `INIT_APPLY_FW=1`, `NFQWS2_ENABLE=0`, empty `NFQWS2_OPT`, TCP ports `80,443`, UDP ports `443`, and TCP/UDP in/out packet limits of `15`. QNUM is deliberately inherited from the base runtime default. Active configs keep those fixed firewall values and set `NFQWS2_ENABLE=1` with the qualified managed strategy arguments. Restoring the baseline and running full restart removes its target-local queues and stops nfqws2; restoring an earlier active config reinstates its firewall/daemon state. The config replacement is atomic; the init script's stop/start sequence is not a zero-interruption or kernel-atomic firewall transaction. Journal v2 persists complete committed and pending candidate ID lists alongside their hashes. Commit promotes the pending list; rollback/crash reconciliation restores the prior list and hash. Reporting validates qualification/groups and exact rendered hash against the read-only DB. Status reports invalid refs as unresolved; `active-ids` and activation fail closed on invalid refs. Legacy v1 journals keep the exact deployed hash and unknown IDs: status marks both groups unresolved, and active-ids refuses to infer a list. A guarded full-set apply upgrades to v2 only after the exact old hash matches; rollback preserves the unknown legacy deployment. Re-init cannot adopt an existing deployment. The transaction engine retains same-directory staging/fsync/rename, durable journal/backup, advisory locking, external drift rejection, rollback and fail-closed crash reconciliation. Failed rollback reload remains pending. Directories must not be writable by untrusted processes; hostile concurrent filesystem mutation is outside the transaction boundary. Shell config safety and exact GGC filtering are unchanged. The isolated [Compose definition](deploy/managed-target/README.md) supplies the marker, mount and ordered startup; isolated deployments are recorded below. No Docker socket, old target paths, Xray edits or host firewall provisioning are included. Before each new deployment, provisioning must verify the pinned image honors `ZAPRET_CONFIG`, supports all listed variables, and starts ss-local while the baseline leaves nfqws2 disabled. Start the fresh target with that baseline, then verify active apply installs target-local nft NFQUEUE rules and starts nfqws2, and rollback restores both. If any image/startup/routing requirement is unsupported or uncertain, deployment must fail closed, not substitute `restart-daemons` or alter an old config. Persistent volume durability is a provisioning requirement; mountinfo alone cannot establish the storage lifecycle. Internal `recoverManagedTarget` and `wireManagedRecovery` add injectable startup bootstrap and saved-first recovery callbacks for the persisted monitor. Bootstrap scans/checks/saves frontend and applies it alone with Player API post-check. Recovery keeps an already healthy frontend, otherwise stops only the fixed target zapret service, tries up to ten qualified saved IDs newest-first, and scans only after complete valid non-pass results or health-rejected rollbacks. Malformed reports/runner errors fail closed. GGC discovery uses the injected managed-SOCKS path, revalidates against the fresh exact host, and saves new immutable evidence before full-set apply. A frontend-only rollback boundary survives GGC failure; unresolved GGC is reported separately, not playback health. Cancelled/failed downtime restores the committed configuration and runs fixed target `start` with an independent 30-second cleanup deadline. Failed cleanup or rollback is fatal to the supervisor; unresolved journal state is never started. The callback caller must hold the monitor singleton; the wiring repeats runtime identity/SOCKS guards. `managed monitor` binds those callbacks and only the dedicated target entrypoint starts it; local and isolated runtime validation results, with their limits, are recorded in [PROGRESS.md](PROGRESS.md). ## Dedicated monitor integration (isolated clean-run acceptance passed) `zapret-autotune managed monitor [--interval 5m] [--failure-threshold 3] [--cooldown 30m]` uses the health environment defaults. Interval is positive and at most 24h, threshold 1–1000, cooldown positive and at most 168h; explicit empty or invalid settings fail before any lock. No executable/path/proxy flags exist. The DB environment must be exactly `/var/lib/zapret-autotune/target/candidates.db`; existing DB/sidecars must be private, owned regular files without aliases/hard links. Runtime/SOCKS, directory, identity and DB path guards run before the singleton. SQLite opens writable target-owned state; active IDs remain journal/DB/hash validated. Probe reuses `health youtube`'s Player API contract, forced owned loopback SOCKS, no direct fallback. Discovery uses that same SOCKS adapter. Scan/check execute only `/usr/bin/blockcheckw`, daemon operations only fixed target-local `/opt/zapret2/init.d/sysv/zapret2` start/stop/restart argv; no shell/eval command strings. Context cancellation kills/waits process groups and bounded restoration finishes before returning. Reports suppress untrusted diagnostics and credentials. Startup reconciles transactions under the singleton and bootstraps only when no qualified active frontend exists. Bootstrap/recovery checks saved candidates first; GGCError reports unresolved and continues probing, not playback success. Other DB/safety/journal/runner failures stop nonzero; joined cancellation plus a cleanup failure is also fatal. A qualified frontend at startup is probed immediately, not rescanned merely because the process restarted. Entrypoint ordering is SS children → listener → fresh managed init if needed → managed reconcile → zapret start → one installed `/usr/local/bin/zapret-autotune managed monitor` child. It supervises all three children; unexpected monitor exit is not a successful shutdown. SIGTERM/SIGINT cancels and waits the monitor before target-local zapret stop and SS child termination/wait. Existing targets and Xray remain unchanged. Deployment allows 240s Compose shutdown grace for bounded monitor cancellation/restoration and child joins. Clean RC `d8316e6` has passed isolated image/routing, bootstrap, periodic probe, monitor-crash cleanup, graceful stop and persistent recreation gates; see the [recorded source/image and PASS report](deploy/managed-target/README.md#recorded-clean-run-acceptance-2026-10-11-pass). This does not establish playback or blanket production approval. Injected unit tests cover exact identity/path/config, mountpoint refusal, old-container-like env, SOCKS port/process refusal, correct fresh-target success, non-overwrite, transaction rollback and redaction. Verification results are recorded in [PROGRESS.md](PROGRESS.md). Focused local checks can be rerun with: ```sh go test ./cmd/zapret-autotune -run TestManaged go build ./cmd/zapret-autotune ``` ## Production preparation This is a standalone **new isolated target** candidate, not a production-approved deployment and not an integration into existing zapret/Xray. Keep the exact `managed-test` role, ID, marker, mount, config, DB and owned-listener guards above. Do not change the role to `production`, adopt old state, share an old network namespace, or relax a refusal. Container provisioning instructions are described in [deploy/managed-target/README.md](deploy/managed-target/README.md). ### Build once, promote the same image Use `Dockerfile.target` for the supervised target; root `Dockerfile` is the proposal CLI image, not the managed service. Both pin Go 1.25.3 and the runtime by digest, use `GOTOOLCHAIN=local`, `CGO_ENABLED=0`, `go.sum`, and `-trimpath`. Pins constrain build inputs; they do not establish live acceptance or guarantee bit-for-bit builds on different platforms. Record the source commit, platform, builder/runtime digests and resulting image digest for every release. Both Dockerfiles require BuildKit for the compilation-cache mount at `/root/.cache/go-build` (enable with `DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1` if not already default). This cache only speeds rebuilds; it is not copied into the final runtime image and is not a secret store. No deployment credentials are needed or passed to the build; keep secrets out of build arguments and cache contents. Example (replace registry and release; never reuse a release tag): ```sh IMAGE=registry.example/team/zapret-autotune-managed-target:2026-10-10-r1 docker build --pull -f Dockerfile.target -t "$IMAGE" . test "$(docker image inspect --format '{{json .Config.Entrypoint}}' "$IMAGE")" = '["/bin/sh","/opt/managed-target-entrypoint.sh"]' docker run --rm --network none --entrypoint /bin/sh "$IMAGE" -ec 'test "$(cat /etc/zapret-autotune/target-id)" = zapret-autotune-managed-v1; test -f /opt/managed-target-entrypoint.sh' docker push "$IMAGE" docker image inspect --format '{{index .RepoDigests 0}}' "$IMAGE" ``` Promote the printed `registry/repository@sha256:...` reference unchanged from validation to deployment; do not rebuild or use `latest`. Authenticate separately, never put registry credentials in these commands. The supplied Compose file selects `${ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_IMAGE:-zapret-autotune-managed-target:local}`. Set `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_IMAGE=registry.example/team/zapret-autotune-managed-target@sha256:` in the same private deployment `.env` as `SS_PASSWORD` (mode `0600`), using the actual printed digest. Tags and the local default are build/test candidates only; an immutable managed-target digest is required for production promotion. From the repository root, validate and pull without printing the rendered secrets: ```sh docker compose --env-file deploy/managed-target/.env -f deploy/managed-target/compose.yaml config --quiet docker compose --env-file deploy/managed-target/.env -f deploy/managed-target/compose.yaml pull target ``` Do not omit `-f Dockerfile.target`: root `Dockerfile` builds the proposal/prototype, not the PID-1-managed target. Assert both entrypoint and provisioned marker on the exact selected image before promotion; the assertions above are image-contract checks, not live resource qualification. A managed-looking tag is insufficient. Start the selected container image with Compose `up --no-build`; no host service installation is required. Keep the selected digest and private configuration together for upgrades and rollback. Never run a build against the production digest selector; build/tag separately as shown above. ### Configuration and secrets Create fresh empty `target-state` owned by root/runtime UID 0, mode `0700`, and the private deployment `.env` mode `0600`; rootless/remapped Docker needs the mapped owner. Bootstrap is for empty provisioned state only; recreation retains identity, journal, candidate DB, sidecars and lock file. Never automatically wipe state to make startup succeed. The entrypoint creates Shadowsocks JSON in private tmpfs (`0700` directory, `0600` files), unsets the password before children, and does not put it in argv. Docker administrators/root can still read container env and runtime config. Do not print `.env`, rendered Compose config, diagnostics or signed URLs; use `docker compose ... config --quiet` for validation. | Existing setting | Default / accepted value for managed target | | --- | --- | | `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_IMAGE` | Local build/test default `zapret-autotune-managed-target:local`; production promotion requires a managed-target `repository@sha256:` | | `SS_PASSWORD` | Required independent hex-only secret, at least 32 characters; deployment README generates 64 | | `SS_DNS_SERVER` | Empty (unchanged resolver); optional literal IPv4/IPv6 for target-only native ss-server DNS, validated before launch | | `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_YOUTUBE_SERVICE` | `0` (legacy) or opt-in `1`; explicitly forwarded by Compose | | `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_GOOGLEVIDEO_MODE` | `cold` default or `adaptive` (requires service `1`); explicitly forwarded | | `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_GOOGLEVIDEO_VIDEO_IDS` | JSON array of 1..5 unique VideoIDs; defaults to only the primary ID; explicitly forwarded | | `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_HOST_SOCKS_PORT` | `11080`; choose an available TCP/UDP port 1–65535, published only on `127.0.0.1` | | `SOCKS_PORT` | Supplied deployment fixes internal listener to `1080`; not a host-port override | | `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_SOCKS_PROXY` | Fixed `socks5h://127.0.0.1:1080` inside this target, no credentials/direct fallback | | `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_VIDEO_ID` | `dQw4w9WgXcQ`; exactly 11 ASCII letters, digits, `_` or `-` | | `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_HEALTH_INTERVAL` | `5m`; duration in `(0,24h]` for monitor | | `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_FAILURE_THRESHOLD` | `3`; integer 1–1000 for monitor | | `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_RECOVERY_COOLDOWN` | `30m`; duration in `(0,168h]` for monitor | | `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_DB` | Fixed `/var/lib/zapret-autotune/target/candidates.db` | Managed Player, metadata, image, media and warmup requests send hostnames through the owned SS listener (`socks5h`), so they respect target-native DNS instead of bypassing it with curl's local resolution. Older private environment overrides using `socks5` are canonicalized internally after validation; arbitrary proxies remain rejected by the listener/port/process ownership guard. Legacy public CLI discovery and root checker `--resolve` pinning are unchanged. This corrects a DNS path bypass, not a proven explanation of earlier peer certificate failures. The monitor's three policy flags override corresponding environment defaults; explicit empty/invalid environment settings are rejected. The entrypoint accepts no arguments. Compose forwards the primary/sample VideoIDs and service/mode settings. It does not forward the interval/threshold/cooldown policy settings from `.env`: add those existing variables to `target.environment` in your deployment copy/override if needed. Keep all fixed identity/path settings unchanged. No public SS listener is published; Xray configuration is external and operator-owned, optionally using the host's loopback SOCKS port. Do not modify an existing Xray deployment as part of bootstrap. Current service/adaptive hardware acceptance is **pending**, independent of the recorded legacy RC PASS. Adaptive means post-warmup, not cold: first connections may fail and native learning repeats after restart. At least three real unique signed ordinary media host samples are required; multiple VideoIDs may yield one CDN host and leave `DEGRADED` with no authorized suffix. Sampled thumbnail/avatar routes do not prove availability of the whole thumbnail pool. The reported `8.8.8.8` DNS diagnostic corrected a tampered avatar, not all thumbnail routes; native DNS correction is not full asset availability proof. Target DNS uses validated native `-d` argv (nonsecret), with installed-option support checked at image build; passwords remain private JSON only. No DoH bridge, permanent Google IP pins, global host DNS edits or external startup manager are introduced. ### Supervision and failure handling The container entrypoint is PID 1 and owns all technical child restart control. After a retryable monitor/SS failure it joins children, reconciles trusted state and stops target-local zapret before starting a new runtime cycle in the **same container**. Retries use cancellable backoff (15s, 30s, capped at 60s) and at most three runtime starts per rolling six hours, including the initial start. Exhaustion stops fail-closed with 78; configuration, safety, DB, journal, rollback or cleanup errors never authorize retry. No new dependency, host service installation or external process manager is required. SIGTERM/SIGINT cancels backoff or the running monitor, waits for bounded restoration and joins children before exit. Compose restart remains disabled: a blanket container restart could loop over a safety refusal or reset the in-container retry budget. Compose stop grace is 240s: the sequential cleanup budget is 140s (45s monitor join, 45s reconciliation plus 5s kill grace, 30s zapret stop plus 5s kill grace, and two 5s SS joins), with room for a deferred 45s startup command plus kill grace and scheduling overhead. The join watchdog runs in a fresh shell and is cancelled when its child finishes; graceful shutdown does not wait out the watchdog's full deadline. Container-platform lifecycle, creation/recreation and host-boot policy belong to the deployment operator, not an external manager supplied by this project. | Target exit | Operator meaning | | --- | --- | | `64` | Invalid configuration; fix settings before starting | | `78` | Safety/DB/journal/rollback/cleanup failure; investigate, no automatic restart | | `75` | Internal technical-cycle result; PID 1 retries only after safe cleanup, within its budget | | `0` | Graceful signal shutdown; no automatic restart | Bootstrap/recovery has a fixed **90-minute whole-job deadline**, plus an independent **30-second restoration reserve**. This is a catastrophic technical ceiling, not a normal candidate-check timeout and not an operator tunable. Valid nonpassing candidates/unresolved GGC are normal recovery outcomes, not a reason to restart the container. Genuine **no qualified strategy** from validated scan/check evidence persists a recovery wait of at least **two hours** in SQLite, including empty bootstrap and frontend/GGC exhaustion. The same container stays alive and continues light periodic Player API probes; it does not scan or apply during that wait. Startup respects the durable expiry, and recovery resumes after expiry under the normal failure-threshold policy. In both fresh bootstrap and periodic recovery, the delay is the greater of two hours and the configured recovery cooldown; a longer configured cooldown is not shortened. Other ordinary recovery outcomes retain the configured cooldown (default **30m**). Malformed/incomplete reports, runner errors and unsafe state are not strategy absence and must not enter this wait. The two-hour minimum absence policy is not a new operator setting, technical retry backoff, or the **90-minute watchdog**. Failed restoration or unsafe state vetoes retry: timeout exit 75 requires the job's own deadline and only timeout/cancellation-related errors, with no joined cleanup, DB or safety failure. Unexpected monitor/SS failures are separately technical only if shutdown cleanup succeeds. Shutdown uses bounded monitor join, guarded reconciliation, target-local zapret stop and SS child joins; failure to join/restore is fail-closed. The reserve is not extra scanning time. The 90-minute budget is shared by the whole bootstrap/recovery job, not renewed per candidate or phase. Monitor health means Player API `OK` through owned SOCKS. GGC evidence covers only the **exact discovered hostname** and tested TLS protocols, not wildcard googlevideo coverage, video transfer, SABR or playback. Unresolved GGC must not be reported as complete playback health. ### Upgrade, rollback and operator recovery 1. Record the current image digest and private deployment configuration. Stop the target with Compose, wait for complete cleanup, and verify the target is stopped. If cleanup fails, investigate before upgrading. 2. With the target stopped, make a root-only backup of the **entire** state directory (including DB sidecars, journal, config, identity and lock file), preserving ownership/modes. Store `.env` and image/config records privately with it; do not print archive contents, diagnostics or signed URLs. A live copy of only `candidates.db` is not a consistent rollback backup. 3. Select/pull the new immutable digest and start without building. Inspect sanitized status/logs, verify identity/hash and expected active groups, owned SOCKS, target-local queues, health scope and persistent recreation. Keep the old image and backup until acceptance; DB migrations may prevent image-only downgrade. 4. To roll back, stop and verify cleanup again. Preserve failed state separately for investigation. Restore the matched stopped-state backup **as a whole** into the same dedicated mount with private ownership/modes, select its old digest/config, then start. Do not merge journals/DB generations or re-init. A restored legacy/live/unverifiable recovery owner can fail closed; never clear its lease or unlink the lock merely to force startup. On startup, `managed reconcile` accepts no flags and uses only the fixed private `/var/lib/zapret-autotune/target/candidates.db`. Known interrupted prepared state is rolled back to qualified committed bytes before any reload/start; fresh baseline and known committed state are idempotent. Unknown/legacy state, drift, missing qualification or failed rollback blocks startup with a non-retry exit. On drift, unreconcilable pending transaction, rollback failure, or exhausted PID 1 retry budget, leave state intact and the container stopped. Diagnose using sanitized status and private artifacts; repair the actual provisioning/configuration issue or restore a known consistent backup. Only then manually start the target with Compose. There is no automatic wipe or automatic adoption path. The recorded clean RC PASS covers empty-state bootstrap through qualified frontend and exact-host GGC apply, image/config binding, ongoing probes, in-container monitor crash restart, graceful stop and persistent recreation. Earlier recovery, rollback, rotation, retry and absence fixtures are distinguished in [PROGRESS.md](PROGRESS.md); do not attribute all of them to the clean run. No media playback, real 90-minute watchdog expiry or real two-hour absence expiry wait is claimed. Production rollout and backup-restore acceptance remain operator gates on a new isolated target; local unit/static checks and isolated PASS do not establish blanket production readiness. ### Explicit experimental Googlevideo suffix Normal `--googlevideo-scope suffix` still requires representative qualification, media proof, and both qualified image profiles. An operator may explicitly own the audited native circular A/E composite without claiming those results: ```sh zapret-autotune managed apply --googlevideo-experiment native-circular --googlevideo-scope experimental_googlevideo_suffix ``` This command requires the monitor singleton to be free, a matching native Lua hash, a fresh Player-discovered exact GGC identity, and existing qualified frontend/assets. It preserves their candidate IDs and uses the normal guarded transaction/reload/Player-health/rollback hooks. The new candidate definition has no cold/adaptive evidence and is not a qualified candidate. Both pending and committed journal policy record `experimental_googlevideo_suffix`; legacy rendered bytes and qualification gates are unchanged. Unknown policies fail closed. For PID-1-controlled application, while this dedicated target is stopped and after taking a complete private state backup, create a private empty file named `.autotune-experimental-suffix-request` in its owned state directory. It must be an empty regular 0600 file owned by the runtime UID, with no symlink/hardlink. Startup validates it before init/reconcile, then atomically claims the validated inode before guarded apply (before launching the monitor). Only a successful apply removes that claim; a replacement request is never deleted. Failure exits closed and retains the private `.autotune-experimental-request-claim-*` artifact; do not blindly retry it. Use the matched whole-state/image rollback above. Candidate-ID CLI apply cannot select/inherit the experimental policy; explicit native-circular authorization is required. Internal journal recovery is unchanged. Resource probes still run. In service mode (legacy or adaptive), healthy actual image/media probes short-circuit recovery, but operational health does not mean family qualification or playback READY. Experimental media recovery preserves the operator suffix and all committed profile IDs: a validated transfer failure permits one guarded restart of that same deployed daemon, then at most 10 native relearning attempts within 120s and a final fresh signed media 3/3 for each of TLS1.2 and TLS1.3. Learning stays in the persistent daemon's RAM; no temporary NFQ worker or replacement/qualified candidate is created. Expiring media is rediscovered, never rewritten or persisted. Missing inventory remains degraded, not strategy absence; mixed, guard, infrastructure and cancellation errors do not authorize relearning. Unrelated missing image inventory may coexist with usable media, but successful media recovery does not repair or qualify it. Avatar inventory first parses fresh homepage `ytInitialData`. Only absent metadata or no allowed avatar permits one fallback to the configured video's watch page, using a validated video ID, the same trusted HTTPS WWW origin and SOCKS proxy, bounded time/body size, no redirects, and discarded diagnostics. Malformed JSON, transfer errors and safety/cancellation failures do not trigger fallback. Both pages and discovered resource URLs remain ephemeral; discovering an allowed URL is not image-transfer qualification or a guarantee of full-family coverage. `managed status` reports active-profile `covered=` separately from qualified `groups` and `unresolved_groups`; `managed active-ids` adds `covered_groups` and `googlevideo_scope` to its JSON. An experimental Googlevideo profile can be covered yet qualification-unresolved; one image profile does not establish full asset-inventory success. Status is read-only and reports live health NOT CHECKED. Historical `a60f62d` restart/recreation and status checks passed, but its upgrade hit `BrokenPipe` and rolled back; that run did not accept media recovery. Later supplied final field results for source `fd25cb8`, managed image `sha256:73e955e7fdc6efaef88c62ebe4f7afeab71c29d29ba3c88b2a2b7547bb647da5` on SOCKS11082 completed a 15-minute watch with restart count0 and a live monitor. Validated rejection/no-qualified-strategy recovery continued with naturally advanced cooldown and unchanged experimental profiles; it did not repair avatars. Three fresh media hosts across two roots passed post-warmup 3/3 on each TLS protocol (18 actual HTTP206/65536-byte MP4 transfers). This is field evidence, not persisted family qualification, a cold/all-host claim or candidate promotion. Watch fallback discovered allowed avatar metadata, but both-TLS curl28 transfers had zero samples: avatar evidence/profile qualification is still absent and overall health is **DEGRADED / NOT READY**. Automatic durable multi-host family qualification remains unimplemented. See [PROGRESS.md](PROGRESS.md) for exact hosts, separate warmup results, timestamps, private proof and remaining gates. No new network checks accompany this documentation. Generic production media behavior and signed-URL/SS secret privacy remain unchanged, as do the persisted minimum two-hour strategy-absence pause and 90-minute whole-job budget.