# Isolated managed-test target This Compose project provisions a new, isolated target. It does not attach to, reconfigure, or stop the existing `zapret2-ss-autotune` container. The target starts from a disabled managed baseline; `managed monitor` bootstraps the frontend/API strategy, then discovers and applies an exact-host GGC strategy. ## Recorded Googlevideo suffix experiment (2026-10-12) Source RC `eade051c2bc335b71b1616d697326ca4c8019d70`, immutable image `sha256:fdb60593e29d7c337a413a47aaddfbcaaeabdeb877042c58f506d4abdc98a13b`, isolated SOCKS `127.0.0.1:11082`: recorded journal generation3, active [1,2,3], scope `experimental_googlevideo_suffix`. Frontend `www.youtube.com` and thumbnail `i.ytimg.com` profiles were preserved; older targets were unchanged. These recorded observations predate this docs commit; no deployment or fresh network check is implied here. Fresh signed media on `rr16---sn-n8v7znsz.googlevideo.com` returned HTTP206, 65536 bytes with MP4 `ftyp` over TLS1.2. The user confirmed browser videos work on 2026-10-12 and accepts initial learning. The shared suffix profile is native circular A/E: **two strategies with per-host learning**, not a single uniform static strategy or proof of all-host cold 3/3. Its explicit operator experimental policy persists across restart under hash/rollback guards, but is **not family-qualified or READY**. Browser-visible images do not qualify the avatar profile; only the thumbnail image profile is currently active. Service-mode health already probes fresh actual images and media using both TLS protocols. Experimental recovery deliberately does not automatically qualify or replace this approved profile. Remaining acceptance is representative signed media coverage (at least three hosts across two roots/prefixes, post-warmup 3/3 on both TLS protocols plus media), avatar qualification, actual restart/recreation recovery of this suffix RC, and autonomous experimental recovery/autoqualification policy with accurate covered-versus-qualified status. See [PROGRESS.md](../../PROGRESS.md) for the five remaining gates. The older clean-run PASS below does not close them. ## Provisioning From this directory, create a private `.env` with a fresh independent password and the configured host SOCKS port: ```sh (umask 077; set -C; printf 'SS_PASSWORD=%s\nZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_HOST_SOCKS_PORT=11080\n' "$(openssl rand -hex 32)" > .env) ``` This refuses to overwrite an existing `.env`; do not print it or commit it. Compose passes `SS_PASSWORD` as a container environment variable. It is removed from the entrypoint environment before Shadowsocks children start and is never placed in argv or logs. Docker administrators/root can still read container environment and runtime config, so use this only for the isolated test target. Create a **new empty** `./target-state`, owned by host UID 0 (runtime user), mode `0700`; rootless/user-remapped Docker needs the mapped owner. Never reuse state. Compose refuses a missing bind source. Retain state for recreation; deletion loses transaction identity, journal, backups and candidate DB. Validate without printing interpolated values: `docker compose --env-file .env -f compose.yaml config --quiet`. Then build and start only this Compose project. The rendered configuration contains the environment password, so never use plain `docker compose config` in logs or shared terminals. By default Compose uses the locally built `zapret-autotune-managed-target:local`. Tags are only local build/test candidates, not production release references. For production promotion, set `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_IMAGE=/@sha256:` in the private `.env` and pull that immutable image before starting the target. Use a managed target image, not the generic image. Do not deploy production with a tag or local default. Offline static guard (from repository root): `python3 deploy/managed-target/check_static.py`. Offline real pre-launch validation and private Compose forwarding fixtures: `python3 deploy/managed-target/check_config.py` (requires local Go and Compose). Isolated, accelerated shell supervision fixtures (no network): `python3 deploy/managed-target/check_supervision.py`. ## In-container supervision ### Opt-in service/adaptive and target-native DNS Compose forwards `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_YOUTUBE_SERVICE` (`0` or `1`, default `0`), `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_GOOGLEVIDEO_MODE` (`cold` or `adaptive`, default `cold`), `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_VIDEO_ID` (default `dQw4w9WgXcQ`) and `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_GOOGLEVIDEO_VIDEO_IDS` (JSON array of 1..5 unique VideoIDs; default only the primary ID). Explicit empty/invalid settings are rejected, not silently replaced. Adaptive requires service `1`. See `.env.example`. Service `0` preserves legacy Player API/exact-host behavior. Adaptive qualification is **post-warmup**, distinct from cold qualification; initial connections may fail and native learning must repeat after restart. It requires at least **three real unique signed ordinary media host samples**. Three sample videos may all resolve to the same CDN host: that means `DEGRADED`, no family-qualified googlevideo suffix, not fabricated coverage. The explicit operator experiment above is separate from this qualification. Service asset checks cover sampled thumbnail/avatar routes, not the whole thumbnail pool. The current service/adaptive hardware acceptance gate is **pending**; the old clean-run PASS below does not qualify these new modes. Optional `SS_DNS_SERVER` is an unbracketed literal IPv4/IPv6 address only (for example `8.8.8.8` or `2001:4860:4860::8888`); empty preserves existing resolver behavior. No domain, port, zone, control characters or option strings are accepted. Validation runs before service launch and reports opaque `configerror` without echoing input. DNS applies only to this target's native `ss-server`. The image build checks installed `ss-server -h` for native `-d ` support; the validated nonsecret address is passed as a separate `-d` argv value, not eval or an assumed JSON key. Passwords still go only to private JSON configs. Managed probes use `socks5h://127.0.0.1:1080`: Player, metadata, image, media, recovery and warmup hostnames go through the owned SS listener rather than curl's local DNS. Older private `socks5` overrides are validated and canonicalized internally; credentials and unowned endpoints remain forbidden. Public legacy discovery and root checker local `--resolve` pinning are unchanged. This corrects a DNS path bypass, not a proven cause of earlier peer certificate failures, and does not fix/prove all thumbnail routes. It is **not full asset availability proof**. No DoH bridge, permanent Google IP pins or global host DNS changes are supplied. PID 1 remains the sole startup/recovery owner. Compose has no automatic restart. PID 1 restarts the entire owned runtime only for technical failures, with three starts per rolling six hours (including initial startup) and cancellable 15/30-second cooldowns. Clean typed recovery timeouts, unexpected monitor exits/crashes, and Shadowsocks failures qualify only if shutdown cleanup succeeds. Configuration (64), safety/database/rollback/cleanup failures (78), and graceful SIGTERM (0) never request restart. Exhausting the restart budget exits 78. Investigate and repair nonretry failures before manually starting again; do not clear state. Monitor cancellation/join is bounded to 45 seconds, reconciliation gets 45 seconds plus five to force kill, and final target-local zapret stop gets 30 seconds then forced kill after five more, and each Shadowsocks join gets five seconds. Exceeding a join bound fails closed. Compose grants 240 seconds. Reconcile after joining the monitor and before even stopping zapret: stop also sources config, so unknown state is never sourced. The sequential cleanup budget is 146 seconds; 240 seconds also covers an in-flight startup command and scheduling grace. Watchdogs run in fresh shell interpreters and cancel/join their own sleepers, including during PID 1's EXIT trap. The monitor has a verified private session. After a crash, remaining check/NFQ workers in that session are terminated and verified gone before reconciliation or reactivation; Shadowsocks, watchdogs and unrelated exec peers are excluded. ## Isolation and runtime contract Only SOCKS TCP/UDP is published on host `127.0.0.1:${ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_HOST_SOCKS_PORT:-11080}` for optional same-host Xray use; no Xray edits are supplied. SS port `8388` is internal and never published. The server binds `0.0.0.0:8388` only inside the dedicated bridge namespace; ss-local binds `0.0.0.0:1080`. Startup validates a hex-only password of at least 32 characters, writes JSON configs to target-owned tmpfs `/run/zapret-autotune-ss` (directory `0700`, files `0600`), then unsets the password before starting child processes. The dedicated bridge is not shared with existing services. No host networking, Docker socket, existing mounts, host Lua/fakes or privileged mode; all capabilities are dropped except `NET_ADMIN`, `NET_RAW`, `SETUID`, `SETGID`, `KILL`, `SYS_PTRACE`. `NET_ADMIN` covers nft/NFQUEUE; `NET_RAW` covers nfqws2 raw sends. Zapret2's `nfqws2 --user=tpws` needs `SETUID`/`SETGID` for UID/GID switching. `KILL` allows bounded cleanup of workers that have dropped their UID. `SYS_PTRACE` permits inspecting socket FD symlinks of privilege-dropped, nondumpable nfqws workers to prove NFQUEUE ownership by inode. The native owned worker path fails fast without effective `KILL`, `NET_ADMIN` and `SYS_PTRACE`; legacy modes do not gain this requirement. Permission denial is an inspection failure, not evidence that another process owns the queue. This capability is confined to the target's **private PID namespace**: never use host or shared/container PID namespaces. It does not grant inspection of broader host processes. The full service/adaptive hardware gate remains **pending**, not PASS; this ownership fix alone does not qualify it. Startup order: ss-server/ss-local → listener 1080 → guarded managed init on fresh state → `managed reconcile` on every startup → target-local `zapret2 start` → supervised managed monitor. Reconciliation uses the fixed private target DB and restores an interrupted prepared transaction's qualified last-good bytes before any daemon reload/start. Drift, unknown state or failed rollback exits 78 (no automatic retry); nothing is adopted. Restore a consistent whole-state backup if needed; do not wipe/re-init persisted state. Startup init and reconcile each have a 45-second deadline; initial daemon start has 30 seconds, with forced kill after five more seconds for each command. Any startup command failure/timeout exits 78, never the retry code 75. These bounds do not shorten the monitor's 90-minute bootstrap/recovery scan budget. SIGTERM/SIGINT cancels and waits for the monitor before stopping target-local zapret and Shadowsocks children. Nonretry monitor fatal exits stop the entrypoint; technical exits and Shadowsocks failures restart from private configs only after safe cleanup. Legacy monitor health is YouTube Player API status through the owned SOCKS, not video playback/SABR; legacy GGC candidates are scoped to the exact discovered hostname. Opt-in service health also checks actual fresh images and media; the experimental suffix scope above is not family qualification. ## Recorded clean-run acceptance (2026-10-11): PASS Tested source RC: `d8316e695bc36e1243c111e19bb1e527355907b6`; local tag `zapret-autotune-managed-target:rc-d8316e6`; immutable image `sha256:5636aa9031fd0f6a0513f2e22cc0c39b1c806e9714b7f9ac040c8713d6a26c6c`. The image was built from that source git archive with pinned inputs, not from the later documentation commit. Private source root: `/home/agent/zapret2-autotune-rc-d8316e6`. The additional clean Compose project `zapret-autotune-clean-d8316e6-45bb14ba` uses root `/home/agent/zapret2-managed-clean-d8316e6-45bb14ba` and host SOCKS TCP/UDP `127.0.0.1:11081`. It is left running for inspection; the existing managed target on `11080` and older SS target remain untouched. - Before launch, state was empty, root-owned and mode `0700`; the independent secret was 64 hex characters and `.env` mode `0600`. Real `blockcheckw` was used, without mocks or copied config/candidates. Fresh init was observed; fast bootstrap meant no exact generation-0 status snapshot was captured. - Bootstrap committed generation2, frontend ID1 (verified layout-safe fake + multidisorder seed) and exact-host GGC ID2 for `rr17---sn-n8v7kn7d.googlevideo.com`. Both have valid raw TLS1.2/TLS1.3 evidence, 3/3 each. Periodic `lastProbeAt` advanced, counter0, recovery idle. - Monitor SIGKILL changed host PID522765→525271 in the same container/PID1, DockerRestartCount0, preserving IDs[1,2] and config hash `57e639c98420be73a8ec4754b20ba975d81aced44215ed547b1ac029c89c14de`. Graceful stop exited0 in 0.61s with no worker leaks. Forced recreation (`5af686e2ad94…`, host PID525625) retained generation2, IDs and hash. - Post-recreation counters1 then2 were observed; their cause is unproven. A fresh-discovery GGC mismatch sample is not proof of the actual error cause. The next default probe at 07:54 reset the counter to0, no active recovery. Player API was OK and host SOCKS curl to `www.youtube.com` returned HTTP200. - Both older targets' images, IDs, PIDs, start times and ports were unchanged (managed PID518298, old SS PID266922); no host-manager or Xray changes. Private PASS report: `final-cleanrun-report.json` under the clean root above; raw artifacts: `final-evidence/`. This is isolated clean-run acceptance, not blanket production approval or media playback/SABR verification. No real 90-minute watchdog wait was performed; shortened/injected tests cover expiry. Saved-first recovery, rollback and other fault-injection results are recorded separately in [PROGRESS.md](../../PROGRESS.md), not implied by this clean run. For any new rollout, validate its own image binding, routing and lifecycle gates on the new target only; never widen capabilities or reuse existing config/network as a workaround.