Isolated managed-test definition — deployment deferred
This definition is not autonomous acceptance-ready: managed monitor and
entrypoint recovery integration exist in code but are not live verified. Do not build/pull/start it as part of this
change. Existing containers, production and Xray configuration are out of scope.
For a later approved deployment, from this directory:
- Copy
.env.exampleto.envand restrict it to0600; it sets only the host loopback SOCKS port. Generate a new independent secret locally:(umask 077; set -C; openssl rand -hex 32 > ss_password). This refuses to overwrite an existing file. Never copy existing secrets or put the password in.env, environment variables or command arguments.ss_password,.envand state are gitignored and excluded from the build context. Do not commit the secret file. Compose mounts it read-only at/run/secrets/ss_password; keep the host file owned by the invoking user with mode0600(no deploy-time chown or world-readable permissions). Use only this newly generated regular file at./ss_password, not a symlink or a reused secret. Do not mount its parent directory or other host secrets. - Provision a new empty
./target-state, owned by host UID 0 (runtime user), mode0700. Rootless/user-remapped Docker needs the mapped owner. Never reuse mounts/state. Compose refuses a missing bind source. Retain state for recreation; deletion loses identity, journal, backups and DB. - Orchestrator may validate without deploying:
docker compose --env-file .env -f compose.yaml config --quiet. Rendered Compose config contains only the secret file path, not its value. Build/run require separate approval and runtime validation gates.
Offline static guard (from repository root):
python3 deploy/managed-target/check_static.py. It pins the capability allowlist
and single-secret/single-state mount shape; it does not prove runtime readability.
Only SOCKS TCP/UDP is published on host
127.0.0.1:${ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_HOST_SOCKS_PORT:-11080} for same-host Xray;
no Xray edits are supplied. SS port 8388 is internal, never published.
The server binds 0.0.0.0:8388 only inside the dedicated bridge namespace;
ss-local binds 0.0.0.0:1080. Startup requires a hex-only secret of at least
32 characters and writes JSON configs to the dedicated target-owned tmpfs
/run/zapret-autotune-ss (directory 0700, files 0600). Both Shadowsocks
processes receive only -c <config_path>, never a password in argv or env.
Docker administrators/root can still read mounted secrets and runtime configs;
file-backed Compose secrets are not encrypted storage.
The dedicated bridge is not shared with existing services. No host networking,
Docker socket, existing mounts, host Lua/fakes or privileged mode; all
capabilities are dropped except NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SETUID, SETGID
and DAC_OVERRIDE.
NET_ADMIN covers nft/NFQUEUE; NET_RAW covers nfqws2 raw sends. Zapret2's
nfqws2 --user=tpws needs SETUID/SETGID for UID/GID switching, then retains
only CAP_NET_RAW and CAP_NET_ADMIN. DAC_OVERRIDE lets the root entrypoint
read the invoking user's mode-0600 file-backed secret despite its different
host UID; it does not make the host file world-readable or writable through
the read-only secret mount. This capability is container-wide, not restricted
to one pathname: its safe scope depends on exposing only
./ss_password → /run/secrets/ss_password (read-only) and the fresh
./target-state → /var/lib/zapret-autotune/target bind, plus dedicated runtime
tmpfs. Never add host directories, other secrets or existing state to this
container. No default-all capability set is used. Rootless/user-remapped Docker
must validate secret readability separately; this does not bypass user-namespace
or host filesystem restrictions.
Go builder matches Dockerfile; runtime digest is pinned and image-owned
Lua/fakes retained. Startup: ss-server/ss-local → internal listener 1080
(30-second bound) → guarded managed init on fresh state (status on recreation)
→ zapret2 start using target config → one installed managed monitor child. Drift/pending state refuses startup;
no automatic adoption of unknown state. SIGTERM/SIGINT cancels and waits the monitor
before stopping target-local zapret and the entrypoint's Shadowsocks children.
Monitor fatal exits stop the entrypoint; no restart policy hides fail-closed exits.
Monitor probes Player API via owned loopback SOCKS; unresolved GGC is not playback health.
Inside target, zapret-autotune health youtube uses
socks5://127.0.0.1:1080, never the host port. It is one-shot Player API health,
not playback or scheduling.
The supplied remote read-only inspection verified shadowsocks-libev 3.3.5
and ss-server -h supports -c <config_file>; runtime JSON loading remains
unverified. Before deployment acceptance, validate Lua/fakes,
ZAPRET_CONFIG binding and full zapret start/stop/restart with only
the explicit NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SETUID, SETGID, DAC_OVERRIDE capability set (including
the tpws user drop). Prove target-local routing,
NFQUEUE activation/rollback, signal cleanup and persistent recreation on the
new target only. Compose syntax, build and runtime integration are unverified
by this producer. Do not widen capabilities or reuse existing config/network
as a workaround. Autonomous acceptance also needs tests/build and live verification
of monitor/recovery and crash reconciliation, including shutdown grace sufficient
for bounded restoration (which may exceed the defined 45s). Docker configuration
has not been changed by this code integration increment.