# Isolated managed-test target This Compose project provisions a new, isolated target. It does not attach to, reconfigure, or stop the existing `zapret2-ss-autotune` container. The target starts from a disabled managed baseline; `managed monitor` bootstraps the frontend/API strategy, then discovers and applies an exact-host GGC strategy. ## Provisioning From this directory, create a private `.env` with a fresh independent password and the configured host SOCKS port: ```sh (umask 077; set -C; printf 'SS_PASSWORD=%s\nZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_HOST_SOCKS_PORT=11080\n' "$(openssl rand -hex 32)" > .env) ``` This refuses to overwrite an existing `.env`; do not print it or commit it. Compose passes `SS_PASSWORD` as a container environment variable. It is removed from the entrypoint environment before Shadowsocks children start and is never placed in argv or logs. Docker administrators/root can still read container environment and runtime config, so use this only for the isolated test target. Create a **new empty** `./target-state`, owned by host UID 0 (runtime user), mode `0700`; rootless/user-remapped Docker needs the mapped owner. Never reuse state. Compose refuses a missing bind source. Retain state for recreation; deletion loses transaction identity, journal, backups and candidate DB. Validate without printing interpolated values: `docker compose --env-file .env -f compose.yaml config --quiet`. Then build and start only this Compose project. The rendered configuration contains the environment password, so never use plain `docker compose config` in logs or shared terminals. By default Compose uses the locally built `zapret-autotune-managed-target:local`. Tags are only local build/test candidates, not production release references. For production promotion, set `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_IMAGE=/@sha256:` in the private `.env` and pull that immutable image before starting the target. Use a managed target image, not the generic image. Do not deploy production with a tag or local default. Offline static guard (from repository root): `python3 deploy/managed-target/check_static.py`. Isolated, accelerated shell supervision fixtures (no network): `python3 deploy/managed-target/check_supervision.py`. ## In-container supervision Compose has no automatic restart. PID 1 restarts the entire owned runtime only for technical failures, with three starts per rolling six hours (including initial startup) and cancellable 15/30-second cooldowns. Clean typed recovery timeouts, unexpected monitor exits/crashes, and Shadowsocks failures qualify only if shutdown cleanup succeeds. Configuration (64), safety/database/rollback/cleanup failures (78), and graceful SIGTERM (0) never request restart. Exhausting the restart budget exits 78. Investigate and repair nonretry failures before manually starting again; do not clear state. Monitor cancellation/join is bounded to 45 seconds, reconciliation gets 45 seconds plus five to force kill, and final target-local zapret stop gets 30 seconds then forced kill after five more, and each Shadowsocks join gets five seconds. Exceeding a join bound fails closed. Compose grants 240 seconds. Reconcile after joining the monitor and before even stopping zapret: stop also sources config, so unknown state is never sourced. The sequential cleanup budget is 146 seconds; 240 seconds also covers an in-flight startup command and scheduling grace. Watchdogs run in fresh shell interpreters and cancel/join their own sleepers, including during PID 1's EXIT trap. The monitor has a verified private session. After a crash, remaining check/NFQ workers in that session are terminated and verified gone before reconciliation or reactivation; Shadowsocks, watchdogs and unrelated exec peers are excluded. ## Isolation and runtime contract Only SOCKS TCP/UDP is published on host `127.0.0.1:${ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_HOST_SOCKS_PORT:-11080}` for optional same-host Xray use; no Xray edits are supplied. SS port `8388` is internal and never published. The server binds `0.0.0.0:8388` only inside the dedicated bridge namespace; ss-local binds `0.0.0.0:1080`. Startup validates a hex-only password of at least 32 characters, writes JSON configs to target-owned tmpfs `/run/zapret-autotune-ss` (directory `0700`, files `0600`), then unsets the password before starting child processes. The dedicated bridge is not shared with existing services. No host networking, Docker socket, existing mounts, host Lua/fakes or privileged mode; all capabilities are dropped except `NET_ADMIN`, `NET_RAW`, `SETUID`, `SETGID`, `KILL`. `NET_ADMIN` covers nft/NFQUEUE; `NET_RAW` covers nfqws2 raw sends. Zapret2's `nfqws2 --user=tpws` needs `SETUID`/`SETGID` for UID/GID switching. `KILL` allows bounded cleanup of workers that have dropped their UID. Startup order: ss-server/ss-local → listener 1080 → guarded managed init on fresh state → `managed reconcile` on every startup → target-local `zapret2 start` → supervised managed monitor. Reconciliation uses the fixed private target DB and restores an interrupted prepared transaction's qualified last-good bytes before any daemon reload/start. Drift, unknown state or failed rollback exits 78 (no automatic retry); nothing is adopted. Restore a consistent whole-state backup if needed; do not wipe/re-init persisted state. Startup init and reconcile each have a 45-second deadline; initial daemon start has 30 seconds, with forced kill after five more seconds for each command. Any startup command failure/timeout exits 78, never the retry code 75. These bounds do not shorten the monitor's 90-minute bootstrap/recovery scan budget. SIGTERM/SIGINT cancels and waits for the monitor before stopping target-local zapret and Shadowsocks children. Nonretry monitor fatal exits stop the entrypoint; technical exits and Shadowsocks failures restart from private configs only after safe cleanup. Monitor health is YouTube Player API status through the owned SOCKS, not video playback/SABR; GGC candidates are scoped to the exact discovered hostname. ## Recorded clean-run acceptance (2026-10-11): PASS Tested source RC: `d8316e695bc36e1243c111e19bb1e527355907b6`; local tag `zapret-autotune-managed-target:rc-d8316e6`; immutable image `sha256:5636aa9031fd0f6a0513f2e22cc0c39b1c806e9714b7f9ac040c8713d6a26c6c`. The image was built from that source git archive with pinned inputs, not from the later documentation commit. Private source root: `/home/agent/zapret2-autotune-rc-d8316e6`. The additional clean Compose project `zapret-autotune-clean-d8316e6-45bb14ba` uses root `/home/agent/zapret2-managed-clean-d8316e6-45bb14ba` and host SOCKS TCP/UDP `127.0.0.1:11081`. It is left running for inspection; the existing managed target on `11080` and older SS target remain untouched. - Before launch, state was empty, root-owned and mode `0700`; the independent secret was 64 hex characters and `.env` mode `0600`. Real `blockcheckw` was used, without mocks or copied config/candidates. Fresh init was observed; fast bootstrap meant no exact generation-0 status snapshot was captured. - Bootstrap committed generation2, frontend ID1 (verified layout-safe fake + multidisorder seed) and exact-host GGC ID2 for `rr17---sn-n8v7kn7d.googlevideo.com`. Both have valid raw TLS1.2/TLS1.3 evidence, 3/3 each. Periodic `lastProbeAt` advanced, counter0, recovery idle. - Monitor SIGKILL changed host PID522765→525271 in the same container/PID1, DockerRestartCount0, preserving IDs[1,2] and config hash `57e639c98420be73a8ec4754b20ba975d81aced44215ed547b1ac029c89c14de`. Graceful stop exited0 in 0.61s with no worker leaks. Forced recreation (`5af686e2ad94…`, host PID525625) retained generation2, IDs and hash. - Post-recreation counters1 then2 were observed; their cause is unproven. A fresh-discovery GGC mismatch sample is not proof of the actual error cause. The next default probe at 07:54 reset the counter to0, no active recovery. Player API was OK and host SOCKS curl to `www.youtube.com` returned HTTP200. - Both older targets' images, IDs, PIDs, start times and ports were unchanged (managed PID518298, old SS PID266922); no host-manager or Xray changes. Private PASS report: `final-cleanrun-report.json` under the clean root above; raw artifacts: `final-evidence/`. This is isolated clean-run acceptance, not blanket production approval or media playback/SABR verification. No real 90-minute watchdog wait was performed; shortened/injected tests cover expiry. Saved-first recovery, rollback and other fault-injection results are recorded separately in [PROGRESS.md](../../PROGRESS.md), not implied by this clean run. For any new rollout, validate its own image binding, routing and lifecycle gates on the new target only; never widen capabilities or reuse existing config/network as a workaround.