Preserve strict v1 semantics and fingerprints; bind v2 typed expectations to a new proof namespace. Reuse bounded shared collection across checks, monitoring, qualification and apply health. Document prefix-only MP4 and deferred public GIF/plugin/runtime boundaries. Co-authored-by: GPT-6 <gpt-6@openai.com>
626 lines
40 KiB
Markdown
626 lines
40 KiB
Markdown
# Resource compatibility planner and isolated qualifier
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## First collector migration (shared-core parity verified; managed acceptance pending)
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Private typed response contracts now select generic GET/HEAD, full decoded image,
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or bounded MP4 range validation inside the existing shared HTTPS transfer core.
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The redundant legacy forwarding wrapper and media boolean are removed; image and
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media adapters retain their measurements and GooglevideoPass DTOs. Generic v1
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status/MIME/byte expectations use the same validation entry, with a distinct
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completed-mismatch result retaining the same measured facts. No public Range config, schema,
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proof importer, registry or dependency was added.
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Injected-wire tests exercise the real generic producer and legacy callers, both
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TLS versions, normalized byte/hash/timing facts, private stdin/pinning, origin,
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redirect, framing, bounds and strict range/ftyp/image decoder rejection. Direct
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core tests ensure strict validation is not an unused legacy-only helper.
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MP4 requests use Range `0-65535` (a 64 KiB upper bound, not an exact response
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size requirement). The core accepts validated 16–65536-byte ranges; the existing
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producer additionally requires at least 1024 measured bytes. Content-Range end
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and total must parse without overflow, with total greater than end; rejected or
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unknown totals cannot produce a media PASS DTO.
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This is collector migration only: public schemas and the legacy YouTube producer
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remain unchanged, including three discovered CDNs, adaptive A/E, warmup then 3/3
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samples on each TLS version, explicit googlevideo.com suffix authorization, fresh
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discovery, and independent qualification of image/avatar assets. The legacy path
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is retained. Generic GET success is never full YouTube qualification.
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Recorded local verification: archived `2149a4a` versus current source passed 86
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parity subcases; 14 new integration cases, 11 focused EUID-0 serial/race tests and
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full Go tests passed (full Go about 55s). Python static/config/startup checks passed;
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the long supervision check timed out at 18s and again at 120s and is unresolved.
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Do not call all tests green or infer a regression from that timeout: entrypoint
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code was unchanged and later full Go entry tests passed. These are prior results,
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not reruns in this docs-only update.
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### Scoped remote shared-core parity (2026-10-15)
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Privileged-read evidence: `/home/agent/core-runtime-parity-45d28e3-20261015/report.md`.
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Exact-source baseline `2149a4a` and current
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`45d28e37330069ddf0efa3120fec8a558d37ba7f` each passed 48 real curl/HTTPS/SOCKS5h
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fixture subtests (24 cases × TLS1.2/1.3). Of the normalized rows, 46 matched and
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two intentionally differed: overflowing Content-Range total, formerly saturated
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by ParseInt, now rejects without a PASS DTO. Known negative classifications are
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preserved; invalid/unknown/overflow totals are not proof.
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Coverage includes GET/HEAD expectations and retained mismatch facts, bounds,
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redirect/framing/trust rejection, real PNG/JPEG/GIF decode and rejection, strict
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206 range/ftyp checks, and stdin/argv/result privacy sentinels. Real 65536-byte
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and 1024-byte media responses passed the same Range request. Each version made
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60 SOCKS5h connections/SNI handshakes and 58 authenticated HTTP requests, including
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18 actual Range requests; two untrusted-certificate attempts stopped before HTTP.
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Original hostname/SNI was retained; curl verified a fresh private fixture CA,
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without TLS bypass. Timing/speed were positive but excluded from exact normalized
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parity hashes; this is not a performance comparison or fatal-reason-tree parity.
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The proxy maps only allowlisted fixture names to a loopback TLS listener: it is
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not an SS proxy or DoH resolver. **NOT RUN:** normal public CLI under owned PID1
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SS/DoH, managed ownership/guard checks and probe orchestration, NFQ/native behavior,
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real YouTube discovery/three-CDN qualification, or candidate/apply/monitor flow.
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No DoH validation or production qualification follows from helper tests. No
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candidate/PASS/DB/JSON proof imports occurred. Helpers exited and joined listeners;
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no owned containers/networks were created. Root-private artifacts, keys, manifests
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and hashes remain retained. Selected foreign identity/running/start facts matched
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before/after, not arbitrary foreign application-data hashes.
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### Public typed checks (v2; remote acceptance pending)
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`resource-check-v2.example.json` adds closed `kind` values `http`, `image` and
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`mp4_range`; omitted v2 kind canonicalizes to `http`. V1 still requires explicit
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`http` and retains its serialization/fingerprints. V2 requires explicit statuses,
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content_type, min_bytes and max_bytes. HTTP retains GET/HEAD semantics; typed
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checks require GET. Image requires exactly [200] and image/png or image/jpeg,
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full decoding, positive dimensions at most 16 MiPixels and a configured body
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ceiling at most 5 MiB. Public GIF/omitted image MIME are deliberately deferred
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until a decoder with an aggregate frame/pixel budget exists; legacy GIF remains.
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MP4 requires exactly [206], video/mp4 or audio/mp4, and 16 <= min <= max <= 65536.
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The core always requests bytes 0-65535, even with a smaller max_bytes; actual
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returned bytes must fit that smaller bound and the validated Content-Range/ftyp.
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This proves a bounded MP4 prefix, **not playback or YouTube qualification**.
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All kinds use configured 100–30000 ms timeouts and byte ceilings, private stdin,
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strict framing/TLS/origin and all-answer DNS policy through the same public check,
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periodic monitor, isolated M=3 qualifier and apply-health path. Wire-valid typed
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semantic failures are complete expectation negatives; unsafe output, malformed
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metrics/framing, cancellation and ownership failures cannot become benign proof.
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V2 source and row HMACs bind version, normalized kind and expectations, so old
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plain-HTTP evidence/state cannot promote typed checks. V1 historical journal
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reconstruction is unchanged. No public proof import or module framework exists.
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Local verification for this v2 slice: full Go tests (`-p 1 -parallel 1`), affected
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resource race tests, vet, CGO-disabled build, four managed-target Python fixtures
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and shell syntax passed. Current and archived `45d28e3` each passed the existing
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86 legacy adapter/generic-mismatch parity subtests. Privileged tests ran as EUID 0
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inside the current user namespace (UID 0 maps to host UID 100000), not host-initial
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root. These are local injected-wire/fixture results, not remote network acceptance.
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Next let the YouTube adapter supply qualified exact endpoints/dynamic inventory into
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the generic registry, preserving fresh discovery and the three-CDN contract.
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Keep measured endpoint proof separate from explicit suffix/adaptive-learning
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authorization: both capabilities are prerequisites to complete managed migration.
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No plugin framework, legacy deletion or full controller/journal/profile migration
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is implied. Full runtime acceptance is pending; avatars and legacy exit78 remain
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unresolved. No production READY claim.
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`plan` remains **proposal-only** and never changes runtime or config.
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Explicit generic startup apply/replay and the per-PID-1 failure latch have passed
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bounded remote acceptance with independent privileged verification (see below).
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This is not automatic recovery, full concurrency acceptance or production READY.
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Explicit isolated qualification temporarily installs an owned NFQ worker and
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queue rules, but never changes legacy SQL groups, renderer or apply journals.
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Monitor HEALTHY, old SQL measurements and public check JSON are not proof.
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Without a completed owned qualification batch, compatibility is UNKNOWN and
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hosts are unassigned. No PASS/evidence import is exposed.
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Commands require root and the existing `managed-test` target settings:
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```
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zapret-autotune strategy-import --strategies /private/strategies.json
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zapret-autotune plan --config /private/resources.json
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zapret-autotune qualify --config /private/resources.json --strategies /private/strategies.json --isolated
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```
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`strategy-import` requires an owned, regular, single-link 0600 file. Only
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definitions are accepted; duplicate keys, unknown fields and evidence fields
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are rejected. Example:
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```json
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{
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"version": 1,
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"strategies": [
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{
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"id": "split-one",
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"args": "--payload=tls_client_hello --lua-desync=multisplit:pos=1",
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"selectors": {"transport":"tcp","ports":"443","l7":"tls","tls":"both"}
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}
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]
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}
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```
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The registry is one immutable batch (1–32 unique IDs). This conservative slice
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accepts only TCP/443/TLS selectors and `tls12`, `tls13`, or `both` policy.
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Argument whitespace is canonicalized; option/Lua stage order is preserved.
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Existing payload/range validation is reused. Lua stages are restricted to
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fake, multisplit, multidisorder, fakeddisorder, split and disorder; parameters
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to pos, repeats, tcp_ts, tcp_flags_set, seqovl and blob=fake_default_tls.
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File/inline Lua, queue/user/fwmark/filter options and arbitrary stages are
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rejected. Acceptance of a definition is **not** runtime verification.
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The private target directory holds `.resource-plan-key` (32 random bytes),
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`.resource-plan-strategies.json` and, when an owned producer exists,
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`.resource-plan-matrix.json`. JSON envelopes have `payload` and an HMAC-SHA256
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`mac`. Each file is write-once, owned, 0600, no-follow, single-link and bounded
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to 64 KiB. Held directory/file identities and exact snapshots are checked;
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foreign entries, replacement inodes and modified bytes are never clobbered or
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silently adopted. Interrupted writes remain blocked for explicit operator
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repair. There is no automatic rotation/update/repair in this slice. The private
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key and same-UID/root boundary must be protected: HMAC is not protection from an
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actor who can read the key and replace the whole target state between processes.
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Matrix v1 binds the registry digest and at most one completed run per candidate.
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Each run binds ID, definition digest (canonical args **and selectors**), keyed
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config fingerprint, start/completion milliseconds, resource/TLS outcomes and
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keyed resource fingerprints. Its attestation records collector/runtime,
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definition digest, composite executable/Lua input hash, installed rules hash,
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actual worker-argv hash, queue and worker PID/start identity, plus
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restored/joined completion. No URLs, headers, resolved IPs, bodies or raw errors
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are persisted. A nonserialized producer seal protects the completed in-memory
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snapshot against mutation before publication. Only the owned producer and
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test-internal fixtures create seals; JSON DTOs cannot authorize publication.
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Every resource/protocol cell records exactly three actual attempts; any nonpass
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in those attempts makes the cell negative (never an average or partial PASS).
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`plan` loads only authenticated private state and the existing resource-config
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snapshot (including resolved environment secrets, DNS/proxy and private headers
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in keyed fingerprints). Every resource on an exact host, across all services
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and input group labels, must have matching complete results for every required
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TLS protocol. Complete failed checks are negative; missing, expired (24 hours),
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future, mismatched or partial checks are unknown. Changed config invalidates old
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run evidence. Malformed/unauthenticated state yields blocked, unassigned output
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and exit 78; valid missing evidence yields unknown output and exit 0.
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Output contains `proposal_only`, `evidence` (authentication status, **not**
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health), per-host `validated`/`negative`/`unknown` candidate alternatives,
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`assignments` and `unassigned`. Compatible equal args/selectors merge coverage
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across input labels. Greedy greatest-uncovered coverage, then lexical candidate
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ID, produces deterministic disjoint exact-host assignments. It does not claim
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global optimality or suffix coverage. Explicit legacy YouTube suffix policy is
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unchanged.
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## INTRUSIVE / ISOLATED startup only
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Set **both** `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_QUALIFY_CONFIG` and
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`ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_STRATEGY_CONFIG` to container paths on a dedicated target.
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Do not send working user traffic to this target's published SOCKS port. This is
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not noninterrupting background search. Provision the private resource and 0600
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strategy files separately; compose forwards paths but does not mount files for
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you. Start with the managed disabled baseline, not an existing active profile.
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Qualification v1 accepts lowercase DNS hostnames, not literal IP targets; the
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ordinary resource-check command's broader literal-IP policy is unchanged.
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PID 1 starts its owned SS+DoH services, initializes/reconciles known state, then
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launches one finite `qualify ... --isolated` session **instead of** starting the
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live zapret daemon or monitor. Qualifier checks root/target namespace, PID 1's
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actual entrypoint/environment, direct-child executable/arguments/session ACK,
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owned SS and DNS readiness anchors. A flag or docker-exec environment alone
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does not authorize qualification. Missing either startup path fails closed.
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Without `--isolated`, `qualify` remains UNKNOWN/exit 78 without runtime changes.
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The shared monitor singleton excludes legacy and generic controllers. Any
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existing NFQ worker/queue, active profile, unknown config/journal or existing
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immutable matrix is refused. Known baseline config/journal/backup/identity
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inodes and bytes remain held unchanged throughout the job. This first producer
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does **not** pause/stop/restart existing active profiles; job-bound maintenance
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rollback is deferred rather than pretending a path-only daemon stop is safe.
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Each candidate uses the existing worker-before-nft/queue-ready lifecycle on
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queue 200, fixed Lua imports and fwmark 0x10000000, plus native
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`--filter-l7=tls`. The actual child executable, argv, parent, start identity,
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queue socket ownership, executable/Lua hashes, native `--version` output 1.0.2
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and installed nft rule bytes are attested before capture and checked again at
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each collector guard. DoH's existing 0x50000000 socket mark bypass remains.
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TLS policy is collector/eligibility policy, not a nonexistent native TLS-version
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filter. All configured protocols are measured; incompatible selector policies
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remain UNKNOWN in the proposal.
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The existing GET/HEAD generic collector preserves TLS origin verification,
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configured body/status/content-type expectations, private stdin and IP pinning.
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Completed expectation failures and typed peer response/TLS/transport negatives
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do not stop the remaining repeats/cells. Guard/source/unknown infrastructure or
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batch cancellation veto the entire batch; no partial positive matrix is saved.
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Config (including resolved environment/header secrets) and strategy-source
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snapshots are checked after DNS/before transfer and before sealing/publication.
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Workers are joined and temporary nft queues removed before verifying unchanged
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disabled baseline/runtime and sealing. The batch has a fixed 15-minute deadline
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with separate bounded cleanup; PID 1 keeps SS+DoH alive through cleanup.
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The bounded 64 KiB matrix size (including its authenticated envelope and
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worst-case field widths) is checked before any worker/nft operation; excessive
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catalogue/resource combinations return UNKNOWN/exit 64 even within individual
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count caps (32 strategies, 64 resources).
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Successful batches, including complete negatives, return the assignment proposal.
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Incomplete/unsafe jobs return UNKNOWN/blocked exit 78 without proof. PID 1 then
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stays safe-idle with SS+DoH for inspection, for either success or blocked
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completion: no qualification retry loop, duplicate controller or automatic
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generic monitor start. Retests require future explicit immutable snapshot
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rotation, not overwriting prior evidence.
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Completed controller cleanup is acknowledged separately from qualification in
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an exclusive, 0600 HMAC-authenticated `qualification-completed.json` on the
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current boot's SS tmpfs. It binds the launched PID, exit outcome (0 or 78) and
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verified cleanup; it is **not** strategy proof. PID 1 checks that ACK against its
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private session launch and revalidates the disabled baseline, singleton,
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SS/DoH ownership and absence of NFQ workers/temporary nft queues before shutting
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down dependencies. Thus TERM after a clean blocked qualifier has exited but
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before its parent reaps it can exit cleanly. Worker/nft/join/restoration failure,
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missing/foreign/mutated ACK or unverified early failure still veto clean shutdown
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with exit 78. Ordinary legacy/generic monitor exit 78 remains a safety veto.
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No unsupported `--filter-mark` or blockcheck embedded/stream/progress/deadline
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flags are used. Background noninterrupting search, active-profile maintenance
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and immutable snapshot rotation for repeated runs remain deferred.
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## Explicit generic transactional startup apply (local implementation)
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On the target with its already completed private qualification batch, unset both
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qualification startup paths and set:
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```
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ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_RESOURCE_CONFIG=/private/resources.json
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ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_RESOURCE_APPLY=1
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ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_STOP_GRACE_PERIOD=90s
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```
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Compose forwards the apply flag and configurable stop grace (legacy default
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remains 240s). Generic PID 1 cleanup has one shared 80-second budget. No external
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manager, new proof importer, SQL frontend surrogate or parallel journal exists.
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PID 1 starts owned SS/DoH, reconciles known bytes, launches the acknowledged
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`managed resource-apply --resource-config FILE` child before the checks-only
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monitor, and starts the native daemon only with verified committed config.
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This is at most one apply launch per PID 1 lifetime. A RAM latch is marked failed
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before launch and succeeds only after child wait=0 and owned-session cleanup.
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Launch/ACK failure, nonzero/signal exit, SS/DoH loss, or incomplete cleanup leaves
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it failed: after authoritative cleanup PID 1 remains cancellably BLOCKED, without
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restarting SS/DoH, native zapret, apply or monitoring, even across former 60s retry
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windows. Cleanup still stops SS/DoH (DNS last); BLOCKED does not keep them alive.
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Successful apply is skipped on later monitor/SS restarts, but every runtime cycle
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still reconciles committed refs before native start. Qualification and legacy
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retry behavior are unchanged.
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**Ceiling:** this is not a durable manual-intent latch. A fresh PID 1 (including
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an external Docker restart policy) resets authorization and, with flag=1, permits
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one new attempt. Operators must disable unattended external restart/recreation
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for this workflow. Set `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_RESOURCE_APPLY=0` for explicit repair-only
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startup: prepared state is reconciled, never promoted or reapplied. Identical
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committed requests still resume by authenticated refs without a new transaction.
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The command refuses standalone/docker-exec callers: actual PID 1 environment,
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entrypoint, namespace, direct-child executable/argv and held launch ACK are
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required, plus the existing controller singleton and no pre-existing NFQ worker.
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First apply supports **disabled baseline → generic**. Explicit PID 1 startup
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selection also permits generic → generic rotation among already verified
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alternatives in the **same immutable authenticated registry/matrix/source**.
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Active legacy profiles, changed source/catalogue/proofs and uninterrupted live
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rotation remain unsupported. Every configured resource must require `both` TLS protocols and
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every assigned exact host must have complete, candidate-bound passing proof for
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all its resources across all input labels. New apply requires completion within
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24 hours, never in the future. Negative/unknown/unassigned hosts cannot authorize
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apply. Registry definitions may still describe single-TLS proposals, but native
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apply rejects them instead of widening unsupported TLS-version selectors.
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Canonical ordered args/selectors define profiles separated by `--new`; each
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contains `--filter-tcp=443 --filter-l7=tls --hostlist-domains=^a,^b`. Exact-host
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semantics use the pinned native source
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`https://raw.githubusercontent.com/bol-van/zapret2/4df94497869e18ed4fdf1272141427b2fbfc6604/nfq2/hostlist.c`:
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inline `AppendHostlistItem` uses `addpool`, leading `^` sets
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`HOSTLIST_POOL_FLAG_STRICT_MATCH`, and `SearchHostList` rejects suffix fallback
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when that flag is set and `!bHostFull`. Existing YouTube suffix policy is unchanged.
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The packaged executable/Lua hash must match private attestation; held native,
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Lua, source, marker and proof identities/bytes are guarded through the transaction.
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No active queue version probe or mark/filter change is made (DoH500/probe100/live400).
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The **existing** journal gains v4 independently tagged committed/pending refs
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(`baseline`, `legacy`, `generic`). Generic refs exclude legacy IDs/scopes and bind
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exact authenticated registry/matrix envelope hashes, source fingerprint,
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internally derived canonical assignment digest and complete config hash.
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Optional scalar `strategy_ids` retains the canonical selection policy on each
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generic ref; missing/empty means the original default greedy policy. No policy
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is permitted on baseline/legacy refs. This remains v4: older strict-decoding
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engines reject the new field, so downgrade is blocked, not silently reinterpreted.
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Unknown versions/tags, mixed refs and unresolved historical reconstruction block
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without adopting or erasing foreign state; v1–v3 legacy behavior remains.
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Staging/backup/prepared/replace/fixed restart/health/commit reuse the same engine.
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All required resources/TLS are checked through the existing synchronous owned
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SS/DoH collector (all-answer SSRF validation, CONNECT pin, SNI/cert validation,
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private stdin). No Player API health or public check JSON authorizes commit.
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Committed identical requests are idempotent: historical proof expiry alone does
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not trigger reload, reapply or rejection on restart. Authenticated integrity,
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source and native drift still block. Prepared recovery **never** promotes pending
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bytes, including after successful health: it restores prior bytes and reloads.
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Generic rollback additionally checks all resources before finalizing the journal.
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**Strict first-slice ceiling:** a DPI-broken disabled baseline can legitimately
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fail these checks; restored bytes then remain `prepared`/BLOCKED until operator
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repair. Physical restoration is not falsely reported as healthy rollback.
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Legacy rollback has no new health requirement. Cancellation joins synchronous
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checks before rollback; PID 1 bounds the owned session and retains prepared state
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on unsafe/unfinished cleanup. `ActiveCandidates` refuses generic deployments;
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managed/resource status validates generic refs without inventing legacy groups.
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### Explicit startup selection (implemented; bounded positive field observations)
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Set `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_RESOURCE_STRATEGY_IDS=s1,s2` with
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`ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_RESOURCE_CONFIG` and `ZAPRET_AUTOTUNE_RESOURCE_APPLY=1` on a
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fresh container PID 1. Empty retains default greedy selection. The bounded list
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accepts at most 32 unique registry IDs, canonicalized in lexical order; malformed,
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duplicate, unknown or incomplete-coverage requests cannot authorize a transaction.
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Eligibility is filtered **before** equal-args/selectors coverage merging; excluded
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candidates cannot lend proof to a selected profile. Compatibility evidence and
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all alternatives remain visible; the policy is not proof or a new qualification.
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No registry/matrix files are written by rotation. Exact hosts, both TLS versions,
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all required cells/M=3, native/source integrity and the 24-hour freshness gate
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remain required for every new selection. Identical committed selection replays
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without reload even after expiry. Distinct redundant allowlists are distinct
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policies and may create a transaction even if rendered bytes coincide.
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PID 1 forwards the setting in environment only; the apply child authenticates it
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against PID 1's original environment, not CLI arguments. Syntax is validated
|
||
even with APPLY=0; nonempty policy requires generic resource config. With APPLY=0
|
||
selection is ignored for reconciliation/monitoring (registry membership is not
|
||
resolved): committed and pending refs reconstruct independently from their own
|
||
stored policies and historical completion horizon, never the requested setting.
|
||
Prepared recovery restores the old generic bytes **and policy**, never promotes
|
||
the pending side; failed rollback health retains prepared state for repair.
|
||
Startup still allows just one attempt per PID 1; external restart policies reset
|
||
that authorization. There is no monitor autotuning, new qualification, proof
|
||
import, snapshot overwrite or uninterrupted maintenance in this slice.
|
||
|
||
Local root fixture tests cover the production snapshot factory and shared engine;
|
||
independent local review and deterministic 180-second retry-window fixtures passed.
|
||
The earlier bounded baseline gates below cover guarded apply/replay, strict rollback,
|
||
prepared repair and the per-PID-1 failure latch; they do not establish rotation fault
|
||
acceptance or authorize live rollout.
|
||
|
||
### Verified-profile rotation observations — source `8d43dd9`
|
||
|
||
**Positive field observations only; partial native acceptance, not full rotation
|
||
safety acceptance or READY.** Saved-artifact privileged audits observed default A
|
||
generation 1 → selected multisplit B generation 2 → identical B replay generation 2
|
||
→ A return generation 3. No repeat positive sequence is required for the next gate.
|
||
|
||
- A config SHA-256 was `27f9a8ffd56a4c19d4bd522dd9f5a5e8b49b18b0ae48d41431ef9b22975ea772`;
|
||
B was `51faacf53e76fa0ce95fead1f02da3846c1706ecb9edc8ddaba095c089ea2c82`.
|
||
Replay retained transaction `09dfd03e9741abdf8e6b9f3bd44b2118`; A return used
|
||
`49a29d560f086a11f9de770913777e07` and restored the exact original A bytes.
|
||
Historical prepared snapshots held actual old-A backup before B and actual old-B
|
||
backup before A. Sampled old-committed → prepared → new-committed transitions
|
||
demonstrate these observations, not crash safety or failed-rotation rollback.
|
||
- Fourteen saved registry/matrix snapshots passed exact-payload HMAC and byte
|
||
invariance checks; source fingerprint was unchanged. The two original runs,
|
||
16 M=3 cells and 48 prior both-TLS qualification transfers were reused, about
|
||
12 hours old at startup, **not requalified**. Native A/B argument hashes differed;
|
||
A return matched original A, with native queue 300 socket-inode/PID linkage
|
||
observed. Early A-return process inventory is missing; full phase-path native
|
||
argv acceptance is not established.
|
||
- Six authenticated monitor snapshots each showed four HEALTHY resources and zero
|
||
failures. Saved fixture records showed 64 successful GETs, TLS 32/32, matching
|
||
SNI/Host and expected-header presence; A return contributed 32, TLS 16/16.
|
||
This proves fixture compatibility, **not causal DPI benefit** or continuously live
|
||
change. Original A-return official stop exited 0; fixture stop exited 2, not an
|
||
observed product failure in this run.
|
||
- Evidence base: `/home/agent/rotation-8d43dd9/field-private/` (root-private).
|
||
`report.safe.json` covers only generations 1/2/2, not final completion. Generation
|
||
3 is supported separately by `a-return-timeline.private.json`, retained state and
|
||
`final-passive-evidence/{before,stopped}/` snapshots. The initial harness ended
|
||
with KeyboardInterrupt; two continuation-construction bugs and observer filename
|
||
alias corrections are disclosed in `harness-path-alias.safe.json`. Corrections
|
||
affected host observer artifacts only, not proof inputs.
|
||
- Final saved cleanup verification is
|
||
`final-passive-evidence/final-cleanup-verification.safe.json`, timestamp
|
||
`1792051407108`: both exact owned stage containers and the owned network absent,
|
||
eight recorded PID paths absent, both known network namespaces without PIDs,
|
||
and three foreign full-inspect hashes unchanged. Owned containers/network were
|
||
explicitly removed with orchestrator approval; private state/evidence/keys were
|
||
retained. Foreign SS remained running and the two older containers unchanged.
|
||
Xray was not mutated; no fresh Xray inventory or exhaustive process audit is claimed.
|
||
- The first independent forensic audit passed the bounded 14-HMAC positive evidence,
|
||
but the automated grader rejected missing independently refreshed dated evidence
|
||
and exact native argv phase paths. Do not upgrade this to full native/safety
|
||
acceptance. Unknown-ID refusal and old-profile fault/repair observations were
|
||
subsequently recorded below, with narrower attribution than a branch-specific
|
||
refusal proof. Crash safety remains untested. Natural 24-hour expiry remains
|
||
unit-only, without a 24-hour wait.
|
||
- Prior local verification recorded 17 EUID-0 fixtures in one race/parallel pass
|
||
with 57 subrecords; namespace UID 0 mapped to host UID 100000, not host-initial
|
||
root. Full producer Go/race and four Python checks passed serially after parallel
|
||
resource-contention failures; this does not establish a contention-free baseline.
|
||
These are prior checks, not tests rerun for this documentation-only update.
|
||
|
||
### Subsequent old-generic rotation faults (bounded saved-artifact acceptance)
|
||
|
||
Actual remote source was `8d43dd9`, **not** shared-core `45d28e3`; these separate
|
||
results do not establish end-to-end acceptance of a combined release. Privileged
|
||
reads verified `/home/agent/rotation-fault-8d43dd9/field-private/ACCEPTANCE.safe.md`
|
||
and `standaloneprivilegedaudit.safe.json`, dated `1792054235151`
|
||
(2026-10-15 08:50:35.151 UTC), verdict
|
||
`PASS_BOUNDED_SAVED_ARTIFACTS_AND_CURRENT_CLEANUP`.
|
||
|
||
- All 13 snapshots passed exact-serialized-payload HMAC/immutable proof checks.
|
||
Old A is generic with empty/default policy, not baseline; B selects multisplit.
|
||
Historical old/new refs reconstruct independently.
|
||
- One-shot: eight B apply checks (one HTTP500), eight successful A rollback checks,
|
||
A committed/pending clear, no automatic reapply through 80s; official stop0.
|
||
- Persistent: 24 checks across apply/rollback/cleanup reconciliation, three
|
||
HTTP500; A bytes physically restored with PREPARED old-A/pending-B retained,
|
||
no reapply through 80s; stop78 retained the unsafe-cleanup latch. Healthy fixture
|
||
plus only APPLY=1→0 (requested B still set) gave eight reconcile + eight monitor
|
||
successes, old A committed/pending clear and four HEALTHY resources; stop0.
|
||
- Total: 56 authenticated requests, TLS28/28, four controlled HTTP500. At the
|
||
dated audit all 150 recorded owned PID/start identities were gone, recorded netns
|
||
had no processes, five owned containers and network were removed, and three
|
||
foreign raw-inspect hashes were unchanged. Root-private evidence was retained;
|
||
sampled identities are not an exhaustive all-helper inventory.
|
||
- Valid-syntax `unknown-safe-id` reached the actual CLI apply entry, which exited
|
||
78 and latched BLOCKED, with zero requests. Before/stopped config, journal,
|
||
backup and proof bytes were unchanged; no staging was sampled. This is an
|
||
**observed refusal with an unknown-ID request**, not uniquely attributed to the
|
||
unknown-ID branch: the generic diagnostic cannot exclude another trust error.
|
||
Source validation order supports an inference, not a specific logged reason
|
||
or complete pre-mutation proof. Official stop0 is separate from CLI exit78.
|
||
|
||
Startup remains one-shot per PID1, without automatic apply retry. These fixture
|
||
faults do not establish crash/cancellation safety, continuously live rotation,
|
||
causal DPI benefit or READY. Next migration work is the minimal typed generic
|
||
image/media capability above; owned managed runtime acceptance remains pending.
|
||
New-batch/versioned stores, uninterrupted rotation, strategy breadth and Prometheus
|
||
are separate future work, not prerequisites to documenting this collector slice.
|
||
|
||
## Bounded generic apply/replay and failure-latch acceptance
|
||
|
||
**DONE within the stated bounds**, not full generic autotuning or service READY.
|
||
Fault acceptance used source `643d0c6`; the earlier healthy committed replay used
|
||
`36aace0` after the atomic launch-ACK correction. Independent privileged audit
|
||
returned `PASS_BOUNDED_GENERIC_APPLY_FAULTS` for the observed A/B/C safety gates.
|
||
Root-private evidence references (no private payloads reproduced here):
|
||
|
||
- `/home/agent/generic-latch-643d0c6/field-private/field-report.md`
|
||
- `/home/agent/generic-latch-643d0c6/field-private/independent-audit.safe.json`
|
||
- `/home/agent/ack-recreate-36aace0/field-private/field-report.md`
|
||
|
||
### Observed acceptance
|
||
|
||
- Real apply health reused authentic, still-fresh qualification: 16 M=3 cells,
|
||
48 prior TLS transfers, two strategies and four resources. No new qualification,
|
||
timestamp rewrite, fake ACK or imported proof was used. Pinned native 1.0.2/Lua
|
||
stayed unchanged. The earlier healthy start/recreate each made eight TLS checks
|
||
with four authenticated HEALTHY resources; v4 committed generation 1, refs,
|
||
config and proof bytes remained unchanged. Both official stops exited 0.
|
||
- **A — one HTTP 500:** eight apply plus eight rollback requests, one 500 total.
|
||
Rollback committed prior baseline generation 1 and cleared pending. Request
|
||
count, journal and config stayed frozen at 45.096/90.084/135.124 seconds;
|
||
one apply only, no automatic retry. PID 1 stayed alive/BLOCKED with SS/DNS and
|
||
other owned runtime stopped. Official stop exited 0.
|
||
- **B — persistent HTTP 500:** 24 requests and three 500s: eight apply, eight
|
||
rollback and eight cleanup-reconcile checks, not a second apply. Prior baseline
|
||
bytes were physically restored, but failed health retained PREPARED committed
|
||
baseline/pending generic refs. State stayed unchanged for 80.097 seconds with
|
||
no reapply; official stop exited 78. After repairing only fixture behavior and
|
||
changing startup APPLY=1 to APPLY=0, the same state/source/environment completed
|
||
eight reconcile and eight monitor checks. Baseline became committed, pending
|
||
cleared, and generic was never promoted; official stop exited 0.
|
||
- **C — TERM during a real slow request:** one canceled request plus eight passing
|
||
rollback checks. The canceled curl was joined before the first rollback request;
|
||
baseline generation 1 committed and pending cleared, with no false generic
|
||
commit. Actual PID 1 exit was **78**, with `monitor cleanup status 78`, not 0.
|
||
Apply health cancellation is collapsed into `errPlan`/CLI 78; outside the
|
||
qualification-specific completion path, the supervisor accepts only 0/143 and
|
||
retains a sticky failure even after verified rollback. This is conservative
|
||
**outcome conflation**, not an observed rollback-health failure or cleanup
|
||
defect. Do not blanket-allow 78 or manufacture a completion ACK. A normal-0
|
||
path would require authenticated completion plus fresh guards; that optional
|
||
future refinement is not a blocker for this bounded P0 safety slice.
|
||
|
||
### Bounds and remaining work
|
||
|
||
- A/B/repair/C totalled 65 actual HTTPS requests. All 171 observed owned PID/start
|
||
identities disappeared, owned netns were empty, and owned targets/network were
|
||
removed. Foreign SS/container full-inspect hashes stayed unchanged. Passive
|
||
100ms inventories do not cover every shorter-lived helper; no exhaustive argv
|
||
or packet-level privacy audit is claimed. Same-root HMAC-key mutation is outside
|
||
the trust boundary.
|
||
- The latch is one RAM authorization per PID 1, **not durable manual intent**.
|
||
Fresh startup/external restart policy reauthorizes ENV=1; keep unattended
|
||
external restart/recreation disabled. ENV=0 repairs/reconciles only. Historical
|
||
committed replay/repair allows proof expiry; a new apply still requires fresh,
|
||
complete source-bound qualification within 24 hours. Natural remote 24-hour
|
||
expiry remains unit-covered only; remote qualifier singleton conflict is still
|
||
untested.
|
||
- Use an execution-free remote harness: stage inputs before startup; no target
|
||
`exec`, `cp` or `nsenter` during active guards. Observe host metadata/private
|
||
files and Docker logs/inspect; official stop is the cancellation operation.
|
||
Earlier scan EACCES nonrecurrence does not establish its cause.
|
||
- No production READY, causal DPI benefit, active-profile maintenance, plan or
|
||
snapshot rotation, automatic recovery or monitor autotuning is accepted here.
|
||
Next roadmap work is the missing rotation fault/repair gate above, then dynamic
|
||
profile/plan rotation and compatible selectors,
|
||
generic resource tuning and bounded strategy-DB collections; bounded-ID
|
||
Prometheus remains a separate planned function. No new framework, probes or
|
||
native/live upgrade was introduced. Legacy YouTube exit 78 and unfinished
|
||
images/avatars remain NOT READY.
|
||
|
||
## Bounded remote acceptance — source `5cdc0cd`
|
||
|
||
The isolated producer/registry/matrix/planner slice is **bounded-qualified**.
|
||
Independent privileged evidence audits passed the observed positive, fault and
|
||
active-state refusal gates. **Full remote concurrency acceptance is PARTIAL**;
|
||
this is not generic apply, active-profile maintenance or service READY.
|
||
|
||
Root-private proof references (retained reports, not logs copied into this doc):
|
||
|
||
- `/home/agent/zapret2-autotune-matrix-5cdc0cd/execution-free-private/execution-free-report.md`
|
||
- `/home/agent/zapret2-autotune-matrix-5cdc0cd/fault-final-private/qualification-fault-report.md`
|
||
- `/home/agent/zapret2-autotune-matrix-5cdc0cd/refusal-gap-private/remaining-refusal-reports.md`
|
||
|
||
### Observed positive and fault gates
|
||
|
||
- The execution-free private batch made 60 actual transfers: two candidates,
|
||
five resources, both TLS protocols, three attempts per cell. Its 20 aggregated
|
||
cells contain 16 PASS and four `expectation_failed`: mandatory resource d's
|
||
HTTP 500 fails for both candidates/protocols, leaving d unassigned. Exact
|
||
hosts a/b/c receive the greedy multidisorder proposal with authentic multisplit
|
||
alternatives. Input groups remain metadata, not assignment boundaries;
|
||
there is no generic suffix coverage or automatic apply.
|
||
- Independent verification authenticated the exact stored payload HMAC, not a
|
||
reserialized JSON equivalent. Distinct native arguments/worker-argv hashes,
|
||
executable/Lua/rules evidence, queue 200 and NFQ 1.0.2 attestations bind the
|
||
two joined/restored runs. Disabled baseline bytes stayed unchanged; sampled
|
||
workers, queue and temporary NFT rules were gone. Official PID 1 shutdown
|
||
exited 0 in 1.31s; foreign inspect hashes stayed unchanged.
|
||
- Mid-batch cancellation and effective semantic config drift each stopped
|
||
after two requests, published no matrix and preserved the native baseline.
|
||
Official PID 1 exits were 0 in 2.46s and 0.44s respectively; the deliberately
|
||
changed config source was retained, not silently rolled back.
|
||
- Unsafe Lua/queue/fwmark/user/file definitions and evidence/schema imports
|
||
were rejected without transfers. Oversized capacity was rejected before
|
||
worker launch; unauthorized isolated startup was refused. Corrupt MAC blocked
|
||
planning while preserving payload bytes; changed effective config produced
|
||
unknown/unassigned output without changing the original authenticated matrix.
|
||
Immutable catalogue replacement and completed-matrix retest were refused
|
||
without transfers or overwriting original state.
|
||
- A genuine archived v3 committed journal with two candidates passed official
|
||
`reconcile`/`ActiveCandidates` validation before qualification refused active
|
||
profile state. Profile/config, journal, last-good and target identity remained
|
||
byte-identical; zero transfers/workers and no matrix. Actual PID 1 exit 78 was
|
||
an expected early preflight refusal, **not** an exit-0 cleanup ACK. This did
|
||
not activate or maintain a running active-profile NFQ daemon; that remains
|
||
unsupported. Whole-DB byte preservation is not claimed.
|
||
|
||
### Explicit limits and testing lesson
|
||
|
||
- Remote qualifier singleton conflict is **NOT RUN**. The earlier planted-lock
|
||
fixture failed initialization before that branch and does not count. The
|
||
shared-lock unit second-acquire `EWOULDBLOCK` check passed, but is not remote
|
||
qualifier concurrency acceptance. No deterministic official lifecycle seam
|
||
exists for this bounded test; no test framework or racy injection was added.
|
||
- Natural 24-hour remote expiry is **NOT RUN**. The existing unit check rejects
|
||
a structurally valid 25-hour-old proof; this is not observed remote expiry.
|
||
- Privacy sentinel absence was checked in tested logs/state and sampled fault/
|
||
refusal argv. Positive active argv and exhaustive DNS packet-level privacy
|
||
were not proved. Configured/observed encrypted DNS is not exhaustive proof
|
||
against transient fallback.
|
||
- Compatibility on this baseline is not causal DPI-desync benefit. Historical
|
||
worker-scan EACCES origin remains unknown; nonrecurrence in the execution-free
|
||
batch does not identify its cause. Earlier harness failures remain recorded
|
||
in the referenced reports, not erased or relabeled as product acceptance.
|
||
- Stage all inputs before target startup. From startup through qualification
|
||
completion, prohibit target `exec`, `cp` and `nsenter` (even passive exec starts
|
||
a process). Observe host `/proc` metadata and Docker logs/inspect only; inspect
|
||
runtime and run `plan` after finalization/cleanup. The explicit official stop
|
||
used for cancellation is the documented exception, not an observer exec.
|
||
- Owned test containers/network were removed and private evidence retained.
|
||
Foreign SS1080 stayed running and legacy11082 stayed stopped with exit 78.
|
||
No live upgrade or push occurred; unresolved legacy exit 78, YouTube/image
|
||
readiness, transactional generic apply/profile-journal migration, immutable
|
||
rotation and noninterrupting search remain outside this producer acceptance;
|
||
the later bounded apply/replay gates are recorded separately above.
|