Isolated managed-test target
This Compose project provisions a new, isolated target. It does not attach to,
reconfigure, or stop the existing zapret2-ss-autotune container. The target
starts from a disabled managed baseline; managed monitor bootstraps the
frontend/API strategy, then discovers and applies an exact-host GGC strategy.
Provisioning
From this directory, create a private .env with a fresh independent password
and the configured host SOCKS port:
(umask 077; set -C; printf 'SS_PASSWORD=%s\nZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_HOST_SOCKS_PORT=11080\n' "$(openssl rand -hex 32)" > .env)
This refuses to overwrite an existing .env; do not print it or commit it.
Compose passes SS_PASSWORD as a container environment variable. It is removed
from the entrypoint environment before Shadowsocks children start and is never
placed in argv or logs. Docker administrators/root can still read container
environment and runtime config, so use this only for the isolated test target.
Create a new empty ./target-state, owned by host UID 0 (runtime user),
mode 0700; rootless/user-remapped Docker needs the mapped owner. Never reuse
state. Compose refuses a missing bind source. Retain state for recreation;
deletion loses transaction identity, journal, backups and candidate DB.
Validate without printing interpolated values:
docker compose --env-file .env -f compose.yaml config --quiet.
Then build and start only this Compose project. The rendered configuration
contains the environment password, so never use plain docker compose config
in logs or shared terminals.
Offline static guard (from repository root):
python3 deploy/managed-target/check_static.py.
Isolation and runtime contract
Only SOCKS TCP/UDP is published on host
127.0.0.1:${ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_HOST_SOCKS_PORT:-11080} for optional same-host
Xray use; no Xray edits are supplied. SS port 8388 is internal and never
published. The server binds 0.0.0.0:8388 only inside the dedicated bridge
namespace; ss-local binds 0.0.0.0:1080. Startup validates a hex-only password
of at least 32 characters, writes JSON configs to target-owned tmpfs
/run/zapret-autotune-ss (directory 0700, files 0600), then unsets the
password before starting child processes.
The dedicated bridge is not shared with existing services. No host networking,
Docker socket, existing mounts, host Lua/fakes or privileged mode; all
capabilities are dropped except NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SETUID, SETGID.
NET_ADMIN covers nft/NFQUEUE; NET_RAW covers nfqws2 raw sends. Zapret2's
nfqws2 --user=tpws needs SETUID/SETGID for UID/GID switching.
Startup order: ss-server/ss-local → listener 1080 → guarded managed init on
fresh state (status on recreation) → target-local zapret2 start → supervised
managed monitor. Drift/pending state refuses startup; unknown state is never
adopted. SIGTERM/SIGINT cancels and waits for the monitor before stopping
target-local zapret and Shadowsocks children. Monitor fatal exits stop the
entrypoint. Monitor health is YouTube Player API status through the owned SOCKS,
not video playback/SABR; GGC candidates are scoped to the exact discovered
hostname.
The deployment has not yet passed live runtime acceptance. Validate the pinned
image's JSON config loading, Lua/fakes, ZAPRET_CONFIG binding, target-local
routing, NFQUEUE activation/rollback, signal cleanup and persistent recreation
on this new target only. Do not widen capabilities or reuse existing config or
network as a workaround. Verify the complete unattended path: empty profile →
frontend/API candidate scan and apply → exact-host GGC candidate scan and apply
→ ongoing probes → saved-first recovery, falling back to scan only when saved
scenarios validly fail.